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Executive summary 
1. The terms of reference of this study are wide-ranging. Within the scope of this study it has 
only been possible to do a broad-brush presentation that might function as a point of 
departure for possible follow-up studies.  
2. The Nordic countries are often praised for their efforts in development assistance and 
commended for their generosity. Over the last few decades the Nordic countries have 
consistently been the most generous donors in relative terms. Their aid levels have been 
well above the UN target of 0.7 % of Gross National Income and comfortably above the 
average of the members of the Development Assistance Committee. 
3. Finland has traditionally been the “odd man out” among the four. It has generally not 
managed to match the Scandinavian “frontrunners”, except in the “heyday” of Finnish aid 
in the 1980s. In 1991 the Finnish aid level peaked at 0.80 % of GNI. Finland has never 
managed to reach that level again. 
4. Despite regular changes in Nordic aid policies it is continuity that is the salient feature. 
5. Donor interests are often linked to domestic private interests, or security or geo-political 
interests. The Nordic countries are often referred to as a group of donors that are hardly 
driven by such considerations, instead being motivated mainly by altruism and the needs of 
the recipients. In addition, their development assistance has been a prolongation of the 
social democratic project – a means of selling their social model. 
6. However, both in Finland and Denmark private interests have to a greater extent had an 
impact on and been a more important motivation for their aid programmes than has 
generally been the case in Norway and Sweden.  
7. An interesting trend that becomes more visible in the 1990s in all the Nordic countries is 
the emphasis on compatibility and interdependency between donor interests and recipient 
needs. In contrast to earlier periods where donors’ interests were defined more narrowly, 
poverty reduction is today viewed as part of a global strategy to achieve a more just and 
secure world.  
8. Besides government and parliament, the most important actors in Nordic development 
assistance are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies. In Norway and Sweden 
the Development Directorates also have a key role. Other important actors and stakeholders 
are NGOs and the private sector. 
9. There have been and still are general annual debates in the Nordic parliaments about 
development assistance. Still it seems justified to argue that the parliamentarian influences 
has in practice been limited, at least according to studies of the Danish and Norwegian 
cases. Most of the policy papers – which are often vaguely defined and based on 
compromises - are often only rubberstamped by the parliamentarians. Despite a few notable 
exceptions Nordic aid is marked by broad parliamentary support, even if there have been 
major shifts in its implementation. At least in Scandinavia, a broad majority of the 
parliamentarians have found it expedient to maintain a high level of aid because this has 
become an important and integrated part of their international image. In Finland the 
situation is different.  
10. Despite periods of decline, the volume of Scandinavian aid has seldom been seriously 
challenged. The aid budget has more or less been a protected item in the preparation of the 
national budgets of the Nordic countries, making development assistance resistant to both 
economic and political challenges. A definite decency limit is the UN target. This limit does 
not seem to exist in Finland, which may explain why Finland has not managed to reach the 
UN target again after the peak in 1991.  
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11. Even if researchers are arguing that there has been an increasing commercialisation of 
Danish aid in particular, the business sector does not constitute a group that is seriously 
challenging official aid policy.  
12. The NGOs are very important actors in Nordic development assistance as they receive a 
large share of official aid. Currently all the sources employed for this study suggest that the 
NGOs, generally speaking, largely act as strong supporters of the official aid policies rather 
than as correctives.  
13. The Nordic donors have many common characteristics compared to the DAC average. 
Traditionally, they have disbursed a larger share of their aid through multilateral channels 
than the average donor country. Currently, it is only Denmark and Finland that disburse a 
considerably higher share of their aid multilaterally. All the Nordics have a strong 
preference for the UN agencies relative to other multilateral organisations. Most of their 
allocable bilateral aid is channelled to Africa, even though it is in Asia that Nordic business 
interests are more active. More than other countries, the Nordics are in practice giving 
priority to the poorest countries and those with the best human rights records. Generally 
speaking, during the past decade the Nordic countries with the exception of Denmark have 
disbursed a gradually larger share of their aid to health, education, good governance, and 
civil society. Despite the fact that all of the Nordic countries attach great importance to 
private sector development Denmark is in reality the only country among the four that 
through its sector support strongly emphasises economic infrastructure.  
14. The Millennium declaration of September 2000, the International Conference on Financing 
for Development in Monterrey and the Johannesburg World Summit in 2002, the Roma 
declaration of 2003, and the Paris Declaration of March 2005 were among several events 
that spurred an ongoing process of rethinking the whole relationship between the developed 
countries in the north and the developing countries in the south.  
15. However, as early as in 1977 a Swedish parliamentary commission on development co-
operation suggested a more coherent Swedish aid policy. During the 1990s, also the other 
Nordic countries produced White Papers and strategies on aid that put an emphasis on 
coherence. For example, in 1996 the Norwegian parliament agreed that development aid 
must be addressed in a broader North-South context. While coherence has been a policy 
objective of the Nordic countries for some time, the issue has been put higher on their 
political agendas in the course of the last few years, strongly spurred by above mentioned 
international events.  
16. In this context, coherence has two broad meanings. Firstly, it means that the aid policy of a 
donor must be consistent. The second meaning of the concept refers to a kind of coherence 
that embraces all policy areas of the donor country that may have an impact on the partner 
country.  
17. Despite the Nordics’ strong emphasis on coherence, so far only Sweden has developed a 
special policy document on the subject. Sweden has by far the most ambitious approach to 
coherence. Its work has been characterised as pioneering.  
18. A majority of the informants claim that work on coherence has stranded at the policy level. 
It has not reached the stage of operationalisation, they assert. Of course, implementing 
coherence is a long-term process and not something that is likely to happen over night. 
Within all the Nordic countries, though, there seem to be strong personalities striving to 
move this agenda further. 
19. How has policy coherence for development been received in the Nordic countries? The 
agenda is very ambitious and may lead to opposition from affected domestic groups and 
from government departments and ministries whose primary responsibility is not 
necessarily that of poverty reduction. So far, based on interviews with aid bureaucrats in the 
Nordic countries, there is reportedly little resistance towards the new way of thinking, even 
if not every key stakeholder is equally enthusiastic. All the Nordic countries apparently 
acknowledge that there are some areas that will be difficult, not to say impossible, to make 
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coherent. This will, for example, involve measures that may threaten the jobs of Nordic 
workers.  
20. Even if not all the major DAC members are convinced, internationally there is a growing 
recognition that moving towards more sector programmes in general and budget support in 
particular at the expense of project aid will make aid more effective and produce better 
results. All the Nordic countries have in recent policy documents given strong support to 
this view. In light of their strong political declarations, their actual achievements are rather 
modest. 
21. Issues such as alignment and harmonisation are far less controversial than budget support 
and have generally been broadly backed in the Nordic countries, even if budget support al 
the same is a key instrument for alignment and harmonisation. In all of the Nordic countries 
the modes and ways of dealing with aid are in the process of undergoing substantial 
changes, both in terms of how they organise their activities and how aid is delivered. At the 
same time, bureaucrats within all the Nordic countries fear the huge knowledge gap that 
exists with regard to the new aid modalities, both among the public and among politicians. 
22. Tanzania is one of the Nordic partner countries in which harmonisation, alignment, and the 
use of new aid modalities has come the furthest. It is therefore an interesting case in which 
to investigate how the Nordics have responded to the changes in the aid regime. 
23. Informants at all the Nordic embassies report having especially cordial and trusting 
relations with Tanzanian authorities. One reason for the good relationship between 
Tanzania and the Nordic countries is that they were among the first donors in Tanzania, and 
also that they have been there throughout. 
24. Aid makes up approximately 45% of the Tanzanian budget. The Tanzanian government has 
stated that general budget support (GBS) is the preferred aid modality. How have the 
Nordic donors responded to this request?  
25. According to embassy staff 18% of Danish aid to Tanzania is allocated as GBS, despite the 
general scepticism to this aid modality at the political level in Denmark. Currently, Finland 
allocates 10-15% of its bilateral aid to Tanzania as GBS; 25% through sector initiatives, and 
the rest as project aid. Currently, Norwegian aid to Tanzania is evenly divided among the 
categories: project aid, sector support, and general budget support. GBS makes up 20% of 
total Swedish bilateral aid to Tanzania. With the transition from project to programme aid, 
embassy staff has experienced a marked strengthening of the dialogue and coordination 
with other donors. 
26. The issue of coherence appears rather abstract to both personnel in the field or aid 
bureaucrats that are involved in country operations at headquarters. In practice it is still an 
issue that only concerns them to a small extent, which also is illustrated in our case-study of 
Tanzania. 
27. Previously, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a strong degree of coordination 
and a special feeling of companionship among Nordic aid officials and agencies in 
Tanzania. The Nordic countries no longer function as a useful sub-group, nor are the 
Nordics regarded as a clique by the rest of the donor community in Tanzania. 
28. Despite many similarities among the Nordics there are also differences. Most significantly, 
Denmark is more focused on being able to link technical sector involvement and finance 
than the other Nordic donors. They are also less in favour of silent partnerships, and feel 
that Norway and Sweden are moving too fast on GBS. In contrast, Norway and Sweden are 
very closely aligned both on harmonisation and the new aid modalities, and cooperate 
extensively to achieve increased efficiency. As Finland has not yet decentralised authority 
to its embassy in Tanzania, it is slower to move on new initiatives than the other Nordics. 
  x 
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“A tradition of leadership in development co-operation”1 (Sweden) 
 “Norway is setting an example for the DAC”2 
“Maintaining the momentum of development co-operation leadership”3(Denmark) 
“Keeping up with other Nordic countries and enhancing Nordic co-operation is an important 
underlying theme for Finland”4 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The research topic: Nordic exceptionalism in development assistance? 
The Nordic countries are often praised for their efforts in development assistance and commended 
for their generosity. Over the last few decades the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have 
consistently been among the most generous donors. They have not always been so generous. When 
they first involved themselves in aid in the 1950s and 1960s, their efforts were meagre. Their 
dramatic increase in aid started in the 1970s. Until recently, the Nordic countries have competed 
amongst themselves for the position of most generous donor. Their aid levels have been well above 
the United Nations (UN) target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) and comfortably above the 
average of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). However, the Nordic 
countries are not only praised for their munificence. Nordic development assistance also has a good 
reputation for being less tied to narrow economic or strategic interests than has been the case for 
many other donors (Stokke 1989). This is also reflected by the fact that they have been channelling 
a large share of their Official Development Assistance (ODA) as multilateral aid. All their ODA is 
essentially disbursed as grants. Moreover, the Nordic countries in general and Sweden in particular 
have a reputation for being innovative and flexible donors, willing to adapt their aid policies to the 
very best practices at hand. 
Finland has traditionally been the “odd man out” among the four. It has generally not 
managed to match the Scandinavian5 “frontrunners”, except in the “heyday” of Finnish aid in the 
1980s (Koponen 2005). In 1991 the Finnish aid level peaked at 0.80 % of its GNI. Finland has 
never managed to reach that level again, but strives to match the Scandinavian countries and has 
declared that the UN target shall be reached by 2010 (OECD 2003: 12).  
Even if Finland has not matched the other Scandinavians in terms of aid volume, the 
Nordics still share many common characteristics. Despite regular changes in their aid policies it is 
continuity that is the salient feature. Moreover, compared to the DAC average their aid has 
generally been more poverty oriented in the sense that a larger share has been channelled to the 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The Nordic countries have a strong Africa focus in their aid. 
They have disbursed the majority of their allocable bilateral aid there, despite the fact that they have 
few historical ties and weak commercial links with Africa. Donors are often criticised for not living 
up to their aid commitments. Nordic countries have a reputation for honouring their commitments. 
Another salient feature of these four countries is that public support for aid has been high even in 
times of economic recession. How can this be? To many outsiders it may appear puzzling. Anybody 
                                                     
1 OECD 2005: 11. 
2 OECD 2005: 10.  
3 OECD 2003: 11. 
4 OECD 2003: 17.  
5 Scandinavia consists of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, while the Nordic countries comprise of Iceland and 
Finland in addition to the Scandinavian countries. For the sake of simplicity, in this report the phrase “the 
Nordic countries” refers to Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark if nothing else is specified. 
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within the realist tradition would probably immediately call for hidden agendas. From a “small 
state” perspective it seems rational for small and vulnerable states with open economies to opt for 
strong multilateral organisations and poverty alleviation as part of their extended security 
considerations (Donnelly 1993). The small state argument may provide some explanation. The fact 
that all four countries are among the wealthiest in the world, and can thus afford to go “soft”, may 
also be part of the explanation. Nevertheless, not all small, rich states are as generous as the Nordic 
ones.     
This study aims to understand and explain the Nordic countries’ aid policies and practices. 
What is it that makes them more generous and seemingly less selfish than most other donor 
countries? What is the explanation for what may be termed a kind of Nordic exceptionalism in 
development assistance? Aid policy declarations and highly aggregated outcomes do not necessarily 
tell us much about what is going on at the operational level. How do the Nordic countries actually 
operate? Are they so much more altruistic than most other donors? Doing a comprehensive analysis 
is beyond the scope of this project. Here, the focus will be to elaborate on the main underpinnings 
of their aid policies, how they are shaped and how they have transformed into practice at the more 
general level. The study will focus on recent and current developments, but will also briefly give an 
outline of the historical background. We will also present a short field report from the Nordic 
countries’ operations in Tanzania, which will provide some insights into their operations at the 
country level. This is important because all four countries have given such strong emphasis to 
decentralisation in their aid operations. We have chosen Tanzania since it has been among the most 
important recipients – if not the most important recipient of Nordic aid. It should be underscored 
that an assessment of whether their aid efforts are more efficient than those of other donors is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Elaboration of the research topic: Understanding Nordic development 
assistance 
During the last decade, at least at the level of political rhetoric, there have been a gradual 
convergence and a process towards increasing consensus in the international aid community 
(Selbervik 2003). In the 1980s clear fronts existed between liberalist views associated with the 
World Bank, the USA and the UK among others and more state-centred views associated with the 
UN and, for example, the Nordic countries. Currently, “all” major donors are seemingly gathered 
under the same banner and adhere to the same rhetoric (Selbervik 2003). All the DAC countries 
now talk about poverty reduction, coherence, harmonisation, partnership and ownership. In this 
study we will look at how the Nordic countries have adjusted to the new aid discourse and the new 
aid modalities. 
However, whether the seeming consensus is more than a rhetorical shift is beyond the scope 
of this study. Whether it is the “rest of the world” that has become similar to the Scandinavian 
countries or the other way around cannot be fully dealt with in this report. The answer to that 
question is nevertheless probably somewhere in between. However, if the lofty political 
declarations of the donor community at large transform into practice, the Nordic donors may not be 
as exceptional anymore.  
As mentioned above, many similarities do indeed exist in terms of aid policies and practices 
among the Nordic countries. This fact probably does partly explain why there are so few 
comparative studies of the Nordic countries. There are also few studies comparing the Nordic 
countries with other bilateral donors (King and McGrath 2004). However, some studies do exists of 
the so-called like-minded countries comprising the Scandinavian countries together with Canada 
and the Netherlands (Stokke 1989). These countries are often referred to as humane 
internationalists, due to a strong moral bent to their foreign policies. In some respects it seems 
justified to argue that the so-called like-minded group may traditionally have pursued more similar 
aid policies than the Scandinavian countries and Finland. Moreover, today there are several 
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countries that might be characterised as belonging to an extended group of like-minded countries. 
These are countries that, among other things, are pushing to implement the new aid modalities. 
These countries, which we may term “soft donors”, are referred to as the Nordic plus group, which 
includes the four Nordic countries under scrutiny plus, the UK, the Netherlands, and Canada. On 
other aid issues this group occurs as an extended Nordic Plus group and includes Germany and 
Ireland as well.6   
In recent years it seems fair to argue that Finland has become more like Norway and 
Sweden. However, even traditionally, some kind of companionship among the Nordic countries in 
the area of aid seems to have existed. Moreover, there are many similarities among the Nordic 
countries when it comes to general objectives, motivations and domestic conditions for their aid 
involvement. Although objectives have changed, their overall objective has been to improve the 
livelihood of poor people in poor countries. In the course of the last few years, the Nordic countries, 
together with the donor community at large, have been giving even stronger emphasis to poverty 
reduction as the main goal and have generally linked their aid strategies to the fulfilment of the 
Millennium Goals. 
The predominance of a moral motivation for providing aid is also a salient feature of the 
Nordic countries. Other motives such as political concerns have also been prevalent all along, but 
moral considerations and motives linked to international solidarity have been the most important 
justifications for aid. There has been a broad political consensus when it comes to their aid 
operations. Even if political forces on the far right have regularly been arguing for cuts in the aid 
budgets, these forces have been rather isolated politically. However, as we shall see in Denmark the 
political consensus on aid was seriously challenged when rightist parties became represented in 
government in 2001, which in turn led to quite substantial aid cuts. This illustrates the fact that there 
are limits to the political “peace” when it comes to aid in the Nordic countries. 
There are also profound differences among the Nordic countries that will be further 
explored in this report. Historically, Denmark and Finland have tied their aid more closely to the 
interests of their private sectors than has been the case in Norway and Sweden. Furthermore, 
technical assistance has constituted a much larger share of their aid. It has been suggested that 
Denmark has in practice moved further away from Sweden and Norway and has become more of a 
hard-liner demanding value for money and by more explicitly linking development assistance with 
its overall foreign policy. Whether this is the case will be explored. In the post Cold War period 
there have been important changes in the external conditions for aid, as well as in the modalities and 
modes of aid thinking. How has this impacted on the Nordic countries as donors? Moreover, the 
political consensus that has surrounded development assistance in the Nordic countries has been 
seriously challenged, particularly in Denmark. Are there particular domestic challenges that indicate 
that the Nordic four have lowered their aspirations as frontrunners in aid? These are some of the 
issues that will be analysed in the report.  
Methodology and sources 
This report rests on a wide range of sources. The literature on development assistance is particularly 
valuable when depicting the historical backcloth and in providing us with critical background 
information (for a complete list of references, see the bibliography). A second category of sources is 
white papers, implementation plans, strategy papers and so on. These give us the official picture. 
However, white papers and policy papers are outcomes of policy processes and include 
compromises; a third significant category of sources is therefore interviews with key actors that can 
provide insights into the policy processes. Moreover, in the written material you are always faced 
with a time-lag and the informants help to fill some of the gaps. In order to grasp the underlying 
                                                     
6 The Utstein group  has also been an important group of countries in this respect. It comprises of Germany, 
the UK, Norway and the Netherlands and was formed by four female Ministers of Development Co-operation 
representing these four countries. 
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dynamics of policy making we also need some inside information; the informants have given us 
some of that.  
With few exceptions we have mainly conducted interviews with aid bureaucrats within the 
aid administrations located at the headquarters in the four Nordic capitals and at the four Nordic 
embassies in Dar es Salaam. We have tried to single out informants that have been involved in the 
aid business for some time. However, we have also interviewed some “newcomers” for 
supplementary insights. Ideally, we would have complemented the list of informants with other key 
stakeholders. However, within the scope of this study that has not been feasible. Instead, the 
influence of other stakeholders in development aid, such as private businesses and NGOs, has been 
extracted from the written material. 
A fourth category of sources is public opinion polls on development aid. Having generous 
aid budgets depends to some extent on strong public support for aid (Olsen 2001). This has largely 
been the case in Norway (Selbervik 2003). Consistent and timely surveys have been performed by 
the Eurobarometer for members of the European Union (EU) from 1996 onwards. Norway is not a 
member of the EU, and hence has not been included in these surveys. However, the statistical 
bureaux of the Nordic countries conduct regular opinion polls. Statistics Norway and Statistics 
Sweden have conducted opinion polls on aid since the early 1970s. The data from the 
Eurobarometer is supplemented with these data. It should be stressed, however, that the national 
surveys on aid in the Nordic countries are undertaken at different times and questions are phrased 
differently. Hence, data from these polls are not directly comparable.  
A fifth category of sources is the DAC statistics, which provide us with comparative data 
over a long time span: on volume, aid channels, sector allocations, and on geographical 
distributions. Doing a thorough analysis of the relationships among aid, trade, and investments is 
not feasible within the time frame of this study. However, we will do a broad-brush investigation of 
possible linkages among the three. The last categories of sources are data from the Nordic 
investments funds, trade statistics, and investments statistics. 
Report outline 
Chapter 2 is sketching the underlying philosophy, main motivations and the rationale for Nordic 
development assistance. The chapter is mapping the main actors involved in development assistance 
in the four Nordic countries. Their functions are briefly explored. Moreover, it tries to grasp the 
dynamics of the policy formulation processes within the area of aid. 
Chapter 3 focuses on broad patterns in Nordic aid allocations. The Chapter traces 
differences and similarities. It illustrates trends in aid volumes, sector allocations and geographical 
distributions.  
Recently many changes within the international aid community have taken place. Chapter 4 
explores how the Nordic countries are responding to the new aid modalities, i.e., how are they 
dealing with the new challenges, such as coherence and harmonisation? 
Chapter 5, which is the last substantial chapter, looks at the Nordic countries’ operations in 
Tanzania. The main focus is on how the embassies are tackling and dealing with the new aid 
modalities. Are the Nordic countries frontrunners in the field? 
The final and concluding chapter asks – is Nordic exceptionalism under stress? In 
accordance with the terms of reference, it is followed by an annotated statistical appendix on 
various aspects of Nordic aid allocations. 
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Chapter 2: Nordic development assistance: The 
domestic arena 
Introduction 
Besides cabinet and parliament, the most important actors in development assistance are the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies. In Norway and Sweden the Development 
Directorates also have a key role. Other important actors and stakeholders are NGOs, the private 
sector, and public opinion, which to varying degrees play distinctive and significant roles in both 
the shaping and the implementation of the aid policies of the Nordic countries.  
It is a common view that a country’s domestic policies are shaped in the intersection 
between international and national concerns and pressures (Putnam 1988; Evans 1993). Nordic 
development policy is no exception (Selbervik 2003). However, this chapter will be focussing 
primarily on the role of the domestic actors in the domestic arenas. It should be underscored that 
within the scope of this project it is not possible to make a comprehensive analysis of the dynamics 
of domestic aid policy making in all four Nordic countries. Nonetheless, we will offer a brief 
presentation of the overall picture and explore how one might understand the shaping of Nordic aid 
policies.  
It needs to be stressed, though, that the new challenges facing development assistance, such 
as the need for greater coherence, new aid modalities, and trends towards increasing harmonisation 
and alignment, have led to major reorganisations of the aid administrations of the Nordic countries. 
Many of these reorganisations are so recent that making any definite assessment of their effects will 
be premature. How the Nordic countries are coping with the new challenges in aid will be dealt with 
in Chapter 4.  
Firstly, this chapter will offer a description of the normative platform of Nordic aid. 
Secondly, it will give a presentation of the role and functions of the respective ministries of foreign 
affairs, the development directorates, and the embassies. Thereafter the main lobby groups, such as 
the NGOs and the private sector, will be dealt with. The role of public opinion will also be explored. 
A main argument in this chapter is that the aid policy processes in the Nordic countries have, to a 
great extent, been top-down processes.  
Solidarity and humanitarianism as joint normative platforms   
What have been the main motivations and the rationale for Nordic aid? Academic and political 
discussions on the very motivations for aid often end in a battle between the interests of the donor 
on the one hand and the needs of the recipient on the other. Donor interests are often linked to 
domestic private interests, or security or geo-political interests. The Nordic countries are often 
referred to as a group of donors that are less driven by such considerations, instead being more 
strongly motivated mainly by altruism and the needs of the recipients (Stokke 2005; Selbervik 
2003; Olsen 2005; Danielson 2005). In a comparative perspective they have to a greater extent been 
driven by moral obligations and humanitarian concerns with assisting the poor and needy. In 
addition, their development assistance has been a prolongation of the social democratic project – a 
means of selling their social model. This description has often been applied to Swedish aid but also 
to Norwegian aid.  
In the case of Finland, on the other hand, Juhani Koponen maintains that even if Finnish aid 
rests on what he terms a ‘developmentalist’ platform, it has predominantly been motivated by 
‘instrumentialist’ concerns, such as political and commercial interests (Koponen 2005). The extent 
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to which other interests have challenged more altruistic motivations has varied over the years and 
also differs among the Scandinavian countries. And even if the rhetoric may suggest otherwise, it 
seems as if these ‘other interests’ such as political, diplomatic and security interests are on the 
increase in all the Nordic countries.  
Both in Finland and Denmark the interests of the donor have to a greater extent had an 
impact on and been a more important motivation for their aid programmes than has generally been 
the case in Norway and Sweden. In Denmark there has been a substantial business interest involved 
in aid, which can be illustrated by the Danish position on aid untying. Aid untying has been strongly 
opposed not only by the business community itself, but also by the government and the aid 
community in Denmark (Olsen 2005). As is documented in the appendix, Denmark and Finland 
have traditionally had more tied aid than Norway and Sweden. Previously, Denmark officially 
declared that a certain percentage of Danish ODA should be returned to Denmark – the so-called 
‘return percentage’. In practice the return percentage should be as high as possible. The very 
rationale behind this policy was that since the level of Danish aid was so high, as much as possible 
of it should benefit Danish interests and citizens. Today, the return percentage does not play an 
important role, although the figures are still accounted for. It does not appear in official documents, 
but is reported to the board of Danida.7  
In Norway, it has even been difficult to gather parliamentary acceptance for endeavours to 
promote economic interests to any large extent. Economic self-interest has been perceived to be at 
variance with humanitarian concerns, and there has been an explicitly expressed fear that this could 
tarnish Norway’s reputation in important circles in poor countries (Selbervik 2003). On the part of 
Norway some interesting recent changes in its main motivations have been documented. By 
perusing parliamentary debates from 1952 to 1998 the political scientist Anne Maurits van der Veen 
analysed changing motivations for Norwegian aid. Humanitarianism has been among the most 
important motivations from the outset and remained so in the 1980s and 1990s (Van der Veen 
2000). However, she reveals an interesting shift in the 1980s. In the period 1980-1992, besides 
humanitarianism, power and prestige became the two most important motivations of Norwegian aid. 
In the period 1995 to 1998, however, the importance of prestige diminished and was replaced by 
what van der Veen termed enlightened self-interest, which was related to Norway’s involvement in 
the Middle East.8 Motivations linked to enlightened self-interest have also been strongly 
emphasised under the current Danish government and is strongly elaborated upon in the latest 
policy documents and in the 2005 Africa Strategy (see e.g. Government of Denmark 2005).  For 
example Denmark’s involvement in the Iraq war and its recent Arab initiative, seeking to promote 
democracy in Arab countries reflect that the present Danish government prioritise alignment with 
American foreign policy. 
Another interesting trend that becomes more and more visible in the 1990s in all the Nordic 
countries is the emphasis on compatibility and interdependency between donor interests and 
recipient needs. However, this was not something new. For example in the case of Sweden the 
interdependency perspective was expressed already in the Government Bill of 1962, but in contrast 
to earlier periods where donors’ interests were defined somewhat more narrowly, poverty reduction 
is today viewed as part of a global strategy, which is to achieve a more just and secure world that is 
                                                     
7 Based on interviews with Danish aid bureaucrats. 
8 However, van der Veen holds that the distinctions between the various motives may be blurred. The power 
motive reflects the ambition of pursuing greater international influence more generally, but also more 
specifically to gain influence within international institutions. The power motive is also linked to prestige, e.g. 
taking leadership and being an example for others to follow. Prestige motives are, according to van der Veen, 
related more to identity in respect of foreign aid, ‘beginning with reputation and glory’ (Van der Veen 2000: 
119). Humanitarian motives refer to personal obligations to improve the well-being of people in despair and 
to international solidarity. Human rights are also categorised as a humanitarian argument. Enlightened self-
interest is largely linked to conventional interpretations of self-interest, i.e., security interests (Van der Veen 
2000: 111-131).  
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beneficial to both donors and recipients. It is underscored that development assistance is only one 
tool among several. But before we discuss these issues in more detail, who are the actors? 
The main policy makers: parliaments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the development directorates, and the embassies 
All four countries have a tradition of frequently reorganising their aid administrations. Sometimes it 
may be difficult to grasp the rationale for this. In the case of Sweden, Anders Danielson and Lennart 
Wohlgemuth hold that “When problems of effectiveness and poverty alleviation become too great, 
it seems as if the frustration is focussed on the donor administrative machinery rather on trying to 
accomplish a true dialogue with the development partners” (Danielson 2005: 533).  
There are many similarities but also some distinct differences as to how the Nordic 
countries organise and manage their aid programmes. In all four countries, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has been involved all along, while some of them have periodically been operating with 
separate Ministries for development aid. Previously, all of them had a more or less autonomous 
development agency in charge of ODA. Today it is only Sweden that still has a separate directorate 
in charge of the implementation of governmental aid. In recent years, as a result of increasing 
centralisation and as part of an effort to make aid management more efficient, development issues 
have been integrated into their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Currently, all the Nordic 
countries have a separate Minister dealing with development assistance. Organisational maps of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the development directorates are shown in the appendix. In the 
following, a brief introduction will be given to the official actors in the four Nordic countries. 
Sweden 
In 1962, the first Swedish government aid agency was established. In 1965, the Swedish 
International Development Authority (Sida)9 was launched. Sida, on the other hand, has kept its 
initial functions and has from the onset had a far more autonomous role than its sister organisations 
in the other Nordic countries. This fact can partly be explained by the tradition of having strong 
governmental agencies in Sweden. Sida’s dominant position in all fields of development co-
operation was increasingly questioned in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, new fields of 
development co-operation were launched partly as a result of lobbying from various interests groups 
in Sweden. It was trusted that those new fields could be more effectively handled in separate 
authorities, and hence the Swedish Agency for Research Co-operation (SAREC) was launched 
followed by several other aid entities: Swedfund and the Swedish Agency for International 
Technical and Economic Co-operation (BITS). Most recently, the Swedish International Enterprise 
Development Cooperation (SWEDCORP) was formed in 1991. The increasing number of agencies 
led to duplication and unclear roles. In addition, changes in the external conditions for aid after 
1990 called for more coherence and the agencies merged back to one. As a result, in 1995, Sida was 
more or less back to its original structure, but was now named the ‘new Sida’. Sida is in charge of 
bilateral aid and some multilateral aid implementation. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(SMFA) is in charge of development policy and most of the multilateral co-operation. Sida is 
responsible to the SMFA and reports to Government via the SMFA. 
The role of the embassies has also changed over the years. For many years Swedish 
embassies had a stronger position than those of the other Nordic countries, but they have always 
been under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, the embassies report both to the Sida 
headquarter and to the SMFA. Swedish aid bureaucrats claim that they are struggling with a 
duplication of work between the Sida and the SMFA parts of the embassies. Several measures have 
been effected to streamline the work of the embassies, but bureaucrats maintain that the problems 
                                                     
9 Before 1995, ‘the old Sida’ was abbreviated with capital letters, whereas ‘the new Sida’ was not.  
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have not been sufficiently solved. As long as Sida exists as a separate implementing body, some 
duplication may be inevitable.  
Norway 
As a result of the Norwegian Government’s Action Plan for Combating Poverty in the South 
towards 2015 it was decided to undertake a major evaluation to assess the efficiency of Norwegian 
aid administration and to adjust it to the new challenges facing aid. The Norwegian Government 
wanted to adopt a holistic approach towards poverty eradication. Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD) was established in 1968. Until 2004 NORAD was the main 
implementing aid agency, while the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) functioned as 
the policy maker. All the same, the NMFA was in charge of implementation with respect to 
multilateral and humanitarian aid. The share of Norwegian aid disbursed as humanitarian assistance 
was growing rapidly in the 1990s, so its role as an implementing agency was increasing (see figures 
in the appendix).  
The evaluation team finalised its work in 2003 and came up with two main suggestions: 
NORAD should either be given a more autonomous role – similar to the Swedish model – or 
NORAD should be integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as in Finland and Denmark. The 
head of administration, the Secretary General of the NMFA argued for the first alternative. 
Nonetheless, the Government did not go for either of the two suggestions. Instead, an intermediate 
solution was chosen. NORAD is now a technical advisory directorate and quality controller under 
the NMFA. The NMFA is in charge of both policy and implementation. NORAD’s role has been 
substantially reduced, but it is still in charge of aid channelled to Norwegian NGOs and of various 
support schemes to the private sector. 
The NMFA has two ministers still, one for Foreign Affairs and one for International 
Development. The Ministry has 10 departments, all of which report to both Ministers. At the same 
time as the new organisational set-up is finding its form, another reorganisation process is ongoing: 
a process of decentralising authority to the field. This is not only a Norwegian trend, but is more of 
a general pattern and a way of trying to make aid delivery more efficient. All the Nordic countries 
have carried out extensive decentralisation reforms in recent years, with the exception of Finland, 
which has just started this process (more on this in Chapter 4). The idea behind these reforms is to 
give the embassies more of a strategic role and to improve co-ordination and coherence between 
bilateral and multilateral aid. Because the embassies are located in the recipient countries, they will 
be in a better position to take important country specific decisions.  
Finland 
The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMFA) is the key actor in development co-operation in 
Finland. As in Denmark, Finland has an integrated aid organisation. On the other hand, the FMFA 
currently has three different Ministers, of whom one is the Minister of External Trade and 
Development Co-operation. Many reorganisations have taken place over the years in Finland, too. 
More recently, the FMFA has become more integrated to meet the new global challenges for 
development assistance. The integration process has been going on for some years, but culminated 
with the centre-left government’s White Paper, Development Policy, of 2004. The FMFA has gone 
far in its integration efforts. There is now only one department within the Ministry that deals solely 
with development co-operation, namely the ‘Department for Development Policy’. Due to the tight 
integration of trade, aid, culture, and political affairs, it is difficult to say how the Ministry’s 
resources are channelled towards development co-operation. Recently, there has been a 
strengthening of the geographical department that is in charge of a holistic approach vis-à-vis 
Finnish partner countries, where development co-operation only forms one part. Some academics 
are critical of these changes. They insinuate that development co-operation in practice has been 
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downgraded. This demotion of aid has met only insignificant resistance within the Ministry itself 
and has resulted in little critical debate in the media, they claim (Koponen 2005).  
Finland has approximately 50 missions abroad involved in development assistance. The 
main tasks of the embassies with regard to development assistance are: 1) partaking in project 
identification; 2) negotiation of agreements; and 3) monitoring and reporting to the Ministry in 
Helsinki. Finland is by far the most centralised and hierarchical aid organisation among the four 
Nordics, hence the embassies in the field have little autonomy or authority. Most decisions need 
consultation and clearance from Helsinki. However, the embassies maintain some independence and 
can in theory act more or less autonomously, in local co-ordination meetings, for example. A new 
embassy instrument has also recently been launched – the Local Co-operation Fund. The fund 
finances local NGOs within specific areas to the amount of 7000 to 1 EUR million per country. The 
embassy works out an annual plan, but this rests upon approval by the Ministry. However, when 
approved, the funds are disbursed independently by the embassy. 
Staff at both the embassy level and at headquarters feel that they are greatly understaffed. 
However, according to the DAC Review undertaken in 2003, compared to other DAC countries the 
number of staff in Finland is approximately average (OECD 2003: 46). On the other hand, the 
degree of centralisation and the high degree of dispersion of a relatively small aid budget may lead 
to unnecessarily high workloads, according to the DAC. Moreover, the fact that the Ministry mainly 
recruits generalists and few with special competence may also add to the problem. 
Although the most important actor in Finnish aid is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Finnish Ministry of Finance also has a role in development assistance. As in Sweden, the Finnish 
Ministry of Finance works with the FMFA on the joint Nordic-Baltic instructions to the World 
Bank Board. Compared to Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, however, Finland has played a rather 
minor role in this co-ordination work (Selbervik 2003: 302).  
Nonetheless, compared to the other countries the Finnish Ministry of Finance seems to have 
more of a say over the level of development assistance, and has contributed to keeping the level of 
Finnish aid low even under favourable economic conditions (Koponen 2005). The Central Banks of 
the Nordic countries also play a marginal role in aid. They are in charge of co-ordinating the Nordic 
positions at the IMF board. This has, in practice, often led to diverging positions between the 
Nordic countries’ bilateral and multilateral aid policies. The Finnish Central Bank in particular is 
perceived as representing very conservative viewpoints.10 
Denmark 
The 2001 Danish elections had implications for the organisation and management of Danish aid. 
The many changes were largely made under the banner of increasing efficiency and included 
measures such as the abolition of several advisory committees that were viewed as superfluous and 
a more general reshaping of the aid administration. The posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Minister of Development Co-operation were merged. Nonetheless, in 2004 the post of Minister of 
Development Co-operation reappeared and the Minister for Integration, Refugees and Immigration, 
Bertil Haarder, was also handed responsibility for development assistance. In 2005, a separate 
Minister for Development Co-operation was again appointed, but then the post was given to Ulla 
Tørnes. These changes seem mainly to be related to internal power struggles within the government 
(Libak 2005).   
The Danish aid administration is largely centralised and compact. One out of three 
departments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deals with all development co-operation matters. 
This unit is called the South group, but is more commonly known as Danida. It is chaired by a civil 
servant who reports to the Minister.  
In the new government’s review of development co-operation in 2002, it was stressed that 
the process of delegation of authorities to the embassies should be speeded up and become more 
                                                     
10 Interviews with Nordic aid bureaucrats. 
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extensive. Despite the many reorganisations and the focus on streamlining and efficiency, Denmark 
has kept the board of Danida, which in several respects represents an anachronism. The Danida 
board consists of nine representatives. Currently, three of the members are recruited from NGOs, 
three come from the private sector, while the remaining three are recruited from the research 
community. However, board members do not represent the groups they are appointed from. The 
three mentioned groups have always been represented on the board, but in 2005 the 3 + 3 + 3 model 
was formalised.11 The chair of the board is always recruited from the research community. The 
board has an advisory function with respect to the implementation of aid policy vis-à-vis the 
Minister of Development Co-operation, but not on the policy itself. The board makes its comments 
on issues such as country strategies and sector programmes. The board also has a granting authority 
for programmes and projects. The very existence of such an institution with a formal granting 
authority is unique. To what extent the board has a real function is somewhat disputed, and it was 
probably more influential previously than today. Changes in the organisation of aid delivery and the 
process of decentralisation may have given the board a new and important function in co-ordinating 
and keeping a more general overview of Danida’s activities. Aid bureaucrats report that statements 
and signals from the board are taken very seriously by the staff.   
The role of parliaments 
At the end of the day it is the respective parliaments that give their stamps of approval on the 
countries’ aid policies. They also make directives on various issues. There have been and still are 
general annual debates in parliaments about development assistance. These have often resulted in 
new goals being added and new themes, such as gender, the environment, human rights and so on, 
being put on the agenda. Still it seems justified to argue that the influence of the parliaments and 
parliamentarians has in practice been limited, at least according to studies of the Danish and 
Norwegian cases (Olsen 2005: 203; Selbervik 2003).  
However, Knut Erik Svendsen shows that in Denmark the influence of politicians was 
different prior to 1990. At that time there was a small but active group of parliamentarians that took 
a keen interest in development issues (Svendsen 1989). Olsen holds that this changed in the 1990s; 
even the politicians on the left now seem to be more in line with the voters “in downgrading the 
significance of development aid” (Olsen 2005: 203). The same tendencies seem to have been 
present in Sweden and Finland. Juhani Koponen even argues that “in Finland the formulation of 
policies may be seen as a particularly striking example of the Finnish consensus-based way of 
policy-thinking” (Koponen 2005: 221). Very different governments end up with very similar aid 
policies, he maintains. Most of the policy papers – which are often vaguely defined, based on 
compromises – are often only rubberstamped by the parliamentarians. In the case of Sweden, 
Danielson and Wohlgemuth argue that Swedish aid is marked by continuity and broad 
parliamentary support of the long lines in Swedish aid, even if there have been major shifts in its 
implementation (Danielson 2005). 
There are two types of issue that have often have led to debate, however: recipient country 
selections and aid levels. The extreme focus on aid levels will be dealt with in more depth below. 
The discussion on country selection will be outlined in the following chapter, since this area has 
been more or less depoliticised in recent years. Currently, country selection is largely driven by 
external conditions. The point I want to make here is that, at least in Scandinavia, a broad majority 
of the parliamentarians have found it expedient to maintain a high level of aid, because this has 
become an important and integrated part of the Scandinavian countries’ international image.  
                                                     
11 Interview with chair of the Danida board, Holger Bernt Hansen. 
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Is it all about volume and image? 
For decades the Scandinavian countries have been among the most generous providers of aid 
measured as a percentage of their GNIs. Their aid levels have in relative terms been far above the 
average DAC member country, which has been somewhere above 0.2% but has never reached 
0.4%. In other words, the average DAC member country has a long way to go in order to meet the 
agreed UN target of 0.7% of GNI.  
For the Scandinavians the situation is different. Their aid levels have been far above 0.7% 
of GNI.12 In the 1990s, Denmark most frequently won the “most-generous-donor” competition 
among the Scandinavians. Norway tended to be second, while Sweden has often been number three. 
Figure 1 below shows the ODA net disbursements as a percentage of GNI for the Nordic countries 
and the DAC total in the period 1990 to 2003. Figure 2 illustrates ODA net disbursements in the 
same period, but in real numbers. These figures are added in order to give a more nuanced picture, 
because even in times of declining aid levels measured as a percentage of GNI, growing GNIs have 
often contributed to sustaining and even increasing the volume of aid in real terms. Nevertheless, at 
times in the 1990s Sweden and Finland in particular experienced declining aid levels in real terms.   
  
 
Figure 1: 
ODA net disbursements13 (in million USD at constant 2003 prices) as a percentage 
of GNI, Nordic countries and the DAC total, 1990 to 2003 
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12 GNI is the income earned by a country’s residents regardless of where in the world it originates from. In 
comparison, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the income earned from economic activity within the domestic 
territory only. 
13 Net disbursement is the sum of grants and loans extended, minus repayments by recipients. 
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Figure 2: 
ODA net disbursements (mill USD, constant 2003 prices), 
The Nordic countries, 1990-2003 
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
 
 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that all the Nordic countries have an ODA/GNI ratio far above the DAC average. 
However, substantial variations among the Nordic countries can be observed.  
Denmark had an ODA/GNI ratio of around 1%. In 1985, the Danish Parliament agreed on 
an official target of 1%, which was met in 1992. The establishment of a 1.5% target was discussed, 
but was never officially agreed upon. Denmark’s ODA disbursements increased gradually and 
peaked in 2000 at 2,170 million 2003-USD. Since 2001, the level of aid has been falling and 
constituted 0.8% of Denmark’s GNI in 2003. The new government declared that Denmark should 
no longer work towards fixed targets. Nonetheless, since the dramatic reduction of Danish aid in the 
period 2001 to 2005, the government has declared that the aid level shall not be lower than 0.8 % 
(Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). 
After the level of Finnish aid had increased steadily in the 1980s and reached a historic peak 
of 0.8% in 1991, Finland’s aid decreased dramatically and constituted only 0.3% in 1994. From 
1991 to 1994 Finish aid was more than halved. Finnish ODA has since then been increasing little by 
little and reached 558 million USD in 2003, which was still far below the peak of 1991. In terms of 
the ODA/GNI ratio the level of Finnish aid has not increased significantly in recent years in spite of 
the current government’s ambition to reach the UN’s 0.7 target by 2010. However, in actual 
numbers the rise has been more significant due to a fast growing GNI. As it appears in the 
appendix, aid funds in Finland have risen more than what has been the case in the other Nordic 
countries.  
As early as 1973 the Norwegian parliament set 1% of GNP as a target for Norwegian 
development assistance. This target was reached a few years later. In the 1980s, the ODA share 
stayed at roughly that level (Stokke 2005). In 1990, Norway had an ODA percentage of GNI of 
1.2%, which steadily declined to below 0.8% in 2000. After 2000 it increased again and reached 
0.9% in 2003. Nonetheless, Norwegian real ODA disbursements increased gradually from 1,520 
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million 2003-USD in 1990 to 2,042 million USD in 2003, due to a rapidly increasing GNI. Since 
2000, a significant increase in the level of Norwegian aid has occurred. 
Prior to the 1990s, Sweden used to be the engine among the Nordic donors in terms of 
keeping up a high aid volume. However, from 1% in 1992, Sweden’s ODA/GNI ratio fell to 0.7% 
in 1999, after which it increased and has since then been somewhere around 0.8%. Sweden has 
generally been the largest donor among the Nordics in terms of ODA disbursements, except for a 
period in the mid-1990s. After that, the Swedish ODA again started to increase in real figures and 
reached 2,400 million USD in 2003, which is above the level of other Nordic countries. 
The end of the Cold War and the economic recession affecting many Northern countries led 
to decreasing aid at the global level in the 1990s. Widespread aid fatigue among western aid 
bureaucracies was also a factor. From 1992 to 1996 ODA from the DAC countries fell by 16% in 
real terms (Selbervik 2003: 306), and reached a historically low level. Scholars were talking about a 
serious crisis facing development assistance. Then the level of aid started to rise again little by little 
and in 2003 the global aid level had surpassed the level of 1992.  
Finland, Sweden and Norway have more or less followed this general pattern. Domestic 
economic problems also challenged their aid budgets. This was most dramatic in Finland. Finland’s 
economy ran into very serious economic problems after the end of the Cold War. Harsh economic 
liberalisation of the financial markets combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union which made 
an end to lucrative bilateral trade with the Soviets had serious consequences for Finnish economy. 
As a result, the level of Finnish aid plummeted. Sweden too faced domestic economic problems in 
this period, which were followed by general cuts in public expenditure that affected the aid budget. 
In addition, Norway experienced some economic decline, and deviated from earlier declared 
ambitions to sustain an aid level above 1% of GNI. Only Denmark managed to keep its aid level at 
around 1% during the 1990s.   
Why this focus on volume and percentage? The reason we have spent so much time 
elaborating on aid volumes, not only in real terms, but also in relative terms, is simply because one 
salient feature of Nordic aid is the focus on volume. Some academics even claim that this focus on 
volume may have suppressed real discussion on the content of development assistance. Have they 
been driven by some kind of ‘GNI ideology’? Despite periods of decline, the volume of 
Scandinavian aid has seldom been seriously challenged. How can this be explained? The answer is 
complex. Compared to many other countries, the aid budgets have to some extent been treated as a 
protected area. It must be underscored that the situation in Finland is somewhat different, and also 
to some extent in Denmark, for reasons that will be explored below.  
The pressure to keep up a high aid volume is partly due to a humanitarian and moralistic 
drive to help the poor. However, this cannot be the whole story, because it seems rather unlikely 
that the Scandinavian countries should be more concerned with improving the livelihood of poor 
people than other countries are. Inter-party rivalry among aid-friendly parties has also driven up the 
aid volumes at times. The historian Rolf Tamnes holds that this was the case in Norway (Tamnes 
1997). A more or less explicitly expressed competition among the Nordic countries has also played 
a role in at least sustaining a high aid volume.  
Denmark has also been concerned with the actual volume of its aid, but traditionally the 
Danish attitude has been ‘yes, we want to be among the most generous donors, but then it is only 
fair that as much as possible is returned to Denmark’. This view can be discerned in the Danish 
position on tied aid.14 Aid cynics may argue that that this has also been the case in Norway and 
Sweden. Nonetheless, even if one can trace such tendencies in these countries, it has been less 
prevalent than in Denmark.  
In the Scandinavian countries a broad political consensus on development assistance has 
developed over the years: the level of aid must and shall be above a certain level. Hence, the aid 
budget has more or less been a protected item in the preparation of their national budgets, making 
                                                     
14 However, due to international pressure and EC legislation Denmark has changed its position in the last two 
years. 
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development assistance resistant to both economic and political challenges. In order to illustrate this 
point, one example from Sweden can be given. In the 1990s Sweden was facing serious economic 
problems. Hence, the social democratic government, which succeeded the conservatives in 1994, 
had to make drastic cuts in public expenditure. Still, the level of Swedish aid never fell below the 
UN target. One prominent Swedish aid bureaucrat explains: “we fought tooth and nail for the aid 
budget. In Sweden we talked about the decency and pain limit of aid”.15 A definite decency limit is 
the UN target. She adds that only under extraordinary conditions will the level of aid in the 
Scandinavian countries be less than 0.7% of their GNIs. 
The situation in Finland is different. Finnish aid bureaucrats claim that there is no such 
thing as a decent level of aid. Moreover, the political consensus on keeping aid at a high level is 
also absent in Finland, it is claimed. In spite of the current government’s promise to increase the 
level of aid and its commitment to reaching the UN target by 2010, little is done to meet this goal. 
At the end of the day there does not seem to be sufficient political will to carry this policy through. 
Domestic issues are given priority in budget preparations, even under favourable economic 
conditions. But is this about to change?  
There is one recent event that deserves mentioning. In the spring of 2005, a group of 102 
members of parliament proposed a motion for a vote of no confidence in the government’s policy 
on the volume of the aid budget. In the government’s long term plan for the period 2006 to 2009 the 
aid ratio was only 0.41% of GNI, making it unlikely that the government would reach the 0.7% goal 
by 2010. Moreover, the government even added a clause saying that the level of the aid budget 
would depend on the overall economic situation. In addition, as new elections will be held in 2007 
the government was in reality leaving the bill for the subsequent government. The opposition had 
therefore no confidence in the government’s aid policy. However, during the formal vote the 
opposition lost, and the whole issue seems to have been buried. ‘Nobody’ believes that the 0.7 goal 
will be reached. Nonetheless, the case is most interesting, especially in light of the fact that aid in 
general plays much less of a role in Finland than in the other Nordic countries. To the author’s 
knowledge, it seems unprecedented that there has been a formal vote on a motion of no confidence 
in the aid budget. Currently one is faced with a peculiar situation where it is the opposition that is 
pushing to implement the government’s own aid policy. If there is ever to be a time when the 
Finnish government is able to raise the aid level back to its heyday, it should be in the present 
political and economic situation. Why is it still not feasible? Koponen claims that even if it is 
parliament that endorses the annual aid budget, in reality the Ministry of Finance exerts great 
influence on the budget. The Ministry of Finance had been a key actor in keeping the aid budget 
low in the 1990s, even after the economy recovered. In Finland the aid budget is not a protected 
area. Instead, the aid budget is more of a balancing item. Even if there are some pro-aid fractions 
within all the major parties, they tend to be in a minority (Koponen 2005). 
Political events in 2001 in Denmark challenged the “rock solid” aid budget. Prior to the 
2001 elections some political parties campaigned for a dramatic decrease of the aid budget. Funds 
from the aid budget should instead be spent on sick and elderly people in Denmark, they argued. 
After the election the aid-sceptical parties took office. For the first time the parliament had a more 
or less ‘aid-sceptical’ majority. The two ruling parties had to rely on a clearly anti-aid party in 
parliament. The former parliamentary consensus on keeping a high aid budget was challenged. The 
centre of gravity in parliament on aid issues had moved considerably to the right and in a less aid 
friendly direction. The Danish aid budget was reduced by 1.5 billion DK (cf. figure above).  
Danish aid bureaucrats report that despite some protests from aid organisations, no real 
outcry was made. This came as a great surprise to more aid-friendly circles and the South group 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, in practice, the new government’s policy led to 
less severe changes in development co-operation than critics might have feared. It is also too early 
to assess whether in the long run this will represent a more fundamental break with the past. The 
new government has strengthened the focus on control or effectiveness that is the government’s 
                                                     
15 Swedish prominent aid bureaucrat quoted in Selbervik 2003: 306. 
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preferred euphemism. In this respect Denmark does differ somewhat from Sweden and Norway. 
Some bureaucrats relate this to bureaucratic traditions and the experience of some serious aid 
scandals in the early 1990s.  Nevertheless, in 2005 the new government declared that the Danish aid 
level should not be below 0.8%. All in all, there may be reason to think that the recent upheavals in 
Danish aid have only been ripples on the surface.  
It was not conscious from the outset, but gradually it dawned on the Nordic countries that a 
high aid volume in itself could give these small states a strong international standing. Aid could be 
an area where they could be more than small states in international arenas. This acknowledgement 
seems to have contributed to protecting the level of the aid budgets, as illustrated by a statement 
made by the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, in 1987: “None of the parties in the 
[foreign affairs] committee wants Norway to relinquish its position among the world leaders where 
development aid is concerned” (Selbervik 2003: 1). Having a fairly large aid budget became an 
integrated part of the states’ self-image and self perception. This may have contributed to sustaining 
a high degree of consensus on aid issues (Stokke 2005). 
Some researchers have suggested that Norway got the Winter Olympics at Lillehammer in 
1994 because of its position as a donor. From the 1980s onwards, it gradually dawned on the Nordic 
countries that their positions as donors could give them extra leverage in international negotiations. 
Going through policy documents, one finds repeated references to statements that the Nordic 
countries are ‘punching far beyond their weight in international arenas’. However, to what extent 
that really has been the case is difficult to assess. Studies of the role of the Nordic countries on the 
World Bank board have demonstrated that these countries did have a special impact in the 1980s 
due to their international standing as aid donors. However, in the 1990s they lost this, due to 
diverging viewpoints among the four (Selbervik 2003).  
Some of the Danish informants claim that the main reason for the current Danish 
government’s decision to assure that the aid budget does not fall below 0.8 % of GNI has largely to 
do with its concern for the Danish image. After the drastic decline of the Danish aid budget the 
government felt that the Danish image had been tarnished and that Denmark had lost credibility. 
However, another informant claimed that this policy change was a strategic move to please young 
female voters. 
Finnish aid bureaucrats hold that image does not play the same important role as in the 
other Nordic countries. There is therefore no strong pressure to raise the level of the Finnish aid 
budget.16 Nonetheless, image has also played an important part in Finland’s identity and self-
perception, according to Juhani Koponen. The explanation for this is to be found in Finland’s 
history. Particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, having a large aid budget became part of a strategy of 
distancing itself from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in particular. Constructing strong 
links with the other Nordic countries was a part of a strategy of ‘Westernisation’. A way of getting a 
ticket into the Nordic club was to keep up with them in the area of development co-operation. 
However, Koponen argues that this ‘need’ and hence the rationale for having a large aid budget 
disappeared after 1995 when Finland became a member of the EU. After 1995 Finland became 
more oriented towards Europe. With regard to aid volume, it was no longer the aid level of the 
Scandinavians that was important, but the EU average (Koponen 2005).17 The reason why Finland 
all the same decided to opt for the UN target again after 1995 may be interpreted as ‘showing off’. 
All the international events that have taken place recently have made it politically expedient to state 
such an ambition, but domestically there is not enough will to reach that target and other domestic 
pressure groups do not seem to challenge the government’s position. 
                                                     
16 Interviews with Finnish aid bureaucrats. 
17 This view is also confirmed by Finnish informants. 
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The main lobby groups:  
The role of the business community 
Nordic aid policies have largely been underpinned by moralism and idealism. There were few 
commercial links when they first got involved in aid. In the case of Denmark it is even argued that, 
for example, the Federation of Industries had to be persuaded to take a seat on the Board of Danida 
when it was established (Holm 1982). That changed gradually, however, and there has been an 
increasing commercialisation of Danish aid, according to Gorm Rye Olsen (Olsen 2005). The 
business community is now regularly consulted. Moreover, an interesting shift has taken place in 
Denmark recently, Olsen argues:  
 
Danish business interests have shifted from being only about the sale of Danish 
products towards an increasing focus on establishing co-operative relations and 
forming strategic alliances. In this context, the Fund for Industrialisation in 
Developing Countries (IFU) has provided to be a useful instrument, since it allowed 
investments in the more wealthy developing countries (Olsen 2005: 207). 
 
Olsen holds that the most recent changes towards the establishing of more co-operative relations 
have decreased the levels of conflict between Danida and the business sector. 
In Denmark the argument has been that if the business sector is not getting its share, it will 
be difficult to justify such a high aid budget. In Norway the general attitude has been the opposite, 
even if Norway has also had several schemes for the private sector that have been linked solely to 
Norwegian commercial interests.  
The Norwegian incentive schemes for the private sector are now untied. The current 
Norwegian emphasis is not so much on how Norwegian private interests can benefit, but more on 
new modes of co-operation and on how Norwegian industry and trade can contribute to poverty 
reduction. Norwegian entrepreneurs have been critical of the untying of all the private sector 
support schemes. The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) claims that if 
private investors are not compensated, they will invest their funds elsewhere (OECD 2005). 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that they will be tied in the present international mood. It is more likely 
that Sweden and Finland, which have kept some of their tied private sector investment schemes, 
will untie theirs in the near future.18 
EU regulations – requiring that domestic consultants not be favoured - and a move away 
from the old fashioned way of doing projects have also had consequences, especially for Denmark 
and Finland, which have employed the largest numbers of consultants among the four. From the 
start the main bulk of their projects were run by large consultancy firms and with maximum 
delivery from the donor countries. Parallel structures were established and constituted small 
independent islands within the recipient countries. This proved not to be very sustainable.  
Today the projects are less driven by external consultants and less implemented through 
parallel structures. Furthermore, even if project aid is still the dominant aid modality the projects are 
better integrated into the recipients’ own structures. Finland has among 15-20 consulting companies 
which are involved in development co-operation (OECD 2003). As a result of the aim to decrease 
project aid, reduced tying of aid, and tougher competition from international companies, Finnish 
consulting companies are evidently critical of the new trends in aid cooperation. Nonetheless, as 
Koponen asserts, the government is trying to satisfy business interests and in the process of bidding 
for contracts Finnish consultants have met little competition (Koponen 2005). This is also 
confirmed by Finnish aid bureaucrats. 
                                                     
18 Interviews with Nordic aid bureaucrats. 
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Much more could be added here to give a more nuanced picture. However, this would 
probably not change the main conclusion, namely that the interests of the business sector do not 
constitute groups that are seriously challenging official aid policy, but are rather supporting it. 
The role of NGOs 
What is the role of NGOs in the Nordic countries? The NGOs are very important actors in Nordic 
development assistance as they receive a large share of official aid. Currently all the sources 
employed for this study suggest that the NGOs, generally speaking, largely act as strong supporters 
of the official aid policies rather than as correctives.  
Olsen claims that Danish NGOs had some impact on Danish aid policy prior to the 1990s 
(Olsen 2005). Thereafter their impact diminished. According to the latest DAC Peer Review of 
Denmark of 2003, Danish NGOs are allegedly less influential than NGOs in other DAC countries. 
However, it was not until the 1990s that their percentage of Danish aid started to increase 
dramatically. Terje Tvedt has documented the same tendency in Norway. In Denmark and Norway 
studies have found that the NGOs have become so involved with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
and rely so heavily on government funds that several researchers argue that they have more or less 
been co-opted (Olsen 2005; Tvedt 1998; Jørgensen 1993). As a result, the NGOs have become very 
similar to the state agency in many respects and also less critical.  
In the late 1990s, support to NGOs constituted 17% of Danish ODA. In 2003 Sweden 
channelled 18% to NGOs, while the percentage for Norway was more than 20 in 2003. 
Traditionally, the share of Finnish NGOs has been somewhat smaller than has been the case in 
Scandinavia. Nonetheless, Finnish support to NGOs has increased dramatically in more recent 
years. According to the latest policy documents, it has been decided that this share shall constitute 
14%.  
Olsen argues that in the Danish case this increase is not only a result of clever lobbying, but 
also due to the fact that NGOs have constituted important outlets for the growing aid budget (Olsen 
2005: 204). This also seems to apply to the other Nordic countries. Finnish aid bureaucrats claim 
that increasing the aid channelled to and through NGOs has been a purely political decision. 
However, they claim the contribution to the NGO sector has reached its limit, because of the lack of 
capacity and competence within this sector in Finland. 
It is mainly two types of organisations that receive development assistance: 1) A few big 
organisations that are given core funding and are involved in more ‘regular forms’ of development 
co-operation; and 2) smaller, more activist oriented organisations that receive more scattered 
project-oriented financing.   
To what extent the NGOs have to raise funds from their own budgets to receive support 
varies among the Nordic countries. Denmark is the only country where no such requirements exist 
until now. However, co-financing requirements will be applied as from 2006. Previously, NGOs 
had to make a 10% contribution, but this requirement was abolished in 1993. In the other three 
countries this figure varies from 10-15%.  In Norway the figure is 10%, with the exception of 
humanitarian interventions.  
To what extent does the NGO sector constitute an important lobby group on issues other 
than additional funding? Does the NGO sector in any of the Nordic countries constitute some kind 
of corrective vis-à-vis the official aid authorities? Finnish aid bureaucrats claim that the NGOs, 
generally speaking, are not very active in initiating public debate and that the sector in itself does 
not have any significant impact on the formation of Finnish development policy. Swedish aid 
bureaucrats also claim that the NGO sector is not very influential when it comes to shaping Swedish 
aid policy. It is believed that these groups were more influential previously, whereas today the 
NGOs and the governmental aid agency have largely common interests. Due to the large funds 
many of these organisations receive from the government, some kind of silent understanding has 
developed that these organisations shall not overtly criticise the government. Hence, the lack of 
criticism can also be based on a more or less unfounded fear of losing governmental funds. A third 
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explanation of the lack of criticism and activism on the part of NGOs can of course also be that few 
disagreements do actually exist, partly because they have become very similar to the governments 
and agencies. If that is the case, one may question their very existence. Should not the NGOs have 
other roles than the state aid actors? Even if many NGOs have common interests with the 
government agencies, they do also have some distinct functions that differ from them. This was for 
example visible under the Jubilee 2000 campaign on debt relied. However, they also have many 
joint functions. In 2000 this issue was widely discussed and assessed in Denmark. According to 
interviews with Danish bureaucrats it was concluded that the NGOs should have different functions 
from those of the governmental aid agencies, such as supporting civil society or having more of an 
advocacy role. Nonetheless, this is not sufficient evidence to draw any definite conclusions on 
whether any changes in policy towards the NGOs have taken place yet and to what extent this has 
contributed to altering their roles.  
A question that has been raised in all the Nordic countries is how to make sure that the 
NGOs are spending their resources in accordance with the governments’ policies and priorities and 
how to make sure that this is an effective channel. At least Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have 
been strengthening their accounting and result requirements vis-à-vis the NGOs.  Another pertinent 
issue in light of the current changes in the aid regime in the direction of more alignment, 
harmonisation, and coherence is: where do the NGOs fit in? What are their comparative 
advantages? What place the NGOs will have under the current regime is too early to assess. 
Public opinion 
As is illustrated in the appendix, there are no comparative statistics on public opinion with regard to 
aid in the four Nordic countries (for more elaboration and figures, the appendix should be 
consulted). While several surveys exist, they have been undertaken at different points in time and 
the questions are phrased differently from survey to survey. However, what can be said, based on 
the surveys which do exist, is that generally there is a high and a sustained support for development 
assistance. A recent Swedish survey of 2004, before the Tsunami, found, for example, that eight out 
of ten believed that development assistance is important.     
Somewhat paradoxically, in the case of Norway a large majority of the respondents think 
that the current aid level at any given time is adequate. Only a minority thinks that it should 
increase. Nevertheless, the aid budget has been increasing, as illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 3: 
Comparing total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, 
mill USD) and share of surveyed population who report current level of ODA 
is about right, Norway, 1972 to 2001 
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Danish bureaucrats state that similar results have been found in Denmark.19 The explanation for this 
high and sustained support for development assistance is probably a mixed one. Some have 
suggested that their public awareness programmes have contributed to this success, since the Nordic 
countries are spending more money on public awareness building than are other countries. Sida’s 
budget for this category accounted for as much as USD 30 million in 2004. However, the 
bureaucrats that were interviewed for this study believed that the explanation is to be found 
elsewhere and is linked to deeper historical roots.  
Nonetheless, even if the public is positive towards development assistance, in periods of 
dramatic aid decline there has been little public outcry. Even when Finland’s aid budget plummeted 
in the 1990s, hardly any opposition was heard, according to Koponen (Koponen 2005). Studies have 
also shown that when the respondents are asked to rank the importance of various policy areas, 
development assistance is ranked low. 
Summing up 
This chapter has demonstrated that, despite many similarities, major divergences exist among the 
Nordic countries. Previously, pressure groups played a more significant role in the shaping of 
Nordic aid policies. Currently, based on the broad domestic consensus, the shaping of the aid policy 
is to a smaller extent influenced by domestic events. As consensus on the general policy is not 
disturbed, aid policy is mainly an area driven by the aid bureaucrats and the political leadership in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, in Denmark the political parties and their relative powers 
also seem to play a role. These actors are again heavily influenced by international trends and the 
World Bank in particular. 
The previously strong ties among the Nordic countries within the area of aid are not that 
important anymore. Finland is more oriented towards the EU than the Scandinavian countries. In 
the following chapter we shall mainly be leaving the domestic arena and present an overview of 
where the Nordic countries are disbursing their funds.  
                                                     
19 Interviews with Danish aid bureaucrats. 
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Chapter 3: Aid Patterns: Nordic Characteristics 
Introduction 
The aid policies of the Nordic countries probably had more distinct features previously than is the 
case today. Particularly since 1990, there has been broad convergence about goals and means 
among the major donors. Danielson and Wohlgemuth hold that while earlier it was possible to talk 
about a distinct Swedish aid profile, the 1990s “[…] has placed Sweden more in the mainstream” 
(Danielson 2005: 520).  
Currently, all the major donors have made poverty reduction the overall goal of their 
development assistance. Ownership, harmonisation, and alignment are on everybody’s lips. 
Northern political leaders have been making statements about more aid to Africa, more aid to the 
LDCs, more aid on grant terms, etc. The Nordic countries have also been endorsing all these 
politically correct goals and means. Nonetheless, the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. This 
chapter will investigate to whom the Nordic countries are disbursing their aid, through which 
channels and why.20 The chapter will try to identify possible characteristics of Nordic aid patterns.  
Bilateral vs. multilateral aid: strong multilateral supporters, but 
bilateral shares on the increase 
The Nordic countries have traditionally been strong supporters of multilateral aid, and have 
disbursed a larger share of their aid multilaterally than most other donors. Several arguments have 
been important. As part of their general foreign policy and positions as small states, the Nordic 
countries have favoured strong multilateral organisations and solutions. The multilateral channels 
have also been perceived as being flexible, and possessing comparative advantages in areas that the 
Nordic countries have given special priority to. Moreover, the multilateral channel has been a way 
of easing the burden on the bilateral aid bureaucracies. This has been particularly important in 
periods of steady increase in the aid volume. The relevance of these arguments has varied over time, 
and does differ among the Nordic countries. The latter argument was particularly important in the 
1970s and 1980s. Today this argument seems most relevant to Finland, which is by far the smallest 
donor among the four.  
Denmark and Norway have more or less officially had a policy indicating a 50-50 split 
between bilateral and multilateral aid. As early as 1969 Norway developed a guideline suggesting 
that ODA should be equally divided between the two channels. This guideline was formalised in 
1972 (Stokke 2005). However, practice has differed among the Nordic countries, and generally 
bilateral aid has been given preference. In the course of the 1990s we observe a weakening of the 
position of multilateral aid in Sweden and Norway, while Finland and Denmark are keeping up their 
multilateral shares (see in the appendix for more details). Nonetheless, in the course of recent 
decades there has been a downward trend in the Danish contributions to multilateral organisations 
as well. A main reason for this trend is the desire to link aid interventions to general foreign policies 
and to raise national flags.  
In 2003 Finland was the Nordic country that gave by far the highest share to multilateral 
institutions, which is partly related to the argument referred to above. The Finnish share constituted 
44.6% of total aid. The figures for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden were 37.9%, 28.3%, and 25.9% 
                                                     
20 The aid patterns of the Nordic countries are compared with the DAC average. The DAC average 
includes the Nordic countries.  
CMI REPORT NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE? R 2006: 8 
 21 
respectively, placing Norway and Sweden close to the DAC average of 24.4% in 2003. The DAC 
average has been more or less constant since 1990. Internationally, there has been a tendency 
towards the bilateralisation of multilateral aid. This has also been a trend among the Nordic 
countries.  Bilateralisation of multilateral aid means that the donors earmark the use of their funds 
channelled through multilateral organisations. In practice, it gives the multilateral agencies less 
flexibility to spend their resources and may also decrease aid effectiveness. This tendency has 
therefore been criticised by the organisations themselves and by researchers.  
Nonetheless, despite a downward trend in multilateral aid all the Nordic governments have 
made fairly strong statements about their desire to strengthen this channel in order to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals. According to the current Swedish government and its Policy for 
Global Development, which strongly underscores the importance of multilateral organisations, it is 
likely that the funds channelled to the UN in particular will increase in the coming years. Still, 
Sweden has not yet developed a multilateral aid policy or a strategy on how to meet the challenges 
that are outlined in the Policy for Global Development. It should be stressed that neither Finland nor 
Norway has developed multilateral aid strategies. In light of the great emphasis the Nordic countries 
give to the multilateral organisations, the lack of overall multilateral policies is striking, but 
exceptions do exist.21   
In 1996 Denmark launched a multilateral aid policy termed “active multilateralism”. This 
policy prescribed that Denmark should concentrate its efforts on a few organisations in order to 
increase Danish leverage and impact. There was also a call for better mechanisms to ensure the 
effectiveness of multilateral organisations’ aid operations. Moreover, together with the other Nordic 
countries, Denmark tried to build a network of like-minded partners for monitoring and evaluating 
the multilaterals. According to the DAC Peer Review of Denmark from 2003 active multilateralism 
has resulted in a more pro-active Danish approach. However, researchers are more sceptical about 
what has actually been achieved (Olsen 2005). 
Multilateral aid: the UN the greatest receiver 
To which organisations are the Nordic countries channelling their aid? One clear trend can be 
discerned. The Nordic countries have a strong preference for the UN agencies. In 2003 their 
contributions to the UN ranged from Sweden’s 14.4% of total multilateral aid to Norway’s 17.6% of 
total aid. The DAC average constituted 5.9% only. However, during the past decade a slight decline 
in the Nordic countries’ contributions to UN agencies can be observed. It is Sweden and Denmark 
that have effected the largest cut in their allocations to the UN. Danish aid bureaucrats point to the 
fact that several studies and evaluations have concluded that UN agencies are not very effective. 
This has resulted in a kind of UN scepticism among the political leadership and in the aid 
administration more generally, and partly explains the decline in the level of funds channelled to the 
UNDP, which has repeatedly been blamed for inefficiency.  
The second largest receiver of Danish and Finnish multilateral aid is the European 
Commission (EC). This finding may support the argument presented in the previous chapter, where 
it was indicated that since 1995 Finland has become more oriented towards the EU (cf. Chapter 2). 
In 2003 the EC received 13.9% of Finland’s multilateral aid. The corresponding figures for 
Denmark and Sweden were 7.7% and 5.1% respectively. Norway is not a member of the EU, and 
therefore does not provide aid through the EC.  
Norway’s second largest multilateral receiver is the World Bank group, which received 6% 
of Norwegian multilateral aid in 2003. The second largest recipient of Swedish aid in 2003 was the 
Regional Development Banks. The figure here was 5.5% of total multilateral aid in 2003.22 Sweden 
                                                     
21 Interviews with Nordic aid bureaucrats. 
22 Sweden did not disburse aid to the World Bank group in 2003, but they received as much as 17.8% of 
Swedish aid in 2002. The blank columns for 2001 and 2003 are linked to technical and organisational issues 
and were doubled the subsequent years. See table under section 3.2 in the appendix. 
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has been channelling large funds to the African Development Bank in particular. This is due to its 
focus on LDCs, and as part of a strategy to strengthen regional actors and to promote African 
ownership (OECD 2005).                                       
Bilateral aid: a strong Africa focus 
From the onset Nordic bilateral aid has largely been channelled to Africa. The Nordic countries 
have directed a much higher share of their aid to Africa than have other bilateral donors. This has 
been the case even though Africa was hardly known to the Nordics before the aid epoch. Except for 
a few Swedish families that were involved in some limited trade with West Africa in the sixteenth 
century, a Danish ‘colony’ on the gold coast in the mid-1850s, some Norwegian whalers, and a 
group of missionaries, Africa as such represented a faraway mystery to the Nordics (Tostensen 
2002; Wohlgemuth 2002). Today it is development assistance that is the main link between Africa 
and the Nordic countries. Many Nordic diplomatic missions in African countries were only 
established after the aid agencies were located there.  
So why this focus on Africa? The answer is as complex as the question is simple. A basic 
principle for Nordic development assistance has been to provide support to the ‘poorest people in 
the poorest countries’. There are many poor people in Africa, but that is also the case in Asia. The 
explanation is therefore partly accidental. But when they first ended up in Africa, why did they 
concentrate their aid in a particular group of countries? That English was the language that was 
spoken by the elite was another important criterion for their involvement. The main bulk of their 
long-term development partners have therefore been located in Eastern and Southern Africa where 
English is the most common foreign language. Far fewer Nordic aid bureaucrats and politicians had 
a command of French, Portuguese, or Spanish. Engaging in huge aid programmes would therefore 
have been much more complicated in many West African countries, for example. In addition, 
several East and Southern African countries had housed Nordic missionaries. In the early 1960s 
Tanzania had as many as 50 Nordic missionaries, who also functioned as aid lobbyists (Koponen 
2002). It was the Scandinavian countries that first got involved in Africa, while Finland was more 
of a latecomer. For Finland, it was natural to become involved in many of the same countries as the 
Scandinavians (cf. Chapter 2).       
The Nordic Africa focus has been maintained over the years, and at a much higher level 
than the DAC average. In the period 1990 to 2003, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark channelled on 
average approximately 50% or more of their allocable bilateral aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
figure for Finland is 44.5%. The DAC average in the same period is only 28.9%.  
Nevertheless, over the last few years we observe a downward trend in the Nordic countries’ 
aid allocations to Sub-Saharan Africa. While Denmark in 1990 disbursed 59.2% of its allocable 
bilateral aid to Africa, the share had fallen to 51.5% in 2003. If we are looking at the figures for 
Sweden the share going to Sub-Saharan Africa has decreased even more. While Sub-Saharan Africa 
received as much as 61.7% of total Swedish allocable bilateral aid in 1990, this figure had dropped 
to 53.6% in 2003. The share of Finnish allocable bilateral aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa was 
58.2% in 1990, but declined throughout the 1990s and accounted for 48.2% of total allocable 
bilateral aid in 2003. In Norway the share of total allocable bilateral aid going to Sub-Saharan 
Africa constituted as much as 65% in 1990. This share was down to 47.7% in 2003.  
Why the decline in Nordic aid to Africa in the 1990s and onwards? The downward trend in 
the share going to Africa in the 1990s has several causes. Firstly, the cuts were related to the general 
aid cuts resulting from economic problems in the Nordic countries. In addition, after the lost decade 
of the 1980s, the Nordic aid bureaucrats and politicians were disillusioned with African leaderships. 
Among other issues, several cases of grand corruption contributed to this. Furthermore, in the 1990s 
aid became a more integrated part of the Nordic countries’ foreign policy. Traditional foreign policy 
issues such as security were linked to development assistance. In addition, humanitarian aid grew in 
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importance, and many of these operations were not located in Africa. As a result Nordic aid became 
both more politicised and more widely spread geographically.  
Nonetheless, more recent events, such as the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, have put Africa 
high on the agenda of the major donors. Nordic political leaders have renewed their strong 
commitment to Africa, where development co-operation constitutes the most important part so far. 
The same Danish government that a few years ago decided to phase out three main partner countries 
in Africa launched a new Africa strategy in 2005. This strategy declares that as much as two-thirds 
of Danish aid will go to Africa. The Danish government is currently in the process of picking a new 
long-term partner country on the continent. Due to the rise in the Danish GNI and the commitment 
not to let the share of ODA/GNI fall below 0.8% a new partner is needed. The new long-term 
partner country will be revealed in the autumn of 2005.   
Sweden launched a new Africa strategy as early as the late 1990s, signalling the need for a 
new approach in light of the many challenges facing the continent. The Swedish strategy integrated 
the emerging view on ownership for sustainable changes to take place.  A major message was that 
aid must go hand in hand with other means, such as trade and investment. Despite their strong focus 
on Africa, Finland and Norway have never developed comprehensive strategies for their 
involvement. 
Broad patterns of Nordic aid to Asia: not only the poorest ones 
While the links between the Nordic countries and Africa over the last fifty years have mainly been 
related to development assistance, their relationships with Asia are more complex. However, in 
terms of aid volume Asia plays a less important role. In this sense the Nordic countries differ from 
most other donors. If, for example, we look at the DAC average and lump together aid to South, 
Central and Far East Asia, contributions to these regions constituted on average 33.5% in the period 
1990 to 2003. Looking at figures for the Nordic countries in the same period, they are 24.3% for 
Sweden; 22.6% for Norway; 29.9% for Finland; and 28.9% for Denmark. As we can observe, the 
relative share of Finland’s and Denmark’s aid to Asia is somewhat higher than for Sweden and 
Norway.  
Only Sweden among the Nordics has developed an explicit Asia policy. The first, launched 
in 1999, was called “Our Future with Asia, A Swedish Asia strategy for 2000 and beyond” 
(Government of Sweden 1999). This strategy is in the process of being updated in light of their 
Policy for Global Development.  
While the number of people living on less than one dollar a day has been dramatically 
reduced since 1990 in Asia, the number of poor people living in Africa is increasing (Government 
of Norway 2003: 24). Still, two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor people live in Asia, more than 
half of them in India and China. At the same time several Asian countries are experiencing 
economic growth at a speed and level widely outpacing Africa. Many of these expanding markets 
are of great interest to the Nordic countries. The other side of the coin is that many of the prospering 
countries suffer great environmental damage and human rights violations are common. The 
continent harbours extremely volatile conflicts as well.   
Currently, Norway is left with two main partner countries in Asia, namely Bangladesh and 
Nepal. Other partner countries in this region are Afghanistan, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, East Timor and the Palestinian areas. Sweden has five main partner countries in Asia: 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Other partner countries are Afghanistan, 
India, Thailand, Mongolia, the Philippines, China, and Indonesia. Denmark has four main partner 
countries in Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Vietnam. Other partner countries are 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and India.23 Finland’s aid efforts are more concentrated and have been 
reduced to only two main partner countries in Asia, Nepal and Vietnam, while only Afghanistan has 
the status of a partner country (Government of Finland 2005). It can be mentioned that with regard 
                                                     
23 Interviews with aid bureaucrats in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. 
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to Vietnam Sweden and Finland were the only Western donors that stayed behind from the late 
1970s onwards. The decisions to sustain the aid relationships with Vietnam were controversial and 
much discussed in both countries, especially in Sweden. 
Even if the main and overall goal of their involvements in Asia is poverty reduction, other 
interests and concerns are more visible in this region than in Africa. Very simply, it seems 
justifiable to state that in terms of development assistance the Nordic countries have a two-fold 
strategy in Asia. In their long-term relationships with the poorest countries, mainly located in South 
Asia, their main goal is related to poverty reduction. This includes countries such as Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Bhutan, and Cambodia. All the Nordic countries have development partnerships with 
Vietnam, Sweden being the first Western country initiating bilateral aid with the then North-
Vietnam in 1970. Vietnam is soon to graduate to middle-income country status and the Nordics are 
therefore preparing for a transit or an exit strategy.   
While long-term relationships with engagements in several sectors characterise the Nordic 
countries’ aid efforts in South Asia, aid efforts in South-East Asia are concentrated on a few chosen 
sectors, based on strategic considerations. All the Nordic countries emphasise the environment, 
security, human rights and good governance, as well as private sector involvement.  
Other Nordic characteristics  
As has been illustrated in this study, there are certainly distinct differences among the Nordic 
donors. Nonetheless, their aid patterns have many common features, which will be discussed in 
more detail below.   
Strong poverty orientation 
The Nordic countries disburse a higher share of their aid to so-called low income countries 
(LDCs)24 than the DAC average. In the period 1990-2003 the Scandinavian countries allocated on 
average around 50% of their bilateral aid to LDCs, compared to a DAC average of 25.8%. The 
figure for Finland in the same period is 42%. As is illustrated in the appendix, Finland is less 
poverty-oriented than the Scandinavian countries. The sources do not explain this divergence, but 
one possible explanation might be, as was argued above, that Finland in general is less driven by 
‘developmentalist’ concerns than the Scandinavians. It is still clear that the Nordics are 
considerably more poverty-oriented than most other donors. A downward trend in the LDC shares 
can be observed over recent years. The decreases are partly linked to the fact that more has been 
channelled to conflict and transition countries in the Balkans and to the Palestinian areas. In the case 
of Norway, this reorientation is particularly evident. Among the top six recipients of Norwegian aid 
in 2003, three of them were not on the list of LDC countries: Iraq, Palestinian administrative areas, 
and Serbia- Montenegro. In 1990, on the other hand, the top six countries were all LDC countries 
that were also among the main partner countries.  
 
                                                     
24According to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, three criteria must be fulfilled to be 
classified as a LDC country. In 2003 these were: 1) “a low-income criterion, based on a three-year average 
estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion, above $900 for 
graduation)”; 2) “a human resource weakness criterion, involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) 
based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) education; and (d) adult literacy”; and 3) “an economic 
vulnerability criterion, involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) 
the instability of agricultural production; (b) the instability of exports of goods and services; (c) the economic 
importance of non-traditional activities (share of manufacturing and modern services in GDP); (d) 
merchandise export concentration; and (e) the handicap of economic smallness (as measured through the 
population in logarithm); and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters” 
(http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/ldc%20criteria.htm).  
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Sector preferences: the soft ones  
In the 1970s and 1980s, soft sector issues were not that high on the agenda of the Nordic countries. 
This changed from the late 1980s onwards, spurred by the documented negative social effects of the 
structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank and the 20-20 initiative launched 
at the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen. In 2003, Norway, Finland and Denmark channelled 
more than 40% of their bilateral aid to ‘Social Infrastructure and Social Services’ which include the 
following sectors: education, health, water, sanitation, good governance and civil society (for more 
numbers and details consult the appendix). The figure for Sweden is somewhat lower than for the 
other Nordic countries, but still higher than the DAC average of 31.4%. Norway and Finland in 
particular have dramatically increased their support to these areas. In 1990, the figure for Finland 
was 12.4%, but this share rose dramatically over the next decade and constituted 46.9% in 2003. In 
1990, Norway disbursed 17.6% of total aid to this sector. This share had risen to 60.2% in 2002. 
The Danish allocation to ‘Social Infrastructure and Social Services’ did not increase from 
1990 to 2003. While the Danish share constituted 45.1% in 1990, in 2003 the figure was 43.1%. In 
the course of the 1990s there have been great fluctuations in Danish spending on this sector. While 
the percentage was more than 50% in 1999, the figure was only 22.3% in 2000. Such fluctuations 
can be related to the fact that the DAC database at the sector level only captures commitments; 
actual disbursements cannot be traced. The figures at the sector level can therefore only be used to 
discover trends over longer time spans. It should be noted however, that under the current aid 
regime (cf. Chapter 4) donors’ sector allocations may tell less about donor preferences than was the 
case previously. As a matter of principle, under the current regime the donors are only to be 
involved in a very limited number of sectors, aligned with the priorities of the recipient and 
harmonised with the activities of other donors. According to the DAC, Denmark did not enter the 
education sector in Tanzania first and foremost because there were already too many donors in that 
particular sector (OECD 2003). 
Generally, education has been a minor sector to Denmark. A most important sector for 
Danish interventions has been the water and sanitation sector, but the commitments to this sector 
have decreased over the last four years. Instead, there has been an increase in the commitments to 
support good governance and civil society. Nonetheless, with regard to sector preferences, Denmark 
differs considerably from the other Nordic countries in one respect and that is the relatively large 
allocations to economic infrastructure and the productive sectors. This preference underscores the 
importance Denmark assigns to economic growth as an imperative in order to achieve poverty 
reduction.  
In Finland there is one very significant development over the last thirteen years. Previously, 
Finland had a strong preference for the productive sectors such as forestry and industry. Their 
commitments to these sectors have decreased dramatically. Instead, their involvement in the 
education sector and in good governance and civil society has experienced massive growth. For 
Norway, a dwindling involvement in economic infrastructure and an increasing concern for the 
education sector, good governance, and civil society services are the most pronounced patterns. On 
the part of Sweden, it is the decrease in their commitment to the productive sectors that is most 
striking. While this sector represented 27% of total aid in 1990, the share had dwindled to 2.9% in 
2003 (for more details on sector allocations, see the appendix).  
On grant terms 
Another characteristic of Nordic aid is that their aid is basically provided on grant terms. While the 
non-grant share of bilateral aid for the average DAC country in the period 1990-2003 was 22.3%, 
the figures for the four Nordic countries were: 2.8% for Denmark; 4.1% for Finland; 1.0% for 
Norway; and 0.8% for Sweden. The non-grant shares for Norway and Sweden are generally a little 
lower than those of Denmark and Finland. The figures have been more or less stable over the last 
thirteen years, except for some sporadic fluctuations. With respect to the DAC average we observe a 
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considerable decrease from 27.5% in 1990 to 15.3% in 2003. The reason for this significant drop is 
partly related to the international focus on the negative aspects of non-grant aid over recent years.   
Favouring good governments 
The Nordic countries were among the pioneers in linking development aid and human rights. 
Supporting democracy and human rights has been a principal objective of Swedish development 
assistance since its very inception in the early 1960s, even though it was initially not given much 
emphasis in practice (Dunér 1991). In the mid-1970s, Norway brought human rights considerations 
into the aid debate, and issued a special White Paper on the subject. Nevertheless, it took more than 
a decade before these considerations evolved into more direct linkages between development aid 
and human rights (Selbervik 1997). In 1986, Norway made human rights an objective of 
development assistance and was followed by Denmark in 1987 (Krab-Johansen 1995). Here too, 
Finland was a latecomer and did not join the Scandinavians until the 1990s. But in the 1980s the 
focus was more on protection than promotion and on how to react to grave human rights violations 
by applying negative conditionality. In the late 1980s the donors increasingly started to focus on 
direct support and on fostering human rights and democratisation by supporting human rights 
organisations, law societies and so on. Instead of directly penalising the bad reformers by cutting or 
reducing the level of aid, except in cases of deliberate, systematic and gross human rights 
violations, the Nordic countries declared that they would favour good governments instead (see e.g. 
Government of Norway, 1995; Government of Norway  2000 ). But did they do that in practice?  
Recently a study addressed that specific question. The analysis employs a data set covering 
the period 1980 to 1999 and as many as 91 recipient countries. The study concludes that the Nordic 
countries’ aid allocations do in fact diverge considerably from the patterns of other bilateral donors. 
The Nordic countries disburse more funds to democratic countries and also to some extent favour 
good human rights records. Moreover, the study found that, unlike most other bilateral donors, the 
Nordics are rarely motivated by strategic concerns. The Nordic countries do not give preference to 
their political allies in terms of extra funds (Gates 2004).  
Long-term aid relationships 
Another characteristic of Nordic aid is an emphasis on long-term partner countries. This has often 
been viewed as a strength. It has allowed them to build capacity and expertise within their own aid 
administrations. At the same time, they have built trust and credibility among government officials 
and stakeholders within the partner countries. For many years they had 10 to 20 long-term partners, 
which received the main bulk of their bilateral aid. There is a remarkable stability and continuity in 
the long term partners of the Nordic countries. Despite some temporary ruptures, countries such as 
Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, and Mozambique have been important receivers of Nordic aid 
for decades.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, besides the debate on volume, there has been one 
other issue that has caused great discussion in the Nordic countries; namely, the selection of 
recipients. At an early stage the various Nordic countries developed criteria for country selection. 
The formulation and emphasis on various criteria have varied among the Nordic countries. 
Nonetheless, the criteria for selecting partner countries have involved the following: the recipient 
shall be among the poorest countries; its government shall be development-oriented; and pursue a 
socially just policy. In 1976 Norway added respect for human rights to the list of criteria (Stokke 
2005: 473). But, as Olav Stokke maintains, most of the countries were selected prior to the 
formulation of criteria.  
It is probably Denmark which has developed the most comprehensive list of criteria. These 
were developed by parliament in 1989 and are still used as a means of screening new recipients. 
These criteria include: 1) recipients’ needs and the quality of their development planning; 2) the 
recipients’ capacity to absorb foreign aid; 3) the potential to promote sustainable development; 4) 
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the potential for promoting human rights; 5) the potential for promoting gender equality; 6) 
previous Danish experiences in the country; 7) if all other criteria are fulfilled: the possibility of 
promoting Danish business interests and employment. It should be underscored that the DAC has 
strongly advised the Danish parliament to delete the last criterion (DAC 2003: 27). 
The country selection process was highly politicised in the 1970s and 1980s. Aid to 
countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua caused great debate both inside and outside the parliaments 
of the Nordic countries. Today, aid interventions are mainly driven by external conditions and even 
the country selections are more or less ‘above political debate’. Zimbabwe may constitute a more 
recent exception to this trend, but only because the political situation became extreme. One might 
argue that country selection criteria are still ideological. In the 1990s, the poverty criteria were 
retained, but increased emphasis was given to good governance and commitment and willingness to 
reform. Some scholars and critics claim that the content of such commitment is ideological and 
strongly linked to a certain view associated with the International Financial Institutions in 
Washington. 
The Nordic countries were still emphasising long-term partnerships, but in the 1990s the so-
called long-term partners were receiving a progressively smaller share of total bilateral aid.  Their 
aid operations became more widely spread. This development took place under the heading of 
advancing more flexible aid policies. A more urgent and different type of assistance, humanitarian 
assistance, constituted an increasing share of their aid. The Nordic countries expanded their 
operations to countries like Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
Middle East. In the 1990s, even a small donor such as Finland was involved in more than 100 
countries.  
Numerous evaluations and DAC reviews have strongly urged the Nordic countries to 
concentrate their aid efforts so as to make their intervention more efficient and effective. Currently, 
their officially declared policy is to follow this advice and have fewer long-term partners and, more 
generally, concentrate their aid operations in fewer countries. According to the Finnish government 
60% of its total bilateral aid shall be disbursed to long-term partner countries (Government of 
Finland 2005). Even if Finland has managed to reduce the number of long-term partners to eight, in 
practice this has been a difficult process as the government wants to keep the political flexibility 
that will be lost if a larger share of Finnish aid is tied up with long-term partners. Swedish aid 
bureaucrats claim that on the issue of concentration, Sweden has not come very far despite the fact 
that the parliament has signalled that the number of countries should be reduced.25 Sweden is still 
heavily involved in 45-50 countries. Country selection is not an area for Sida, but is purely a 
political matter. Sweden used to have approximately 20 long-term partners. In 2003 Sweden had 30 
so-called long-term and substantial recipients and Sweden was involved in 111 countries in total 
(OECD 2005: 26). 
Denmark has recently reduced the number of long-term partners from 20 to 15. However, 
despite great efforts to concentrate its aid, more than 30% is allocated to around 70 non-priority 
recipients, whereas another 30% is not country specific. The latest DAC review of Norway claims 
that despite ambitions to concentrate its aid Norway’s bilateral aid is still dispersed and Norway is 
currently involved in as many as 120 countries, thus making Norway the donor that is involved in 
the largest number of recipients. Still, the number of main partners is only seven and all of them are 
LDCs. The number was reduced from eleven to seven in 2001, but the main partners are not yet 
receiving an increasing share of bilateral ODA (OECD 2005: 22). 
Weak links between aid, private investment and trade  
While many donors such as the US, Japan, and France are allocating the bulk of their aid to 
countries where they have important trade and investment interests, the overall picture is somewhat 
different for the Nordic countries (World Bank 1998). All in all there are weak links among their 
                                                     
25 Interviews with Swedish aid bureaucrats. 
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aid allocations and their trade and investment patterns. There are few differences among the Nordic 
countries in this regard. As is documented in the Appendix, the Nordic countries trade almost solely 
with Europe and North America. While the Nordic countries disburse approximately 50% of their 
total aid to sub-Saharan Africa, both their imports from and exports to this region are less than 1% 
of their total imports and exports. For Asia the figures are higher. The Nordics do import and export 
more to Asian countries than to African countries. The figure for Denmark in 2003 was 
approximately 10% for both imports and exports, for the other Nordics the figures were somewhat 
lower.  
Looking at the figures on foreign direct investment, the picture is similar (cf. the appendix). 
Europe is the region that receives by far the largest share of Nordic direct investment. In general, 
markets in sub-Saharan Africa have not been very attractive for Nordic private investors, despite the 
fact that various tools have been developed as a means of stimulating Nordic investors. In 2002, 
0.11% of Swedish direct investments were in Africa, while the figure for Denmark in the same year 
was 0.3%. For Asia the figures are higher. Parts of Asia are becoming important markets for private 
investors, but not first and foremost the LDC countries. The figures for Norwegian and Finnish 
direct investment in Asia in 2002 were 5.6% and 2.0% respectively of their total direct investment. 
The expanding markets in Asia are of far greater interest to Nordic investors. In Far East Asia (e.g. 
countries such as China, Malaysia and Indonesia) the links between development assistance and 
more commercial interests are visible. It is likely that there will be a continuous and strong increase 
in the share of investments in the more advanced Asian economies in the years to come. If African 
economies become more developed and conditions more favourable to private investors, it is likely 
that a similar trend will be visible there. 
In the donor community in general and the Nordic countries in particular private investment 
and trade are being given increasing attention. Until at least the late 1980s the private sector was 
largely treated as something that was at variance with the development objectives of the Nordic 
countries. Today this is different and it is treated as a key sector. Denmark in particular has been a 
driving force in stimulating private sector development in developing countries. It is now widely 
acknowledged that a vibrant private sector is of fundamental importance for a country’s economic 
and social development. 
The Nordic countries’ approach to private sector development is twofold. On the one hand, 
they try to promote relations between private companies in the donor country.26 On the other hand, 
and allegedly more importantly, they try to improve conditions for the private sector in the partner 
countries. The fact that the latter was strongly neglected for decades had to do with the strong 
ideological basis of the Nordic countries’ aid involvements.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the broader features of Nordic aid patterns over the last 10-15 years. 
It has shown that, in spite of differences, the Nordic donors have many common characteristics 
compared to the DAC average. Denmark and Finland in particular disburse a larger share of their 
aid through multilateral channels than the average donor community. All the Nordic countries have 
a strong preference for the UN agencies relative to other multilateral organisations. Most of their 
allocable bilateral aid is channelled to Africa, even though it is in Asia that Nordic business interests 
are more active. Generally speaking, during the past decade the Nordic countries have disbursed a 
gradually larger share of their aid to health, education, good governance, and civil society, with the 
exception of Denmark, where the figures have been more stable. Denmark is in reality the only 
country among the four that through its sector support strongly emphasises economic infrastructure, 
despite the fact that all of the Nordic countries attach great importance to private sector 
development. More than other countries, the Nordics are in practice giving priority to the poorest 
countries and those with the best human rights records. 
                                                     
26 See the appendix on the Nordic countries’ private sector development funds. 
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Chapter 4: On coherence, harmonisation and the new 
aid modalities: feeling the way?  
Introduction 
The Millennium declaration of September 2000, the International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey and the Johannesburg World Summit in 2002, the Roma declaration of 
2003, and the Paris Declaration of March 2005 were among several events which spurred an 
ongoing process of rethinking the whole relationship among the developed countries in the north 
and the developing countries in the south. Taking the content of these declarations literally: a new 
aid architecture was emerging.  
Even though many of the ideas had been around for some time, the approach was now more 
coherent and given an official stamp of approval by the donor community as well as their partners 
in the south. The main messages emanating from the above mentioned international events is that 
not only should the recipient countries show commitment and make their national policies coherent 
in the pursuit of poverty reduction, but so should the donors. In addition, donors should harmonise 
their activities, an increasing share of donor funds should be general budget support, and donors’ 
policies and activities should be aligned with the wishes of the recipient country. In other words: the 
strategy is ambitious. It is expected that ownership will be strengthened at the receiving end, 
transaction costs will be reduced and aid delivery will be more effective. The partners, donor and 
recipient countries, have agreed to go for one overall goal: poverty reduction.  
At a general level, the content of the new aid architecture has hardly been contested. In 
official documents and policy statements most donors embrace it. But applauding these initiatives is 
one thing; integrating them into national aid policies and implementing them in practice something 
else. This chapter will briefly outline the policies of the Nordic countries on issues such as 
coherence, harmonisation, and the new aid modalities. It should be underscored that many of these 
issues have not been or are in the process of being implemented. Making any definite assessments is 
therefore premature. In addition, many of these issues are broad and complex and can not be dealt 
with within the scope of this project. What we can do is to summarise the main approaches of the 
Nordic countries and point at similarities and differences, as well as discuss some of the problems 
and dilemmas which arise in the first stage of implementation. 
On coherence: ambitious policies, but is practice lacking behind? 
Coherence is currently most profoundly linked to Millennium Development Goals (MDG) number 
8: to ‘develop a global partnership for development.’ Coherence is in this context seen as imperative 
for poverty reduction. However, policy coherence for development is not something new. In the 
context of development assistance the term stems from a high level meeting at the DAC in 1991, 
where it was acknowledged that policies towards developing countries ought to be made more 
coherent so as to make aid more effective. The essence of the concept was captured in the term 
‘policy coherence for development’ (OECD 2003). And, as usual, it did not take long before the 
concept of coherence was integrated into the aid policies of the Nordics.  
In the 1990s, the Nordic countries, especially the Scandinavians, produced White Papers 
and strategies on aid that put an emphasis on coherence. For example, as early as 1996, the 
Norwegian parliament agreed that development aid must be addressed in a broader North-South 
context. It was underscored that policies for coherence should not only have consequences for 
development assistance: “it must have consequences for what we are doing in foreign policy and 
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trade policy” Recommendation to parliament No. 229, 1996: 7–8 quoted from Stokke 2005). 
Coherence has also been an underlying theme for Swedish and Danish development assistance 
(Danielson 2005; Olsen 2005; Government of Sweden 2003). The need for greater coherence was 
particularly stressed in Danida’s strategy document ‘Partnership 2000’ and in the ‘World of 
Difference of 2003’ (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003). Coherence has also been a theme of 
Finnish aid policy, but was not properly defined until the White Paper of 2004 (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Finland 2004). Furthermore, while coherence has been a policy objective of the Nordic 
countries for some time, the issue of coherence has been put higher on their political agendas in the 
course of the last few years, strongly spurred by international events.  
Why coherence? The issue rests on a basic premise that better policy coherence will 
improve poverty reduction. OECD has developed a check-list, which the member countries are 
recommended to employ in order to reveal inconsistencies across various policy areas. It has also 
signalled that, along with its regular Peer Reviews of the member countries, the DAC will 
investigate whether member countries are making efforts towards achieving coherence. This implies 
that the member countries must obtain information about coherence and assess what can be done to 
make real improvements in practice.  
What does ‘policy coherence for development’ mean? In this context, coherence has two 
broad meanings. Firstly, it means that the aid policy of a donor must be consistent. The donor 
should, for instance, speak with one voice multilaterally as well as bilaterally. The second meaning 
of the concept refers to a kind of coherence that embraces all policy areas of the donor country that 
may have an impact on the partner country. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses it 
in the following way:  
 
[it] means that both developed and developing countries should ensure that the 
relevant policies do not have side effects that undermine the fight against poverty. 
Relevant policies in this context are those in the fields of trade, environmental 
protection, both local and global, migration (e.g. in connection with remittances, 
brain drain and brain gain), technology transfer, knowledge development and 
capacity building, security issues, investment and development assistance 
(Government of Norway 2005: 5). 
 
In other words, the essence of the concept is that all policy areas should be made to contribute 
towards poverty reduction. Areas such as trade, investment, health, education, agriculture, the 
environment, and development co-operation ought to be coherent as well as consistent with the aim 
of reaching the internationally agreed development goals, the OECD claims. The DAC member 
countries have approved this stance; policy coherence should be the common denominator of all 
donor governments’ policies (OECD 2002). Despite the approval of the member countries, DAC 
explicitly acknowledges that practising coherence may involve great challenges, because it will 
conflict with the domestic interests of the donor countries in some areas.   
How are the Nordic countries approaching policy coherence for development? Perusing 
policy documents and strategies, it is difficult to grasp how the policy of coherence is going to be 
put into practice. Clearly, operationalised strategies seem to be lacking. The issue of coherence is 
referred to in rather general terms, but the content of it is ambitious. The Norwegian government 
formulates it this way: “Coherence is critical, both in the North and in the South. And the burden 
here is first and foremost on us, the rich countries of the world. This means taking a hard look at our 
own policies, and making sure that they reflect the commitments we have made. This means having 
sufficient capacity to sustain a national debate not only on the effects of particular policies, but also 
on how they can be adjusted and changed” (Government of Norway 2005: 4). Despite the Nordics’ 
strong emphasis on coherence, so far only Sweden has developed a special policy document on the 
subject (Government of Sweden 2003). The policy has been approved by the Swedish parliament. 
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 Sweden has by far the most ambitious approach to coherence. Its work has been 
characterised as pioneering.27 Work on a policy for global development was a process that started in 
1996/97 with the appointment of the Commission on Swedish Policy for Global Development 
(Globkom). The Globkom presented its report to parliament and to the government in 2002. This 
report was used as the point of departure in the writing of a pioneering government bill to 
parliament, called Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development (Swedish 
Government 2003). This bill is now referred to as the Policy for Global Development (PGD), or, in 
Swedish, PGU. The PGD was voted upon by the Swedish parliament, but it does not have legal 
status as a law. It has status as a guiding directive vis-à-vis the government. Nonetheless, Sweden 
became the first country in the whole DAC group to approve and put into practice an integrated 
policy for global development. PGD insists that all policy areas shall be coherent with the principles 
of equitable and sustainable global development (Government of Sweden 2003). Looking at the 
process more closely, it appears that work on coherence in Sweden greatly benefited from and 
adopted many of the ideas that were addressed internationally in that period (some of these were 
referred to in the introduction of this chapter). However, at the time, Swedes holding key 
international positions were pushing the coherence agenda in Sweden, as well as internationally.  
What has been achieved so far? This is an issue that is difficult to assess as of now and is 
clearly an area that requires more research. Nonetheless, based on the material employed for this 
study, a few very tentative answers can be provided. A majority of the informants claim that work 
on coherence has become stranded at the policy level. It has not reached the stage of 
operationalisation, they claim. One reason for this disappointing result is the fact that so far the 
focus has been on coherence with respect to aid. Aid bureaucrats claim that the main reason why the 
PGU has not got off the ground in Sweden is that the Swedish Prime Minister is not strong enough 
and not keen enough to make it a key government issue.  
Nevertheless, is it possible to trace any specific achievements resulting from the ‘policy 
coherence for development’? The informants respond rather vaguely. Swedish and Finnish aid 
bureaucrats mention achievements within areas such as the environment and good governance. 
Danish bureaucrats refer to areas such as the untying of aid. Whereas Denmark scored rather poorly 
until two years ago on the issue of tying (see table in the appendix), they are now in the forefront of 
encouraging the untying of development assistance. Denmark has even made a commitment to fully 
untie food aid over the next four year period: “[…] all parts of Denmark’s bilateral and multilateral 
development assistance will now be untied” (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005: 12). One 
achievement that is being singled out by a Norwegian aid bureaucrat is the launching of a new 
global health project. This project has allegedly been pushed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which has managed to pool and direct resources for health research in developing countries. 
Even if the funds contributed are still small, it is an important move in the right direction. The 
Nordic countries are also working to increase the number of Executive Directors from developing 
countries on the World Bank and IMF boards. 
Nonetheless, implementing coherence is a long-term process and not something that is 
likely to happen over night. Within all the Nordic countries, though, there seem to be strong 
personalities striving to move this agenda further. According to the high-ranking Swedish aid 
bureaucrat Ruth Jacoby, this process may consist of at least three stages: 1) increasing the 
knowledge of the fact that domestic policies in donor countries may affect poor countries positively 
or negatively; 2) identification of these effects; 3) identification of areas of conflict and where real 
interests diverge. She admits that there is a long way to go, but claims that Sweden has just entered 
the second stage.28 Moreover, in addition to sufficient political will effecting coherence does 
requires in-depth knowledge about the donor countries’ policies, referred to as stage two. Several of 
the Nordic countries are in the process of collecting more information on this topic. Norway, for 
                                                     
27 One may claim that it should not come as a surprise that it was Sweden that launched the most ambitious 
strategy on coherence, given its record as an innovative donor and its liberal tradition in areas such as trade.  
28 Interview with Ruth Jacoby, Swedish aid bureaucrat. 
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example, is awaiting the result of a pilot study on the effects of Norwegian policy on some selected 
areas in Pakistan, South Africa, Uganda, and Vietnam. One particular aim of the study is to identify 
which positions Norway has taken in international forums and negotiations.29 Sweden is also 
currently funding several studies on the issue.  
Which specific measures have been taken to make the Nordic countries’ policies more 
coherent? As underscored above, coherence goes far beyond narrow aid issues, and also beyond 
more traditional foreign affair issues, such as security. It captures, among other things, finance via 
involvement in the IMF and World Bank, health and education through involvement in the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO) and so on. Sweden, Norway and Finland have departments within their 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs dealing with coherence. Denmark, the only country among the 
Nordics that does not have a department co-ordinating its policy on coherence, has a department co-
ordinating Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU.30 
In March 2002, the Norwegian government decided that various ministries should be 
engaged in a dialogue on areas of their policies that could negatively affect poverty reduction in 
developing countries. Currently, four ministries are involved in such a dialogue, and the idea is to 
include more. There is a plan to work out a relevant checklist for the various ministries on poverty 
reduction and coherence. It is also intended to establish a network consisting of key persons dealing 
with coherence in the relevant ministries (Government of Norway 2005). 
So far, several units have been created to improve coherence within more limited areas such 
as trade policy, natural resources, and environmental affairs. In addition, a unit for trade and private 
sector development has been set up. However, as is stated by the DAC, “Inter-ministerial policy 
coherence was mainly established through informal consultative meetings. This continues to be the 
rule and no separate unit for monitoring PCD has been or will be set up” (Government of Norway 
2005: 46).  
On 30 October 2003, the Finnish government appointed the Development Policy 
Committee (DPC), chaired by Director Gunvor Kronman. This is an expert group that consists of 
members from broad sections of Finnish society, such as NGOs, academics, political parties, and so 
on. Moreover, experts appointed from twelve different ministries are on the Committee. The DPC is 
an integrated part of the Finnish administrative set-up, but coherence is its main task. The 
Committee is an advisory body without any operational function of decision-making authority. In 
February 2005, the DPC delivered its first yearly statement: ‘State of Finland’s Development 
Policy’ to the Government. The mandate of the Committee is to stimulate an operational culture that 
favours consistency across different policy areas (Government of Finland 2004: 147). In addition, as 
part of the coherence agenda, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has tried to increase co-
operation between authorities and interest groups. According to the Ministry of Finance, coherence 
is also advanced by ministerial visits to developing countries (Government of Finland 2004). 
Sweden has undertaken several organisational changes in order to facilitate coherence: for 
example, it is currently in the process of establishing a citizens’ forum: ‘Forum for Global 
Development’. This Forum will have an independent secretariat and a budget to undertake six tasks: 
1) Promote broad dialogues within Swedish society; 2) Stimulate discussion of the diverse 
objectives as well as the annual PGD report; 3) Stimulate public debate on broad development and 
coherence issues; 4) Stimulate co-operation and co-ordination; 5) Encourage mutual learning; 
6) Contribute with concrete suggestions and ideas on PGD implementation (OECD 2005: 23). The 
forum will be broadly assembled, with representatives from parliament, researchers, the private 
sector, NGOs, and so on (Government of Sweden 2005).  
Denmark seems to be the Nordic country that has undertaken the fewest organisational 
changes for coherence. It should be mentioned though, that Denmark has by far the most compact 
and integrated organisation. Trade and security issues have been tightly integrated with aid policy 
                                                     
29 Interview with Norwegian aid bureaucrat. 
30 Interviews with Danish aid bureaucrats. 
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for more than a decade. In the Danish context, the fusion of Danida into the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1991 was a significant move towards greater policy coherence. Nonetheless, coherence 
with regard to the Danish European Union policy is probably better embedded organisationally than 
its policy towards the developing countries. In its EU policy, coherence is secured through a co-
ordination mechanism concerning government agencies, civil society, and the private sector.  
How has policy coherence for development been received in the Nordic countries? As 
mentioned above, the policy on coherence is very ambitious and may lead to opposition from 
affected domestic groups and from government departments and ministries whose primary 
responsibility is not necessarily that of poverty reduction. So far, based on interviews with aid 
bureaucrats in the Nordic countries, there is reportedly little resistance towards this new and 
ambitious way of thinking, even if not every key stakeholder is equally enthusiastic. It is claimed 
that in Denmark there has been little public debate on coherence.31 In Norway the Ministry has 
ostensibly been facing few problems in “selling” coherence to the parliament.32 In Finland, it is 
claimed that the policy has been widely supported by large segments of society, but bureaucrats 
admit that it is rather difficult to implement it. However, when there is more active implementation 
of coherence, more direct resistance may occur. Interestingly, in Sweden there have been some 
critical voices from NGOs and some segments of society.33 However, it does not seem to be a 
strong and influential opposition yet, and whether such arguments will carry any weight will only 
be known when real conflicts of interest are brought to the fore.  
What have been the main dilemmas and challenges in dealing with the policy of coherence? 
Aid bureaucrats at a lower level express confusion about how to deal with coherence in practice. In 
addition, interpretations of the definition of coherence seem to vary (Government of Finland 2005). 
All the Nordic countries apparently acknowledge that there are some areas that will be difficult, not 
to say impossible, to make coherent. This will, for example, involve measures that may threaten the 
jobs of Nordic workers. Subsidies to Norwegian farmers are a hard nut to crack in the light of 
coherence and so are arms exports in a Swedish context. All countries have their difficult areas. 
How are the Nordic countries doing with regard to coherence?  So far, it is difficult to 
assess this, as there are too few reports to rely on. The Nordic countries produce annual progress 
reports on MDG 8, but these reports are not meant to function as critical examinations. Sweden is 
currently in the process of establishing an independent evaluation agency, mandated by the PGD. 
The agency will be provided with funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but there are no 
strings attached. The agency is to identify and execute its own evaluations, but the Ministry may ask 
for evaluations when needed. It will have a advisory function vis-à-vis the Ministry. One may argue 
that the fact that the agency will only evaluate development co-operation issues is a weakness.34 If 
coherence is to be taken seriously the agency ought to have a broader mandate. Sweden and Norway 
have been pushing the OECD to take on board the issue of coherence monitoring, as they believe 
the organisation is in the best position to assess member countries’ policies. Nonetheless, the 
present leadership of the OECD has not been willing to assume this mantle, as this subject is viewed 
as too sensitive and political. Nevertheless, Norway and Sweden hope that the issue can be brought 
up again under the new leadership of the DAC.  
The Center for Global Development (CGD) has since 2003 made an index on ‘commitment 
to development’ which is regarded as a measure of coherence. CGD weighs various criteria related 
to 7 main areas: aid; trade; investment; migration; environment; security; and technology.35 All the 
Scandinavians get top scores with respect to the first dimension, which is partly related to aid 
                                                     
31 Interviews with Danish aid bureaucrats. 
32 Interviews with Norwegian aid bureaucrats. 
33 Interviews with Swedish aid bureaucrats. 
34 Interviews with Swedish aid bureaucrats. 
35 For more information, confer http://www.cgdev.org/ 
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volume, but also to selectivity.36 In 2005, Denmark was ranked as number 1, Sweden as number 3, 
Norway as number 5, and Finland as number 7. While Denmark and Sweden are doing rather well 
in many areas, Norway has a really low score in the area of trade, due to the protection of 
agricultural commodities and large subsidies to the agricultural sector.37 Norway also scores 
relatively low on the environment and rather average on other indicators. Finland, on the other 
hand, gets its lowest scores on aid and migration, but does quite well on the other topics. It should 
be noted that this index is somewhat disputed, but it is the only current comparative source on 
coherence.  
Summing up: On the issue of coherence, the Nordic countries seem to be way ahead of 
many other donors. There is still a great gap between policy and practice. In the long run, their 
credibility rests on real achievements in practice.  
To reach the stage of implementation a number of conditions must be present. Firstly, it 
requires that the whole government takes ownership in the content of coherence. Secondly, 
institutions and mechanisms must be in place so as to co-ordinate various ministries. Thirdly, 
practicing coherence may lead to many conflicts of interests and a body dealing with coherence 
ought to be given enough political weight to be able to give preference to coherence. Such a body 
should therefore probably be placed under the Prime Minister’s office. So far, many of these 
requirements seem to be lacking in the Nordic countries. In all of them coherence has in practice 
largely been an issue with respect to aid, and the bodies trying to co-ordinate policies to achieve 
coherence are located mainly in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Still, ministries and departments 
dealing with trade and security have to some extent taken real interest and ownership in the 
coherence agenda in all the Nordic countries.38  
What can be done to improve their policies on coherence? To single out the key areas is a 
great challenge to all the Nordic countries. The latest DAC Peer Review of Norway suggests that 
the parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs could cover possible impacts of policies 
enacted by other ministries on poverty reduction as well as aid. Moreover, it suggests that the 
committee’s examination of the bills could be broadened by taking into account other committees 
which have a significant impact on developing countries (Government of Norway 2003).  
Reducing transaction costs 
On new aid modalities  
Internationally, there is a common recognition of the fact that moving towards more sector 
programmes and budget support in particular at the expense of project aid will make aid more 
effective and produce better results. This is also agreed upon as part of the Paris Declaration as of 
March 2005. The goal is to provide as much as 66% of DAC members’ aid flows “in the context of 
programme-based approaches” (DAC 2005). All the Nordic countries have in recent policy 
documents given strong support to this view (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005; Government 
of Finland 2005; Government of Sweden 2003; Government of Norway 2005).  
What is sector and budget support? How do these aid modalities reduce transaction costs? 
Various kinds of budget and sector support exist. In practice, definitions and distinctions are 
somewhat blurred. Here it suffices to give the broad and general meanings. Budget support is 
                                                     
36 That the Nordic countries are scoring much higher on selectivity than other donors has recently been 
confirmed in a new study (cf. Chapter 3). 
37 Some Norwegian informants claimed that the ranking did not give an accurate picture of Norway. They 
believed that the ranking gave Norway unfair low scores on some areas. For example, one informant asserted 
that the ranking did not take into account that some subsidies had been removed (interviews with Norwegian 
bureaucrats).  
38 Interviews with Nordic aid bureaucrats. 
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defined by the fact that donor funds are merged with the recipient’s own resources and are utilised 
as part of the recipient’s public expenditure system. The aim of budget support is to finance the 
public budget. The funds are spent through the partner country’s own financial management 
systems and are administered through the partner country’s own financial procedures. The donor 
country can provide both general budget support and more specific budget support where the 
support is earmarked for a specific sector.  
Nonetheless, budget support is not provided unconditionally. All the Nordic countries have 
developed guidelines for budget support. There are slight differences among them, but a quote from 
the Swedish Globcom may capture the general and joint content: “A condition for budget support is 
that the country has an open and transparent budget and budget process. It is also required that the 
country respects human rights and promotes a democratic form of governance. The existence of 
good governance in the form of an effective, open public administration system is also key in the 
assessment of whether a country can be considered for support” (Government of Sweden 2004: 
225-226). A strict definition of these conditions suggests few aspiring candidates. 
In the course of the 1990s, many donors, including the Nordics, were gradually starting the 
move from project aid to sector programmes.39 This meant that support to one sector was organised 
within an overall framework, instead of having islands of separate projects. Sector programmes may 
take many forms and donors often operate with diffuse definitions. Nonetheless, there seems to be 
general agreement on the fact that in order to characterise aid as sector support there must at least be 
some kind of pooling of resources among the partners.  
Sector programmes in general and budget support in particular are perceived to be 
strengthening and promoting ownership in the partner countries, and will thus in the long run give 
more value for money. By providing aid as budget support, the recipient will have a better chance of 
being in the driver’s seat:  “An advantage of development assistance in the form of budget support 
is that development assistance funds are then subordinated to the parliament of the recipient 
country, which can then decide on their use” (Government of Sweden 2004: 369). It is also 
considerably more efficient, since parallel structures are avoided. However, there are some more 
strings attached: in combination with budget support, the donor attaches a capacity building 
component. The idea is to ensure quality of financial management tools and generally to ensure 
economic good governance. The DAC chair shall allegedly recently have noted that increased focus 
on budget support has lead to that all donors now are insisting on ‘getting involved in everything’. 
Some observers doubt therefore that budget support really has lowered transactions costs.   
What is the share of the Nordic countries’ disbursements to these aid modalities? The DAC 
data-base does not give us much assistance here, since there are no separate categories capturing 
these types of assistance. The figures and information presented here draw therefore on written and 
oral information collected at the headquarters in the Nordic countries. 
Norway provides some kind of budget support to all its main co-operation partners in 
Africa, with the exception of Zambia, but does not provide budget support to its two main co-
operating partners in Asia. The government of Bangladesh is less interested in budget support as 
long as it presupposes policy dialogue. The political situation excludes Nepal from the list of 
potential receivers. According to sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian budget 
support accounts for 6% of total bilateral aid. In the African countries that actually receive budget 
support, the figures are reported to be between 20 and 25% of the total Norwegian aid to these 
countries. The figures for sector assistance are higher.40 
In 2004, Denmark provided budget support to four countries: Tanzania, Benin, 
Mozambique, and Burkina Faso. According to Danida’s annual report, Denmark channelled 
approximately 1.9% of total Danish bilateral aid in the form of programme assistance, which most 
                                                     
39 It should be noted that in the late 1970s and early 1980s all the Nordic countries, but Sweden and Norway 
in particular channelled a much larger share of their aid as programme aid, in the form of import support and 
budgets support than what is the case today.   
40 Interviews with Norwegian aid bureaucrats. 
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often comes in the form of budget support (Government of Denmark 2005: 54). It is difficult to 
depict exactly how much is provided as sector aid. However, the figure for this category is allegedly 
much higher than for budget support. Danish informants go so far as to claim that ‘it is Denmark 
that has revolutionised sector aid’ (cf. Chapter 4). So-called sector wide approaches (SWAPs) 
constitute the backbone of modern Danish development co-operation. 
In 2004 Finland provided budgetary support to 3 countries: Tanzania, Mozambique, and 
Nicaragua. It has been difficult to trace the exact figures for budget and sector aid, but according to 
sources in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the combined total being disbursed as sector 
aid and budget support constituted 9.17% of Finnish bilateral aid in 2004.  
Currently, Sweden provides budget support to approximately 10 countries. According to 
sources in Sida, the percentage of sector and budget support amounted to approximately 8% and 5% 
respectively in 2004.41  
In the light of their strong political declarations about increasing the share of the new aid 
modalities, their actual contributions are rather modest. Why do actual disbursements not match 
official policies? There are several reasons for this fact. As mentioned above, a number of criteria 
must be fulfilled before budget support, for example, will even be assessed as a possible aid 
modality. In reality, the number of possible candidates is limited. In addition, it is only in the course 
of the last few years that all the Nordic countries have finalised their general guidelines for budget 
support, and new guidelines and somewhat revisited criteria are in the process of being assessed as 
part of the Paris agenda.  
Furthermore, in spite of strong public statements in favour of the new aid modalities 
scepticism is voiced in private in all the Nordic countries, even within some of the governments. 
According to Danish informants, Denmark is probably the country that is least likely to increase its 
share of budget support in the near future, especially under the current government. Parts of the 
Danida board, the political leadership of Danida, as well as many bureaucrats within Danida are 
unconvinced, they claim. Widespread scepticism is also present in Finland, but it seems somewhat 
less prevalent than in Denmark. In Sweden and Norway the situation is different. The political 
leadership is very positive when it comes to the new aid modalities. Generally, in Norway and 
Sweden there also seems to be a much stronger backing for the new aid modalities within the aid 
administrations, even though you still find sceptics and people with strong preferences for more 
‘old-fashioned’ aid modalities.   
Why the scepticism? A common argument held by the critics is that control over the funds 
is not good enough, particularly with respect to budget aid. A common perception is that, by 
providing budget support, funds are being disbursed into some kind of big black hole, quite possibly 
ending in the pockets of corrupt leaders. Many aid bureaucrats and parts of the political leaderships 
are fully aware that the so-called fungibility problem relates to project aid as well. Still, it has still 
been difficult to ‘sell’ the new aid modalities to some of the key stakeholders, particularly in 
Denmark. Danish aid bureaucrats claim that ‘for the time being budget aid has to be sold as sector 
support’.42 Denmark has not expressed a clear ambition on how it will increase its budget support. 
‘Only a sceptical limit exists’, Danish aid bureaucrats hold.43 Nonetheless, some Danish informants 
claim that, even if Denmark at the present stage is not quite ready for budget support yet, ‘that will 
come, but we do not want to be forced from the outside’.44 When the Danish Prime Minister has 
visited Africa he has expressed great enthusiasm for project aid. This may also partly explain why 
many Danish bureaucrats are hesitant on the issue of budget support.  
Norwegian aid bureaucrats, on the other hand, claim that in Norway the official position is 
that instead of formulating too many strict conditions, one ought to use the financial management 
systems of the recipients at a much earlier stage than is ‘ideal’. The argument is that one should 
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make use of budget support when the quality of the systems is acceptable, even if not quite 
satisfactory, they claim.45 Hence, Norway appears to have taken a much softer approach than the 
other donors. Moreover, on the issue of relying on and making use of the recipient countries’ 
institutions and mechanisms, both Norway and Sweden appear to be radical actors willing to take 
greater risks. 
On aid alignment and harmonisation  
Issues such as alignment and harmonisation are far less controversial, at least as a matter of 
principle, than budget support and have generally been broadly backed in the Nordic countries. All 
the Nordic countries are members of the so-called Nordic Plus group, which, in addition to the 
Nordics, includes the UK, the Netherlands, and Ireland. The Nordic Plus group appears to be a 
driving force for harmonisation and alignment – both as part of the Paris agenda and in the field. Of 
the Nordic countries, Sweden, Norway and sometimes Finland appear to be the most active 
countries among the Nordics.  
Many initiatives have been taken, of which only a few will be mentioned here. For instance, 
in Zambia, Norway has taken an active part in working out a plan for donor harmonisation. 
However, the harmonisation process in Zambia has also been heavily influenced by Sweden, the 
UK, and the Netherlands. In an effort to spur this process, the Nordic Plus countries developed a 
joint plan of action (JPA) in 2003 (OECD 2005). This was later submitted to the DAC Task Team 
on Harmonisation and Alignment. This is a very ambitious plan and included joint programming 
and evaluation as well as the pooling of technical assistance (TA). Currently, an evaluation of the 
Harmonisation in Practice (HIP) is about to be undertaken in Zambia, which in essence will be an 
assessment of the Nordic Plus countries. However, some actors within the Nordic group are 
somewhat sceptical towards the Nordic Plus co-operation, claiming that, in practice, the Nordic plus 
group often appears to be some kind of an elite group  – ‘the most clever ones on aid’. It would be 
more effective to establish broader alliances, Finnish informants claim. Others maintain that, in 
order to reach the MDGs and in order to really get the Paris Declaration off the ground, the Nordic 
Plus locomotive is needed.   
The Nordic countries are also trying out new ways of harmonising their activities. Both 
Sweden and Norway practice so-called silent partnerships or delegated partnerships, which quite 
substantially reduce administrative costs. Sweden has such arrangements with Norway in Malawi 
and the Netherlands in Mali. In addition to Malawi, Norway practices silent partnerships in Zambia 
with the Netherlands. Silent partnership means that a donor pools funds with another donor, which 
is the active part of implementation, reporting, and monitoring. Delegated partnerships mean that a 
donor delegates authority to another donor, which may involve particular appraisals, a complete 
sector or a country programme. The lead donor will have the authority to disburse funds and/or 
perform the policy dialogue (NORAD 2002). Denmark and Finland are currently not practicing 
either silent or delegated partnerships. 
However, because the harmonisation and alignment agenda is strongly driven by the Nordic 
Plus group, the pace and form of implementation will vary greatly from country to country. In 
addition, conditions in the partner countries in the south will differ. In reality, the Paris agenda 
seems presently more relevant to aid dependent countries in Africa than to many Asian countries, 
Nordic aid bureaucrats claim. Even if the Nordics are also trying to push this agenda in Asia, the 
group of pro-harmonisation donors is smaller, most of the countries are less aid dependent, and due 
to the fact that many donors in Asia do have strong strategic or economic interests in the region, 
many donors want to keep a strong bilateral link with partner countries.  
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Public opinion and the ‘new aid regime’: a perfect match? 
As mentioned above, you are also faced with the problems of fungibility with regard to project aid. 
Nonetheless, there is this perception that each donor is able to directly trace and report how its 
funds are spent. Projects can also be designed so as to satisfy interest groups in the donor country. 
This makes it easier to explain and justify aid to the public at home. The new aid regime involves 
more donor co-ordination, alignment with partner priorities and a move towards programme aid. 
Could the transition towards this new regime, where each donor’s contribution is not so easily 
identifiable, pose a public opinion challenge for donors?  
As discussed above, the Danish parliament is allegedly sceptical towards general budget 
support and so is part of the government. Nonetheless, according to informants at the Danish 
embassy in Dar es Salaam, when the Danish Minister for Development Co-operation visited 
Tanzania in 2004, he was sympathetic to Danish co-financing of sectoral basket funds. However, a 
large group of Danish journalists that visited the embassy was reportedly very sceptical to less 
direct control over Danish funds, and especially critical of budget support. Several aid bureaucrats 
saw a clear pedagogical problem in sustaining public support for aid when moving away from 
projects. In addition, many bureaucrats claim that there is a huge gap between praxis and rhetoric 
when it comes to the “new aid policy thinking”. This does in itself constitute a public opinion 
challenge, they claim. There seems to be a general perception among aid bureaucrats in Denmark 
that the public has little knowledge of the new forms of aid deliveries. It is therefore viewed as a 
great challenge to the aid bureaucracy to teach and enlighten the public and to sufficiently justify 
the new approach. It is feared that if this is not taken seriously, public support for aid may decrease. 
Danida is therefore genuinely discussing how this can be done in the best way possible.46  
Nonetheless, Finnish bureaucrats also saw it as a challenge to simultaneously move towards 
budget support and sustain the support of the Finnish public. As in Denmark, there has been great 
scepticism towards the new aid modalities. The Office of the Auditor General (AG) has also taken a 
more keen interest in aid issues, and as formulated by Finnish informants “it is more against budget 
support than for”. In addition, Finnish aid bureaucrats fear that a new big aid scandal may hamper 
the process towards more budget support. Moreover, they saw the “knowledge gap” as a great 
challenge. As one informant formulated it, “99% of Finns probably think that Finnish aid goes to 
projects”. There needs to be a focus on the advances made through the use of budget support, they 
claim, including an acceptable attention to corruption and an assurance that funds are allocated by 
recipient priorities through the PRS. Some Finnish aid bureaucrats maintain that they are seriously 
discussing how to deal with the issue of teaching the public about the new aid modalities.47 
Many Norwegian informants also saw it as a great pedagogical challenge to teach the public 
about the new aid modalities. And as one informant commented when the issue of budget support 
was brought up:  “there are so many horror stories on corruption and mismanagement of funds” 
from developing countries. Another Norwegian informant claimed that it is not clear “…how far 
one should take the public on these technical matters as long as the transition to the new aid regime 
has the support of the Norwegian parliament”. Generally, Norwegian aid bureaucrats were less 
concerned about how the public would respond with regard to the implementation of the new aid 
modalities. However, the Norwegian parliament has given its strong support to the new approach.48 
Most Swedish aid bureaucrats were even more relaxed than the Norwegians about the new 
aid modalities and public support for aid. Sida representatives at the embassy in Dar es Salaam did 
not see public support for the transition to the new aid regime as a big problem. In fact, one Sida 
                                                     
46 This section is based on interviews with Danish aid bureaucrats at the headquarters in Copenhagen and at 
the embassy in Dar es Salaam. 
47 This section is based on interviews with aid bureaucrats at the embassy in Dar es Salaam and at the 
headquarters in Helsinki. 
48 This section is based on interviews with aid bureaucrats at the embassy in Dar es Salaam and at the 
headquarters in Oslo. 
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representative argued that there is no strong pressure for Swedish development co-operation to be 
accountable to the Swedish public. Moreover, the new modalities and harmonisation strategies have 
broad political backing in Sweden, he claimed. Another bureaucrat was more nuanced and saw a 
huge challenge ahead in educating the Swedish public on these issues. We should try to convey the 
fact that, through project aid, we have seen the problems developing countries have in dealing with 
multiple donors and reporting mechanisms, and that the new aid regime is a response to these 
lessons, he maintained.49 
Summing up 
Different and somewhat contradictory currents can be discerned under the present aid regime. On 
the one hand, you have a trend towards increasing harmonisation and more sector programmes and 
budget support, at least at the level of policy. At the same time, there is a push towards proving 
results and real achievements to policymakers and the public. The donors are lowering their flag on 
some arenas, while they are raising it on others.  
However, important differences do exist among the Nordic countries. In Denmark there is a 
far stronger urge to control aid funds and less political will to give up ‘donorship’. At the end of the 
day, giving up donorship is a prerequisite in order to implement the objectives spelled out in the 
Paris declaration and the Millennium goals. Similar tendencies exist in Finland. In Norway and 
Sweden, the political climate is far more conducive regarding the new aid architecture. Nonetheless, 
both within the bureaucracy and at the political level you will find groupings that are more sceptical 
towards general budget support in particular, as well as the new approach in general.  
In all the Nordic countries, the modes and ways of dealing with aid are in the process of 
undergoing substantial changes, both in terms of how the donors organise their activities and how 
aid is delivered. At the same time, bureaucrats within all the Nordic countries do express some 
degree of worry. They fear the huge knowledge gap that exists with regard to the new aid modalities 
both among the public and among politicians. In Sweden and Norway, the bureaucrats appear more 
relaxed. Even if a grand scandal were to be revealed, there is a widely held perception that support 
for development aid would still be rock-solid.  
                                                     
49 This section is based on interviews with aid bureaucrats at the embassy in Dar es Salaam and at the 
headquarters in Stockholm. 
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Chapter 5: Country level operations under the new 
aid regime – the case of Tanzania 
Introduction 
For many of the donors present in the country, Tanzania is a major partner. According to informants 
at the Nordic embassies, this encourages donors to post highly qualified staff to their Tanzanian 
delegations. This in turn creates an environment where donors are more comfortable with handling 
sensitive issues and therefore more confident in experimenting with new ways of structuring their 
aid activities, they claim.50 Tanzania is one of the Nordic partner countries in which harmonisation, 
alignment, and the use of new aid modalities has come the farthest. It is therefore an interesting case 
with which to investigate how the Nordics have responded to the changes in the aid regime. 
 
Firstly, this chapter will give a background to the Nordic countries engagement in Tanzania, as well 
as an overview of trends in their levels of aid. Secondly, how the Nordic countries organise their aid 
activities at the country level is presented. The following sections deal with issues related to the new 
architecture of aid, such as the new aid modalities, the reduction of transaction costs, policy 
coherence, harmonisation, alignment, and ownership. How these issues are dealt with and perceived 
by the field organisations will be explored. Before the conclusion, we ask whether it is still the case 
that the Nordic Four make a joint radical force in development assistance in Tanzania. 
Background and historical trends 
Norway and Sweden were among the first bilateral donors in Tanzania.51 Their first reported aid 
disbursements were in 1962. Denmark reports its first ODA disbursement to Tanzania in 1965 and 
Finland in 1971. Table 1 gives the bilateral ODA (net) disbursement52 allocated to Tanzania from 
the Nordic countries and the total for DAC countries in the period 1980-2003.53 In 1980, Sweden 
was the largest Nordic donor, followed by Norway, Denmark, and then Finland. This relative 
ranking remained unchanged until 1986. From 1987 to 1995 there was no consistency in the ranking 
of the Nordic countries in terms of their contributions to Tanzania, except for the fact that Finland 
remained the smallest contributor of the four. From 1996 onwards, Denmark was the largest Nordic 
donor in Tanzania, followed by Norway, Sweden, and Finland.54  
                                                     
50 This chapter is largely based on interviews conducted with Nordic aid bureaucrats located at their 
respective embassies in Dar es Salaam, as well as with staff from the headquarters. See the bibliography for a 
list of interviewees. 
51 The DAC IDS database on aid disbursements currently covers the period 1960-2003. According to this 
database, only the United States and the United Kingdom reported ODA disbursements to Tanzania in 1960. 
These two bilateral donors were joined by Germany and Canada in 1961. By 1962, there were seven bilateral 
donors reporting disbursements to Tanzania: Austria; Canada; Germany; Norway; Sweden; the United 
Kingdom; and the United States.  
52 Net disbursement of ODA is the sum of grants and loans extended, minus repayments by the recipient. 
53 There are 22 countries in DAC. Of these 22 countries, only Portugal does not report ODA disbursements to 
Tanzania in the DAC IDS database. 
54 Except for the years 2000- 2002, when Sweden was a larger donor to Tanzanian than was Norway. 
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Table 1: Bilateral ODA (net disbursements, million USD in 2002 constant prices) to Tanzania:  
1980 to 2003, Nordic countries and DAC total 
 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Nordic % DAC DAC 
1980 53 26 69 91 29.7 808 
1981 61 25 64 97 31.1 798 
1982 79 24 85 108 35.4 836 
1983 81 32 95 112 42.4 757 
1984 68 36 85 90 36.6 760 
1985 77 28 84 78 38.8 686 
1986 84 38 115 131 50.1 735 
1987 61 37 103 80 32.1 874 
1988 92 64 100 99 40.2 882 
1989 96 51 73 84 38.5 789 
1990 78 39 114 117 42.5 820 
1991 89 33 96 107 43.9 738 
1992 87 31 89 66 35.7 763 
1993 79 17 83 84 40.9 642 
1994 72 22 60 46 37.1 540 
1995 48 7 55 36 29.9 490 
1996 75 7 56 49 35.4 528 
1997 58 9 56 40 30.5 536 
1998 64 11 52 52 24.2 737 
1999 76 10 57 41 31.1 591 
2000 73 13 39 62 24.1 775 
2001 71 14 39 51 17.7 983 
2002 70 13 47 61 21.1 903 
2003 70 11 59 54 23.0 840 
Source: DAC IDS database 
 
Table 1 also gives the ratio of the Nordic countries’ disbursements to the DAC total. This indicator 
of the relative significance of the Nordic donors in Tanzania is also depicted in figure 4. Over the 
period 1980 to 2003, the combined annual Nordic disbursement corresponded to 34% of the DAC 
total to Tanzania, on average. Figure 4 shows that the Nordic contribution was largely above this 
average until 1996, and below it thereafter. In 1986, the Nordic countries contributed 50% of the 
DAC total ODA disbursements to Tanzania. The Nordic share was down to 18% by 2001, but 
increased to 23% in 2003.  The table above shows that in term of financial muscles the Nordics are 
‘loosing’ their relatively dominant position in Tanzania. 
Informants at all the Nordic embassies report of having especially cordial and trusting 
relations with the Tanzanian authorities. One reason for the good relationship between Tanzania and 
the Nordic countries is that they were among the first donors in Tanzania, and also that they have 
been there throughout. As some donors pulled out during the crisis of the mid-1980s, the Nordic 
countries continued their ODA disbursements (Selbervik 1999:35-36). In fact, and as is evident 
from table 1, all the Nordic countries increased their level of ODA from 1985 to 1986.  
Another explanation for these good relations is related to a perception of the Nordics as not 
having any hidden agendas. In addition, the Nordics have no colonial past in Tanzania. The Nordic 
countries do not have any strategic interests in Tanzania, and their aid activities are clearly 
perceived as being driven mainly by humanitarian motives. This special trust relationship makes the 
Nordic countries an effective channel for sensitive issues, the Nordic informants claim. Some 
informants hold, therefore, that it is easier for the Nordics to raise human rights issues as part of the 
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aid dialogue than it is for many other donors.55 The Nordic countries are the main contributors to 
human rights organisations in Tanzania. 
 
Figure 4: 
Nordic countries bilateral ODA (net disbursements, million USD, 2002 constant prices) to 
Tanzania 1980-2003, as percentage of the DAC total 
 
 
 
Source: DAC IDS database 
 
A final explanation highlighted by the Nordic informants is that the Nordic countries have been 
supporting higher education, especially scholarships, for Tanzanians at Nordic universities. Many 
Tanzanians educated in a Nordic country are presently in high-level positions within the Tanzanian 
government and feel some kind of companionship with Nordic aid bureaucrats.  
Aid organisation and management 
As an integrated and important part of establishing the new ‘aid architecture’, the Nordic countries 
are in the process of decentralising authority to their embassies. Informants at the Nordic embassies 
in Tanzania clearly saw this process as a means of increasing ownership, strengthening donor 
harmonisation, and making a more efficient use of resources. In Tanzania, the Nordic countries are 
at different stages in the decentralisation process, too, and have had different experiences with the 
process so far.  
Sweden is the largest of the four Nordic embassies in Tanzania, with 34 staff. The Danish 
embassy has 31 staff, followed by Norway at 28, and Finland at 16. Table 2 gives details of the 
respective embassies’ staff composition. 
                                                     
55 However, as pointed out by a Swedish informant, when it comes to discussing economic sanctions, the EU 
and the USA will have more of an impact. 
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Table 2: Staff composition at the Nordic embassies in Tanzania 
 
Country Professional staff56 Administrative staff Total staff 
Denmark 15 staff: 
1 Ambassador 
1 Minister Counsellor 
5 Counsellors 
1 First secretary (macro-economy) 
1 Programme co-ordinator 
5 Programme Officers 
1 Danish trainee 
16 staff:  
1 Administrative officer 
2 Attachés 
3 Administration 
3 Secretary/receptionist 
7 Drivers/gardener/security 
31 
Finland 7 staff:  
1 Ambassador 
1 Counsellor/Deputy head of mission 
2 Counsellors 
1 Second secretary (politics & dev.) 
1 Poverty reduction advisor 
1 Programme Officer 
9 staff: 
1 Administrative officer 
2 Attachés 
2 Secretaries 
4 Receptionist/drivers 
16 
Norway 12 staff: 
1 Ambassador 
1 Minister Counsellor 
5 First/Second secretaries 
1 Financial management expert 
3 Advisors 
1 Norwegian trainee 
16  staff: 
1 Administrative officer 
9 Administration/consular affairs 
6 Receptionist/drivers/gardeners 
28 
Sweden 15  staff:  
1 Ambassador 
1 Counsellor/Deputy head of mission 
1 First secretary (politics & trade) 
1 Economist 
5 (Senior) programme officers 
2 Programme assistant officers 
4 Senior advisors/Focal point 
19  staff:  
1 Head of administration 
1 Information officer 
1 Assistant to counsellor 
1 ICT Project manager 
7 Administrative/consular affairs 
8 Receptionists/drivers/messenger 
34 
 
Source: Interviews at the Nordic embassies June 2005; Nordic embassies’ web-sites. 
 
Since 2003, Danida has undergone major decentralisation reform. Previously, contact with the home 
office was mainly on aid issues, but is now primarily on political matters. Nevertheless, the Danish 
country strategy is still formally produced in Copenhagen, though the embassy is asked for input. 
Every second year, Denmark has high level consultations with Tanzania,57 which in practice 
functions as a replacement for the previous annual consultations. Denmark has more or less 
completed its decentralisation process. One common problem that is mentioned by aid bureaucrats 
in all the Nordic countries is linked to the recruitment of personnel to the field missions. It is 
claimed that they are not equipped with enough experienced and qualified staff. Informants state 
that a number of case officers were inexperienced and the number of very junior staff running large 
sector programmes or are involved in policy dialogue at a high level is considerable. However, this 
is an issue that is being looked into by all the Nordic countries.58 According to a recent Danish 
evaluation of the decentralisation process, the conclusion is that the benefits of the process by far 
                                                     
56 Professional staff does not distinguish between diplomatic staff and local employees. 
57 In the intervening years, the embassy informed headquarters on recent events via video conferences. 
58 Interviews with Nordic aid officials at the headquarters. 
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outweigh the disadvantages. Nonetheless, given that the Nordic staff is inexperienced and replaced 
every 2-3 years, in reality they have only one option, namely to be following the lead of the World 
Bank. Decentralisation may thus lead to a less distinct Nordic profile, for better or worse.   
As seen from tables 1 and 2 above, Finland is both the smallest aid contributor and has the 
lowest number of embassy staff among the Nordic countries. While the other Nordic countries have 
to a large extent decentralised authority to their embassies in Tanzania, Finland has only started to 
effect its decentralisation process, as from September 2005. It will be implemented in two stages 
and in the first round the embassy will have far less authority than those of the other Nordic 
countries. The many reasons why Finland has lagged behind the other Nordics include bureaucratic 
traditions and legal obstacles that had to be removed.59 Up till now, the Finnish embassy did not 
have the mandate to authorise the spending of any amount; everything had to be approved by the 
home office in Helsinki. Details of how the new organisation will operate (for instance staffing 
issues) are not clear. However, informants at the embassy have received signals from Helsinki that 
they will move to outcome-based management. In this set-up, each embassy will sign an annual 
agreement with the home office, listing the results they are to achieve. It is foreseen that the 
indicators included in these agreements will concern the aggregate level, i.e. measuring the general 
trend in the partner country’s development. The small number of staff is largely seen as a constraint 
on their local operations. At the same time it is also viewed as an advantage. Finnish informants 
indicate that their limited capacity helps them to focus on the important issues and facilitates 
internal co-ordination.  
Like Denmark, Finland no longer has annual bilateral aid consultations with the Tanzanian 
authorities. Such consultations put great burdens on the Tanzanian partner. In 2001, Finland and 
Tanzania agreed that annual consultations were no longer needed. Leading up to the annual 
consultations, the Tanzania desk at the home office used to prepare the “Background 
Memorandum”. This memorandum was discussed and finally approved by the Finnish 
Development Policy Committee, a semi-parliamentarian committee. The Background Memorandum 
is a very comprehensive document, covering all aspects of Finnish relations with Tanzania. Finnish 
development co-operation is still guided by this memorandum, and Finland does not produce 
separate country strategies. The idea is to make use of Tanzanian strategies and policy documents.  
As part of the re-organisation of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD in 
2004, further decentralisation of authority to the embassies was effected. For instance, the 
embassies are now fully responsible for the implementation of development programmes, and have 
a central role in improving the co-ordination of bilateral and multilateral efforts (OECD 2005:53). 
In Tanzania, this decentralisation initiative has coincided with greater political engagement in 
development co-operation from the Tanzanian authorities. Informants at the Norwegian embassy 
report that, as a result of these two changes, the embassy has clearly become the more political and 
strategic actor in the country envisaged in White Paper no 35 (Government of Norway 2003)  
The reorganisation and decentralisation of authority requires other and more specialised 
competencies at the embassy than the more general administrative project management skills that 
were needed before. Two new postings have been assigned to the embassy: one financial 
management expert and one political reporting position. However, embassy staff feels that there 
have, so far, been too few personnel changes in response to the new challenges. The embassy 
therefore currently relies on the resource base at the home office. 
Nonetheless, the decentralisation process has clearly empowered the ambassador. From 1 
April 2004 he is assigned the authority to approve all projects as long as they are within the 
allocated budget and annual activity plan (OECD 2005:72). Norway no longer undertakes annual 
bilateral negotiations, and will no longer develop country strategies, but instead will rely on and 
align with Tanzanian policies. However, Norwegian development co-operation is still embedded in 
a so-called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which draws up the main priorities and goals of 
the co-operation between the partners. The MoU is signed by both parties. The current MoU covers 
                                                     
59 Interviews with aid bureaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Helsinki.  
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five years and expires 31 December 2005. One informant at the embassy saw it as problematic that 
the move away from annual bilateral negotiations renders it difficult for people below the top 
management at the embassy to track changes in priorities.  
Swedish development co-operation is still guided by country strategies, and according to 
informants at the headquarters in Sweden, there is currently no plan to drop them.60 The embassy 
became delegated in 2000. The whole country allocation through Sida is delegated to the Swedish 
embassy. Up to 2004 budget support was excluded, but budget support is now included in the 
country allocation. However, the embassies’ financial authority is still limited to 50 million SEK. 
For support above 50 million SEK the embassy has to get acceptance from the ‘project committee’ 
at the Sida headquarter. The project committee consists of representatives from various 
departments. Its main task is to ensure that projects/programmes are consistent with the 
development objectives. As in the case of Norway, Sweden does no longer require regular annual 
bilateral negotiations.  
Sweden has come far in its delegation process and has several delegated missions in Africa. 
Tanzania is one of them, but because Sida and the SMFA are not integrated, they report to both. 
Informants at the embassy indicated that the reporting of diplomatic staff and Sida staff differs 
somewhat. Sida staff in Stockholm claim that this leads to duplication of work, unclear signals, and 
unnecessary bureaucracy.61  
Priority areas and country ownership 
Through the Rome and Paris declarations, the donors have made a commitment to make aid 
delivery more effective. One way of doing that is to concentrate their efforts in fewer sectors and to 
align their efforts with the priorities set out by the partner country. Since mid 2004, the Tanzanian 
government has led the process of a Tanzanian Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS), which grew out of 
the work on the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) initiated in 2002. The JAS aims to “…specify 
all modalities and arrangements of development support to Tanzania and replace individual country 
assistance strategies” (Government of Tanzania 2005:1). The Tanzanian authorities have now 
presented a preliminary JAS, where they suggest the areas in which the donors should be involved. 
On the issue of ownership and alignment, the test will be whether the donors take their own 
commitments seriously and obediently align with priorities spelled out by the government. 
Nonetheless, the interviews for this study were conducted prior to the start of the negotiation 
process, and the results are not clear yet. The following discussion is based on the donors’ sector 
priorities prior to the conclusion of the JAS process.  
Denmark’s priority sectors in Tanzania are currently health, agriculture, roads and 
industry/private sector. In addition, Denmark manages a relatively large and traditional project 
portfolio. The stated goal for Danish development co-operation is to reduce the number of priority 
sectors to between three and five and also to move away from project aid. However, in the case of 
Tanzania, most of the current projects will not be finalised until 2009/2010. This significantly 
reduces the embassy’s immediate ability to fulfil these intentions.  
Informants at the embassy assume that a transition from projects to sector aid and budget 
support will take place, at least in the main partner countries.62 However, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, aid bureaucrats at headquarters in Copenhagen held that any increase in the use of, for 
example, budget aid is highly difficult in the present political situation. Even though the stated goal 
is to move away from traditional projects and align initiatives with partner country priorities, a 
recent initiative from the home office ran contrary to this policy. Copenhagen suddenly requested 
the embassy to start a refugee project in Tanzania. Political representatives at the embassy had to 
explain to the home office that they would first like to consult Tanzanian authorities as to whether 
                                                     
60 The present country strategy for Tanzania covers the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2005  
61 Interviews with Sida staff in Stockholm.  
62 This section is based on interviews with embassy staff and Danida staff in Copenhagen. 
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they would be interested in such an initiative. It turned out that Tanzania was very happy about this 
initiative, as they felt that the international community had not done enough to help shoulder the 
burden of refugees from the neighbouring conflict areas. However, it is a traditional project in 
which the embassy funds the local operations of a UN agency in four specific regions. In addition, it 
is not consistent with the new way of thinking and illustrates the fact that, even if many aid 
bureaucrats work hard to implement the ‘new way’ approach, fresh political directives can in 
practice wipe out previous policies.  
Norwegian development co-operation in Tanzania now focuses on three sectors: education, 
good governance, and natural resource management. These priorities are aligned with the Tanzanian 
PRS. The choice of these three sectors was heavily guided by the home office: a result of historical 
links; Norwegian interests; and comparative advantage compared to other donors. Formally, sector 
involvement is decided by the Norwegian parliament and may in practice hamper the commitment 
to align with the priorities set by the recipient government. However, the embassy is consulted on 
sector focus and makes recommendations to the home office. For instance, representatives at the 
Norwegian embassy claim that Norway’s prioritisation of education is sensible, as other sectors are 
already overcrowded by other donors with a comparative advantage relative to Norway. Norway is 
planning to follow up a Tanzanian demand for investment in rural roads, as Norway has long been 
involved in this sector.  
Sweden currently has 14 sectors in its portfolio, according to DAC’s sector classifications. 
There is a demand from the home office to reduce their involvement to only three or four sectors. It 
is assumed that such a focusing of effort will increase Swedish influence in the chosen areas. The 
sector choices will be guided by the political agenda in Sweden and a comparison with other donors 
operating in Tanzania, informants at the Swedish embassy claim. They assert that as long as 
Tanzanian authorities are not specific about their preferences for Swedish involvement, “…there is 
not much else to go by”. Sweden would like to continue contributing to sectors where they have a 
value added involvement, for instance through technical and sector-specific expertise. There will 
also be some natural attrition through the completion of projects. Sweden is the largest of the 
Nordic embassies, and in moving from 14 to four sectors, staff cuts cannot be excluded. The 
focusing of effort has been very much debated internally at the embassy, and there has been a 
gradual acceptance of the transition. As was illustrated in the previous chapter, within Sida in 
Stockholm there is strong resistance to a change in focus, or, phrased differently, there are strong 
lobbyists for various sectors that make the sector concentration particularly difficult. 
Not all Swedish aid goes to the sectors prioritised in the PRS. Since the PRS is a 
government-led initiative and may not give priority to the same sectors as Sweden, we feel the need 
to complement the PRS with support to, for example, civil society and the private sector, a Sida 
representative at the embassy explains. This illustrates the dilemma that the donors face when they 
try to practice ownership and alignment in situations where the priorities of the recipient and the 
donors diverge.   
Finnish development co-operation in Tanzania focuses on education, forestry, 
decentralisation, and good governance. Informants at the embassy state that Finland’s choice of 
sectors is largely determined by historic specialisation and driven by Finnish policy. 
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All the Nordic donors support the JAS initiative.63 The current individual country strategies 
of Denmark and Sweden expire at the end of 2005. As mentioned above, Norway and Finland do 
not have country strategies. Awaiting the final JAS document, the donors have halted work on new 
strategies. Denmark, Norway and Finland are less impatient than Sweden. Sweden is anxious to 
have either the final JAS or a new individual country strategy in place before the end of 2005. Even 
if Finland does not have a specific country strategy, it has the background memorandum which 
forms the basis of its aid involvement. Finnish staff concedes that Finland is not able to “stray far 
from [the background memorandum]”. It is therefore not entirely clear how Finland will align with 
the JAS in practice.  
Danish aid comes to Tanzania in four main segments: (i) the main country fund; (ii) 
environment; (iii) refugees; (iv) private sector programme. The last three are ear-marked for these 
sectors. If, for instance, the JAS document specifies that Danish engagement is no longer wanted in 
the areas of environment, refugees or the private sector, these funds will have to go to another 
country. Informants at the embassy also emphasised that they must see a link between competence, 
involvement, and finance in their development co-operation.  
Finland is very open to the JAS initiative, especially the focus on a division of labour 
between donors. Informants at the embassy are looking for a more efficient code of conduct, which 
specifies what is expected of the donors. 
The Norwegian embassy is very positive towards the increased influence and assertiveness 
that the Tanzanian government is aiming for through the JAS. However, the ambassador envisages 
that if Tanzania, through the JAS, demands that Norway engages in other sectors than those in 
which they currently operate, ”…that would be an interesting discussion”. Norway would then like 
to hear the arguments for a change in the current setting, and the embassy would also argue that 
there is an added value to their presence in the sectors they have been involved in so far. However, 
the home office is informed and prepared for the fact that there may be changes in development co-
operation with Tanzania as a result of the JAS.  
The Swedish embassy has very high expectations of the JAS. Informants at the embassy see 
the JAS as constituting a business plan, and the alignment of Swedish priorities with those of the 
Tanzanian authorities should be through consultation. However, Sida representatives report that it 
would be “…interesting to see what would happen if Sweden was no longer welcome in the energy 
sector”.  
Aid modalities 
Aid makes up approximately 45% of the Tanzanian budget. The Tanzanian government has stated 
that general budget support is the preferred aid modality. How have the Nordic donors responded to 
this request?  
According to embassy staff, 18% of Danish aid to Tanzania is allocated as GBS, despite 
general scepticism towards this aid modality at the political level in Denmark. However, Denmark 
differs from the other Nordics on the pace at which they wish to increase the share of aid allocated 
as GBS, the embassy staff maintain. This is partly related to the scepticism mentioned above, and 
                                                     
63 However, according to informants at the Nordic embassies and the local UNDP office, there is only a small 
group driving this process for increased ownership on the Tanzanian side. This group includes a few high 
ranking officials at the Ministry of Finance, some commissioners, and local academics. These operate and 
argue for taking leadership in an environment where civil servants are not encouraged to take the initiative. 
There are several reasons why there is only a small group on the Tanzanian side pushing for more budget 
support and ownership. Donor informants highlighted in particular the fact that in a shift from basket and 
sector funding to budget support the Tanzanian line ministries would have to compete with each other and 
with the MoF for funds, instead of receiving support directly from donors. Furthermore, expressing 
preferences over each donor’s sector involvements is a sensitive issue that could run the risk of driving some 
donors away.   
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partly related to a reported push by strong interest groups operating in Copenhagen that are 
lobbying for their priority areas.64 Given Denmark’s positive experience with SWAPs and the 
expertise they have built around this aid modality, they find it difficult to move to other modalities, 
the embassy staff report. The rationale they give for not moving faster in the direction of budget 
support diverges somewhat from the interviews conducted with staff at headquarters. The staff in 
Copenhagen gives more weight to political scepticism, embassy to their positive experiences with 
SWAPs.   
Currently, Finland allocates 10-15% of its bilateral aid to Tanzania as GBS; 25% through 
sector initiatives and the rest as projects.65 It is moving relatively slowly towards the new 
modalities. However, there is a joint vision between the embassy and the home office that a gradual 
move towards budget support will take place. This shift is partly motivated by the view that project-
based involvement undermines the democratic institutions of the partner country, and that sector 
wide initiatives are in essence large projects. Moreover, as the smallest of the Nordic embassies, 
Finland feels the strain of being involved in projects, sector initiatives, and GBS. The transition to 
more GBS will be gradual, for instance through projects coming to their natural completion. With 
the move towards more GBS, the Finnish embassy recognises that finance does not have to follow 
sector involvements.  
Currently, Norwegian aid to Tanzania is approximately one third to each of the categories: 
projects, sector support, and general budget support.66 According to an informant at the Norwegian 
embassy, aid allocated as general budget support alone represents 14% of the same budget. All 
decisions on the modalities for Norwegian aid to Tanzania are taken in dialogue with the home 
office. They are moving away from projects, and no new projects will be initiated. There is also a 
shared vision with the home office to reduce sector involvement and increase budget support. How 
this will be done in practice and the time frame is not clear at the moment. In Tanzania, Norway is 
making a faster transition to GBS than the other Nordic donors. Norway believes that budget 
support is the natural next step from sector support. 
Swedish aid to Tanzania is currently split in half between project and programme aid. GBS 
makes up 20% of total Swedish bilateral aid to Tanzania.67 Embassy staff holds that the SWAPs 
were revolutionary when they were introduced. However, through these sector initiatives, the 
partner line ministries spent a lot of resources applying for funds from donors and reporting on the 
spending of these funds, duplicating the work of the Ministry of Finance. GBS is therefore the 
natural next step, and Sweden, along with Norway and the UK, are adopting these aid modalities 
faster than the other donors in Tanzania. Informants at the Swedish embassy also claim that the 
move towards GBS can also be seen as a natural response to increases in aid volumes without 
corresponding increases in funds for the administration of these new funds. 
With the transition from project to programme aid, embassy staff has experienced a marked 
increase in dialogue and co-ordination with other donors. However, one representative at the 
embassy argued that increased donor co-ordination has been at the expense of contact with the 
“grass roots”. It is feared that an important dimension in development co-operation between donor 
and partner is lost. Though the home office encourages the embassy staff to go on field trips, there 
is no reciprocal increase in the embassy’s travel budget. The embassy therefore gets some updates 
from strategic partnerships with local NGOs, and arranges field trips with other donors to reduce 
costs.  
                                                     
64 Interviews at the embassy in Dar es Salaam and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. 
65 These figures are solely based on interviews with embassy staff. 
66 This information is based on interviews with embassy staff. 
67 Figures are based on interviews with embassy staff. 
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Policy Coherence 
This section will briefly discuss how the Nordic embassies are dealing with the issue of coherence. 
The Danish embassy puts great emphasis on linking trade and development issues. For instance, the 
embassy has helped initiate a post-graduate course in trade policy at the University of Dar es 
Salaam, and finances Tanzanian secondments to the WTO in Geneva. The embassy has not 
experienced an increased interest in reporting back to home office on the performance of 
multilateral organisations at country level. Informants at the embassy also question the real impact 
of such reporting. 
The work leading up to each “Background Memorandum”, the guiding document for 
Finnish development co-operation in each partner country, is highly conducive to policy coherence. 
The memorandum covers all aspects of bilateral relations between Finland and Tanzania. There is 
also increased awareness of the need to co-ordinate Finland’s multilateral and bilateral aid 
activities.  
Following the re-organisation of the Norwegian aid administration, the Norwegian embassy 
has experienced a marked increase in demand for information on how multilateral organisations 
work in Tanzania. This is reported to the home office and used in the steering committee meetings 
of these organisations. The embassy has received very positive feedback on these reports. It is 
claimed that this information gives Norwegian representatives increased influence in multilateral 
organisations. Since 90% of the work at the Norwegian embassy is related to development, embassy 
staff feels that the issue of coherence is of less relevance.  
All in all, the issue of coherence appears rather abstract to both personnel in the field or aid 
bureaucrats that are involved in country operations at the headquarters. In practice, it is still an issue 
that only concerns them to a limited extent. 
Donor led co-ordination and harmonisation 
Until recently, donor co-ordination in Tanzania was done through informal meetings in the local 
DAC group, which included both bilateral and multilateral donors. In response to the Rome 
declaration (2003) and efforts on the Tanzanian side at increasing ownership, the donors agreed to 
formalise their own co-ordination effort through the Development Partners Group (DPG), which 
replaced the local DAC group (see DPG 2003). DPG has two facilitators. The UNDP resident 
representative is a permanent co-facilitator; the second rotates the other DPG members. Informants 
at the Nordic embassies view DPG as a very useful forum for discussion and donor co-ordination.  
The UNDP has an important role in ensuring that DPG members align with the JAS 
initiative, and informants at the local UNDP office emphasise the importance of JAS continuing to 
be a Tanzanian led process. It could prove counter-productive to pressure Tanzania into rushing the 
process simply because the bilateral donors have their individual time schedules, for when a country 
strategy needs to be in place, for instance. Moreover, there are a lot of expectations concerning the 
JAS. In fact, UNDP informants concede that it remains to be seen whether the JAS will be 
comprehensive enough to replace individual country strategies, as the perceived requirements from 
donors may be too high. What the UNDP hopes to see is a JAS that is clear on aid modalities and 
that specifies under what conditions projects are still to be considered as aligned with national 
processes. It should also include a new perspective on the tying of aid, especially stating the desire 
for the pooling of technical assistance. As mentioned above, the JAS states that the Tanzanian 
government will specify each donor’s sector involvement. However, to all donor informants, 
including the UNDP, it seems more likely that the DPG divides sector involvement among donors 
through some form of objective comparison of comparative advantages.  
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The Nordic four: A radical force, still?  
The Nordic countries have been among strong advocates for partnership thinking and donor 
harmonisation in Tanzania. Several events have been important, starting with the Nordic-Tanzanian 
high level meeting and the Helleiner initiative of 1994. All four Nordic countries welcome the more 
recent developments on the Tanzanian side, where the government has officially declared 
willingness to take more leadership over the development process. According to informants at the 
UNDP local office, Norway and Sweden, together with the UK and the UNDP, are the most 
pronounced supporters of the JAS initiative. Denmark and Finland play more marginal roles in this 
process, which seems partly related to policy and partly related to personalities in the field offices. 
In addition, for Finland a lack of capacity in the field office is also important. 
Previously, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a strong degree of co-ordination 
and a special feeling of companionship among Nordic aid officials and agencies in Tanzania. 
Frequent staff meetings were held. The Nordic countries no longer function as a useful sub-group, 
nor are the Nordics regarded as a clique by the rest of the donor community in Tanzania. None of 
the informants at the Nordic embassies sees the need for a special Nordic grouping or co-ordination 
within, for example, the DPG. The creation of such a sub-group, moreover, would not be in line 
with the new aid thinking. As a result of donor harmonisation, it is now more useful to work in 
broader groupings. Bilateral donor co-operation is now less based on cultural ties between the donor 
countries, and more a result of pragmatic co-ordination of, for instance, a sector basket fund. This is 
reflected by the fact that Norway and Sweden often feel closer to the UK and the Netherlands, as 
these countries are implementing policies that are more similar to those of Norway and Sweden than 
to those of Denmark and Finland. Norway and Sweden in particular feel that Denmark’s approach 
differs in fundamental ways from theirs. Nonetheless, despite the fact that donor sub-grouping may 
not be in line with the new way of thinking, the so-called Nordic Plus group, as has been mentioned 
previously, is in many areas a radical and pushy force on aid issues more generally and does also 
have close co-operation in Tanzania.  
As we have seen in this chapter, though the Nordic countries are often referred to as part of 
the group of like-minded donors, there are also differences among them in their aid activities. Most 
significantly, Denmark is more focused on being able to link technical sector involvement and 
finance than the other Nordic donors. They are also less in favour of silent partnerships, and feel 
that Norway and Sweden are moving too fast on GBS. In contrast, Norway and Sweden are very 
closely aligned on harmonisation and modalities, and co-operate extensively with the sharing of 
roles and silent partnerships for increased efficiency. As Finland has not yet decentralised authority 
to its embassy in Tanzania, they are slower to move on new initiatives than are the other Nordics. 
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Chapter 6: Is Nordic exceptionalism under stress? 
The Nordic countries are exceptional actors in aid. They do differ from that of most other donors. 
They often both say and do “the right things”. The MDGs constitute the point of departure of their 
aid policies. At the policy level they are embracing coherence, harmonisation, and the new aid 
modalities. In addition, they channel most of their aid to the poorest countries and have a preference 
for Africa. Generally they have few strings attached to their assistance and give strong support to 
multilateral organisations. Earlier this year, for example, Denmark was praised for its aid 
programmes by the CGD and ranked as the best donor in the world. The other Nordics were not that 
far behind. Nonetheless, a closer look at their practices reveals discrepancies between policy and 
practice.  
Although the Nordic donors are exceptional compared to most other donors, they are 
probably less exceptional today than previously. An extended group of so-called like-minded 
donors are adopting more or less the same policies as them. On some issues other donors such as the 
UK and the Netherlands are far more progressive than the Nordics. One example is the British and 
the Dutch radical stance on general budget support. In addition, the donor community at large is 
characterised by a growing consensus.    
However, despite the many similarities among the Nordic countries and the emerging 
international consensus, differences do certainly exist among the four. Broadly speaking one can 
divide them into two groups; Norway and Sweden on the one hand and Finland and Denmark on the 
other. The aid policies of Norway and Sweden are so similar that it is difficult to trace the few 
differences that actually exist. Generally, in a comparative perspective their aid interventions seem 
to be slightly more steered by altruistic motivations than what is the case for Finland and Denmark. 
Traditionally commercial interests have played a relatively larger role in the latter two. Nonetheless, 
on the issue of aid tying for instance, Denmark’s approach has changed completely in the course of 
the last two years. The Danish government has committed itself to fully untying Danish aid. In 
Finland as well there has been movement on this subject. Over the last ten years the share of tied 
Finnish aid has been dramatically reduced. 
Another area where there are distinct differences between Norway and Sweden on the one 
hand and Finland and Denmark on the other is the share of aid that is channelled to and through 
NGOs. Norway and Sweden rely much more on this channel than the other two. However, it should 
be noted that Denmark and Finland are also distributing a much large share of their aid via NGOs 
than the DAC average. 
Even if there are many similarities between Finnish and Danish aid, in terms of aid volume 
Finland is certainly the “odd man out” among the four. As is illustrated by the quote in the 
introductory chapter, it has been important to Finland to try to keep up with the other Nordics in this 
regard. Some of the Finnish informants claim that this is still the case to some extent. However, 
most of the informants hold that Finland view the whole idea of Nordic co-operation - not only in 
the area of aid, but also more generally - as old-fashioned. Finnish aid bureaucrats assert that 
Finland is currently more oriented towards Europe than Scandinavia. This view is also supported by 
the literature. 
It is therefore tempting to ask whether the edifice of Nordic-cooperation is crumbling. 
Based on the findings of this study it is hard to tell. However, it seems justified to argue that the 
traditional Nordic aid co-operation has faltered somewhat over the last years. That Denmark chose 
to withdraw from the Nordic Development Fund earlier this year might be a sign of this. Informants 
in all the Nordic countries claim that they often feel a closer companionship with other donors such 
as the Netherlands, the UK or the EC than the other Nordic countries. The Nordic Plus group appear 
as a more important point of reference than the Nordic countries per se. Nonetheless, on several aid 
issues the Nordic countries are still working closely. The aid evaluation units of the Nordic 
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countries are having regular meetings and on World Bank issues the Nordic countries are tightly co-
ordinating their stance on the board.  
On the launching of the new aid architecture and the new aid modalities the Nordic 
countries have shown vigour and have been active forces in order to move the Paris agenda forward, 
for example. Here too it seems as if Norway and Sweden have been the most active and pushy 
countries among the Nordics.  
In Tanzania the Nordic countries are also among the most radical donors in terms of 
adjusting their policies to the new aid regime. They are all disbursing a high share of their aid as 
budget support and are to a large extent trying to align with the priorities of the Tanzanian 
government. Except for Finland the Nordics have largely decentralised authority to the field. 
Norway and Sweden in particular are responding quickly and aptly trying to meet the challenges 
arising at any given time.  
A key issue that some may find puzzling is the robustness of the size of Nordic aid budgets 
and the continued and strong public support of aid. This robustness appears to be a precondition for 
behaving in such a flexible and ‘politically correct’ manner as the Nordic governments do. How can 
these features be explained? They seem related to complex and deep historical causes. There has 
been and still is a strong moral imperative underpinning Nordic development aid. These countries 
have strong humanitarian traditions. Even though not all rich countries are contributing more than 
the UN aid target of 0.7% of GNI, economic wealth would appear to be a necessary condition for 
sustaining a high level of aid over time.   
Self-interest was only of moderate importance when the Nordic countries first got involved 
in aid. Over the years experience taught them that high aid levels with few political or strategic 
strings attached earned them international reputation. It gradually dawned on the aid bureaucracies 
and the political leaderships that it was in their own self-interest to be World Champions in 
development assistance. Hence, the Scandinavians started to compete to be ranked at the top of the 
DAC list. Strong moral and humanitarian backing from the public coupled with a broad political 
consensus among the main political parties made high aid levels relatively robust to economic 
decline.  
A growing NGO sector in the Nordic countries was in the course of the 1990s to an 
increasing extent relying on government funds. Over the years these NGOs grew similar to the aid 
bureaucracies and became dependent on public funds. The interests of the government and the NGO 
sector converged and the NGOs largely became agents of the status quo rather then alternatives or 
correctives to the governments’ policies. Moreover, in spite of the fact that there have been fewer 
economic strings attached to Nordic aid compared to many other donor countries, the private sector 
has seldom seriously challenged Nordic aid policies.  
Nonetheless, as we saw in the case of Denmark in 2001 the broad political consensus on 
development assistance might be challenged. There was no longer backing in parliament for 
increasing the aid budget and this happened even in times of economic stability and progress.  In 
addition, there was remarkable little outcry among the public or in the media as a result of the 
dramatic aid cut that followed after the election in 2001. This came as a great surprise to Danida 
officials. The Danish aid cut was widely criticised internationally. In 2005 the rather ‘aid 
unfriendly’ and right wing Danish coalition government concluded that the move was tarnishing 
Denmark’s international image and reputation. It decided that the aid budget should be “protected” 
and should not be under 0.8% of GNI. This may suggest that the intermezzo in reality produced few 
real and fundamental changes of Danish aid policy. However, the Danish case may be a reminder to 
the other Scandinavians that the broad political consensus and the strong public support for aid 
cannot be taken for granted. 
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Organisation 
The organisational structures of the development institutions of the four Nordic countries are 
illustrated below. 
Denmark 
 
Organisation chart of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Source: Denmark MFA home page (http://www.um.dk/en)  
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Finland 
 
Organisation chart of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Source: Finland MFA homepage (http://formin.finland.fi/english) 
 
Norway 
The Norwegian aid administration is divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Norad is a directorate under the 
MFA. 
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Organisation chart of Norad 
Source: Norad’s homepage (http://www.norad.no) 
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Organisation chart of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Source: DAC Peer Review - Norway (2005) 
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Sweden 
The Swedish donor organisation is divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(Sida). SIDA is a government agency that reports to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
Figure: Organisation chart of SIDA 
 
 
Source: SIDA homepage (http://www.sida.se) 
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Organisation chart of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Source: Sweden government homepage (http://www.sweden.gov.se) 
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Data on official development assistance (ODA) 
In the following section data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the four 
Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden is presented. The main focus is on 
the period 1990-2003.  
 
For comparison, the total of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members is also 
included. The DAC figures are calculated from the aggregate funds distributed by DAC 
countries. As such, this represents a weighted average of allocations made by DAC member 
countries.  
 
ODA refers to aid allocated to OECD Part 1 recipients, developing countries. The 
presentation does not include official aid (OA), which is financial assistance to OECD Part 2 
recipients, countries in transition.  
 
ODA data are extracted from the OECD international development statistics (IDS) database. 
In the IDS database, ODA flows are reported as commitments, gross disbursements and net 
disbursements. In the following the focus is on net disbursements. Net disbursement is the 
sum of grants and loans extended, minus repayments by recipients. However, some data are 
only available as commitments, for instance ODA by sector and tying status of allocations. 
Also, gross disbursements have been used when this is required for consistency with relevant 
OECD DAC publications, e.g. DAC Peer Reviews. Gross disbursement is the sum of grants 
and loans extended. Tables and text specify, in each case, what types of ODA flow have been 
used. 
Total ODA 
In this section, total ODA from the Nordic countries and the DAC total are presented. 
Nordic share of DAC total ODA  
The table below shows the ODA (net) disbursements for the four Nordic countries and the 
DAC total, in million USD at constant 2003 prices, for the period 1990 to 2003. We see that 
total ODA net disbursements from DAC countries increased gradually from 1990 to 1992, 
declining thereafter. From 1997 total DAC ODA disbursements have increased gradually, and 
in 2003 surpassed the 1992 level. Of this DAC total, the Nordic countries made up from 9% 
to 10% in the period 1990 to 2003. 
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ODA net disbursements (mill USD, constant 2003 prices), Nordic countries and the DAC 
total, 1990-2003 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Nordic 
% DAC DAC 
1990 1,438 787 1,520 1,972 8.8 64,920 
1991 1,482 894 1,506 1,949 8.7 67,335 
1992 1,577 674 1,570 2,158 8.8 68,070 
1993 1,608 463 1,396 2,014 8.7 62,708 
1994 1,674 339 1,558 2,004 8.9 62,803 
1995 1,627 363 1,489 1,682 9.1 56,599 
1996 1,794 403 1,536 1,833 9.9 56,055 
1997 1,846 413 1,629 1,782 10.8 52,451 
1998 1,930 430 1,771 1,673 10.1 57,537 
1999 2,009 472 1,779 1,786 10.5 57,837 
2000 2,170 473 1,598 2,160 10.5 60,917 
2001 2,149 495 1,721 2,212 10.6 62,053 
2002 2,014 554 1,957 2,473 10.6 66,219 
2003 1,748 558 2,042 2,400 9.8 69,094 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Emergency and distress relief 
The table below gives the percentage shares of total ODA disbursed to emergency and 
distress relief.68 It shows that Norway and Sweden have both more than doubled the share of 
ODA that is allocated to financing humanitarian action over the period 1990 to 2003. 
 
Emergency and distress relief as a percentage of total ODA (gross disbursements), 
Nordic countries and the DAC total, 1990 to 2003 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 9.0 8.3 7.3 6.2 1.7 
1991 4.3 10.9 6.6 8.6 3.4 
1992 7.3 8.8 6.8 13.9 3.8 
1993 5.7 5.7 11.1 15.7 4.9 
1994 5.2 9.3 15.9 18.4 5.3 
1995 3.9 5.4 14.7 15.8 4.6 
1996 3.0 9.3 15.1 13.4 4.2 
1997 5.6 7.3 14.7 13.5 3.9 
1998 5.3 6.4 16.0 13.4 4.7 
1999 4.9 11.8 17.8 16.6 7.4 
2000 7.4 10.4 16.0 14.7 6.0 
2001 6.8 10.2 13.3 14.5 5.6 
2002 6.4 8.5 14.8 15.0 5.9 
2003 6.2 8.1 17.1 16.1 7.4 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
                                                     
68 The OECD IDS database does not include a separate category for humanitarian action. The category 
‘Emergency and distress relief’ is defined in the IDS database as follows: “An ‘emergency’ is an urgent 
situation created by an abnormal event which a government cannot meet out of its own resources and 
which results in human suffering and/or loss of crops or livestock. Such an emergency can result from 
i) sudden natural or man-made disasters, including wars or severe civil unrest; or ii) food scarcity 
conditions arising from crop failure owing to drought, pests and diseases. This item also includes 
support for disaster preparedness.” 
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ODA to and through NGOs 
The table below shows the share of total ODA that was allocated either as support to 
national/international NGOs or channelled through NGOs. Throughout the period, Norway 
was allocating the highest share to and through NGOs. Since 1994, more than 20% of the 
annual ODA (net) disbursements went to or through NGOs.69 
 
Percentage share of total ODA (net disbursements) to or through NGOs, Nordic 
countries and DAC, 1990-2003 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 8.5 4.0 9.0 9.4 2.5 
1991 10.1 4.7 8.3 5.5 2.2 
1992 12.7 5.3 14.1 5.6 2.9 
1993 12.7 7.0 0.8 0.0 2.9 
1994 0.5 8.2 21.5 6.5 4.2 
1995 9.7 7.1 25.3 6.8 4.8 
1996 8.5 0.4 24.1 14.3 4.1 
1997 8.4 7.2 23.7 6.3 4.4 
1998 9.6 8.1 24.3 6.9 5.0 
1999 8.0 8.1 24.5 22.4 5.7 
2000 6.4 7.9 22.2 15.7 5.8 
2001 9.4 8.2 0.5 14.8 5.4 
2002 9.2 8.6 21.8 13.5 6.3 
2003 0.7 8.1 21.7 13.4 5.9 
Average 8.2 6.6 17.3 10.1 4.4 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Bilateral and multilateral ODA 
The table below gives bilateral and multilateral ODA as a percentage of the total ODA (gross) 
disbursements for the period 1990 to 2003. In this period, DAC countries on average allocated 
72.6% of the (gross) ODA disbursements as bilateral aid. The Nordic countries were all below 
this DAC average; Denmark and Finland had a lower share of bilateral aid than Norway and 
Sweden.  
                                                     
69 In the years 1991, 1993 and 2001 there are no entries of ODA through NGOs in the DAC IDS 
database. 
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Bilateral and multilateral ODA as a percentage of total ODA (gross disbursements), 
Nordic countries and the DAC total, 1990-2003 
Bilateral Multilateral 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 60.5 58.9 62.9 68.7 73.9 39.5 41.1 37.1 31.3 26.1 
1991 57.9 63.2 62.4 69.8 78.4 42.1 36.8 37.6 30.2 21.6 
1992 55.6 68.1 63.7 72.2 71.2 44.4 31.9 36.3 27.8 28.8 
1993 57.1 69.9 65.0 75.3 73.4 42.9 30.1 35.0 24.7 26.6 
1994 57.8 74.1 72.9 75.5 72.3 42.2 25.9 27.1 24.5 27.7 
1995 60.4 59.8 73.0 69.8 71.8 39.6 40.2 27.0 30.2 28.2 
1996 60.7 53.8 72.1 69.8 73.2 39.3 46.2 27.9 30.2 26.8 
1997 62.6 54.1 70.2 69.8 70.8 37.4 45.9 29.8 30.2 29.2 
1998 60.5 54.0 72.0 66.3 70.8 39.5 46.0 28.0 33.7 29.2 
1999 59.9 62.2 73.6 70.3 73.2 40.1 37.8 26.4 29.7 26.8 
2000 61.9 59.3 74.0 69.0 69.4 38.1 40.7 26.0 31.0 30.6 
2001 64.4 58.6 70.0 72.3 69.4 35.6 41.4 30.0 27.7 30.6 
2002 64.4 54.9 67.6 63.2 72.4 35.6 45.1 32.4 36.8 27.6 
2003 62.1 55.4 71.7 74.1 75.6 37.9 44.6 28.3 25.9 24.4 
Average 60.4 60.4 69.4 70.4 72.6 39.6 39.6 30.6 29.6 27.4 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Multilateral recipients 
The main multilateral recipients are given in the tables below. 
 
Percentage share of total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) for 
main recipients of multilateral aid, Denmark 1990 to 2003 
Denmark 
Gross multilateral 
ODA 
UN 
agencies EC 
World Bank 
group 
Reg. dev. 
banks Other 
1990 39.5 18.8 5.7 6.4 2.5 6.1 
1991 42.1 19.9 6.8 6.1 - 9.3 
1992 44.4 20.2 5.7 5.7 3.9 9.0 
1993 42.9 19.4 6.8 6.6 2.3 7.7 
1994 42.2 18.1 6.2 5.9 3.4 8.5 
1995 39.6 17.8 5.8 6.2 1.5 8.3 
1996 39.3 21.0 4.6 4.4 0.6 8.6 
1997 37.4 17.5 5.3 1.1 3.3 10.3 
1998 39.5 17.3 6.3 5.7 3.1 7.2 
1999 40.1 15.9 4.3 7.4 1.2 11.2 
2000 38.1 14.9 5.5 4.5 4.1 9.1 
2001 35.6 16.1 5.2 3.8 2.1 8.4 
2002 35.6 13.6 6.4 3.8 3.7 8.0 
2003 37.9 15.4 7.7 4.1 3.0 7.7 
Average 39.6 17.6 5.9 5.1 2.7 8.5 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Percentage share of total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) for 
main recipients of multilateral aid, Finland 1990 to 2003 
Finland 
Gross multilateral 
ODA 
UN 
agencies EC 
World Bank 
group 
Reg. dev. 
banks Other 
1990 41.1 23.8 - 5.3 7.9 4.2 
1991 36.8 22.2 - 7.1 0.1 7.5 
1992 31.9 20.8 - 8.8 2.0 0.4 
1993 30.1 14.2 - 10.2 4.7 1.0 
1994 25.9 16.2 - 1.3 6.1 2.3 
1995 40.2 16.5 10.1 8.4 3.3 1.9 
1996 46.2 16.7 11.5 8.3 6.9 2.8 
1997 45.9 20.6 12.4 3.5 6.5 2.9 
1998 46.0 19.0 15.9 2.4 6.8 1.8 
1999 37.8 15.6 12.2 2.8 5.5 1.8 
2000 40.7 16.5 13.4 3.6 5.9 1.3 
2001 41.4 16.8 13.9 7.7 2.2 0.9 
2002 45.1 14.4 13.5 6.7 8.8 1.7 
2003 44.6 13.9 19.3 6.3 2.6 2.4 
Average 39.6 17.6 13.6 5.9 4.9 2.3 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage share of total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) for 
main recipients of multilateral aid, Norway 1990 to 2003 
Norway 
Gross multilateral 
ODA 
UN 
agencies EC70 
World Bank 
group 
Reg. dev. 
banks Other 
1990 37.1 22.4 - 9.1 3.6 2.1 
1991 37.6 23.5 - 8.3 4.3 1.4 
1992 36.3 22.8 0.0 7.8 4.3 1.3 
1993 35.0 20.8 - 9.3 4.2 0.8 
1994 27.1 18.4 - 6.9 0.7 1.2 
1995 27.0 18.4 - 7.0 1.1 0.5 
1996 27.9 18.6 - 5.9 2.3 1.1 
1997 29.8 18.2 - 6.2 3.8 1.6 
1998 28.0 18.2 - 4.5 3.6 1.7 
1999 26.4 16.8 - 4.0 3.0 2.6 
2000 26.0 16.3 - 2.6 3.9 3.1 
2001 30.0 18.2 - 6.0 3.5 2.4 
2002 32.4 17.8 - 6.6 3.7 4.4 
2003 28.3 17.6 - 6.0 3.5 1.2 
Average 30.6 19.1 0.0 6.4 3.2 1.8 
Source: OECD IDS database 
                                                     
70 In the period 1990 to 2003, Norway reported allocating ODA funds to the EC only in 1992 (0.62 mill 
USD at constant 2003 prices). 
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Percentage share of total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) for 
main recipients of multilateral aid, Sweden 1990 to 2003 
Sweden 
Gross multilateral 
ODA 
UN 
agencies EC 
World Bank 
group 
Reg. dev. 
banks Other 
1990 31.3 18.3 - 6.2 3.2 3.6 
1991 30.2 18.5 - 7.5 1.0 3.2 
1992 27.8 17.3 - 6.0 3.6 0.7 
1993 24.7 14.1 - 7.2 2.2 1.2 
1994 24.5 14.7 - 6.1 1.3 2.5 
1995 30.2 15.2 5.8 7.0 1.2 1.0 
1996 30.2 13.3 5.3 7.0 2.5 2.1 
1997 30.2 12.8 5.4 7.3 3.5 1.3 
1998 33.7 13.4 6.1 8.1 5.4 0.6 
1999 29.7 13.6 5.5 6.4 4.0 0.2 
2000 31.0 13.8 4.6 8.4 3.7 0.5 
2001 27.7 16.4 6.8 - 3.6 1.0 
2002 36.8 11.2 4.1 17.8 3.5 0.1 
2003 25.9 9.6 5.1 - 5.5 5.6 
Average 29.6 14.4 5.4 7.9 3.2 1.7 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage share of total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) for 
main recipients of multilateral aid, DAC 1990 to 2003 
DAC 
Gross multilateral 
ODA 
UN 
agencies EC 
World Bank 
group 
Reg. dev. 
banks Other 
1990 26.1 6.6 5.4 8.2 3.9 2.1 
1991 21.6 6.0 6.3 6.9 0.8 1.6 
1992 28.8 6.9 6.3 10.4 3.5 1.7 
1993 26.6 6.5 6.7 8.1 3.6 1.7 
1994 27.7 6.8 7.8 7.3 3.7 2.1 
1995 28.2 6.8 8.7 8.2 1.7 2.7 
1996 26.8 7.1 7.6 7.0 2.6 2.4 
1997 29.2 7.1 9.0 7.8 2.7 2.5 
1998 29.2 7.3 8.6 7.4 3.2 2.6 
1999 26.8 6.2 8.9 5.1 3.1 3.6 
2000 30.6 8.6 9.4 6.2 3.5 2.9 
2001 30.6 8.9 9.3 6.7 2.5 3.2 
2002 27.6 7.1 9.2 5.6 2.8 2.8 
2003 24.4 5.9 8.6 4.5 2.2 3.3 
Average 27.4 7.0 8.0 7.1 2.9 2.5 
Source: OECD IDS database 
CMI REPORT NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE? R 2006: 8 
 
 70 
 
Average allocation to the main multilateral agencies over the period 1990 to 2003, 
Nordic countries and DAC 
 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Bilateral ODA  
Bilateral ODA allocated by geographical region 
The tables below show that throughout the period 1990 to 2003 the Nordic countries allocated 
a higher share of their bilateral ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa than the DAC average. 
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Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) by geographical region, Denmark 1990-2003 
Denmark 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
South 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Far 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East Europe 
America 
and 
Oceania 
Bilateral 
allocable 
Un-
allocated 
Total 
bilateral 
ODA 
1990 59.2 6.3 22.3 5.1 2.6 0.0 4.6 512 212 725 
1991 56.8 4.2 23.7 5.1 2.5 0.1 7.5 511 194 705 
1992 62.0 5.0 17.4 8.1 0.8 0.0 6.8 491 239 730 
1993 60.8 5.5 17.6 6.8 1.2 0.0 8.0 518 240 758 
1994 54.0 4.1 18.5 17.5 0.5 0.1 5.3 585 243 828 
1995 55.9 11.5 14.6 8.4 0.5 0.5 8.5 661 240 901 
1996 56.3 4.1 16.1 13.2 0.4 0.3 9.6 663 243 907 
1997 54.6 4.3 15.7 15.3 0.8 0.8 8.5 669 289 957 
1998 57.0 4.2 17.5 9.5 1.5 1.0 9.3 708 263 971 
1999 55.7 5.1 15.3 13.4 1.7 0.3 8.5 738 254 993 
2000 55.4 5.9 13.3 9.9 2.2 3.8 9.5 761 339 1,100 
2001 52.6 3.2 14.2 15.2 1.1 5.0 8.8 858 296 1,154 
2002 49.4 2.0 15.4 15.1 0.7 5.9 11.4 787 309 1,096 
2003 51.5 5.0 18.3 13.5 1.2 2.3 8.3 680 282 962 
Average 55.8 5.0 17.1 11.1 1.3 1.4 8.2 653 260 913 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) by geographical region, Finland 1990-2003 
Finland 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
South 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Far 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East Europe Other 
Bilateral 
allocable 
Un-
allocated 
Total 
bilateral 
ODA 
1990 58.2 6.9 13.1 11.3 2.6 1.3 6.5 285 100 385 
1991 52.6 5.4 13.7 12.2 2.7 4.4 9.1 345 128 473 
1992 43.3 18.1 12.2 9.9 1.7 8.7 6.1 327 88 415 
1993 38.6 2.7 10.5 22.4 3.9 3.5 18.5 217 70 286 
1994 50.7 4.4 13.1 19.7 1.8 5.6 4.8 158 56 214 
1995 40.4 2.8 9.1 21.8 3.3 3.9 18.7 151 45 195 
1996 44.5 2.5 10.4 23.7 4.1 10.0 4.9 140 45 186 
1997 40.5 1.9 10.4 25.4 6.4 8.8 6.7 138 54 192 
1998 41.3 1.5 14.0 22.1 5.6 9.0 6.5 148 51 199 
1999 39.8 1.3 8.7 16.2 4.9 15.7 13.4 208 65 274 
2000 39.1 2.3 11.6 21.2 6.0 12.5 7.2 165 73 237 
2001 43.8 2.5 12.4 17.3 3.6 13.4 6.9 172 75 247 
2002 42.7 3.2 17.3 13.8 4.7 10.1 8.3 167 90 257 
2003 48.2 2.4 13.2 12.5 5.8 8.9 8.8 169 89 258 
Average 44.5 4.1 12.1 17.8 4.1 8.3 9.0 199.3 73.5 272.8 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) by geographical region, Norway 1990-2003 
Norway 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
South 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Far 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East Europe Other 
Bilateral 
allocable 
Un-
allocated 
Total 
bilateral 
ODA 
1990 65.0 0.5 21.2 2.8 0.6 0.3 9.7 638 204 842 
1991 65.3 0.2 19.2 5.2 0.9 0.4 8.9 644 181 825 
1992 64.3 0.1 18.3 7.2 0.7 0.7 8.7 682 195 878 
1993 61.3 0.2 17.8 5.8 0.6 6.9 7.4 613 183 796 
1994 54.1 0.5 14.4 7.1 2.6 14.4 7.0 795 201 996 
1995 52.8 0.2 13.8 8.1 6.8 10.1 8.1 747 207 954 
1996 51.7 0.7 16.0 6.6 8.0 8.8 8.3 766 207 972 
1997 52.4 0.5 13.5 8.2 7.8 8.8 8.8 783 221 1,004 
1998 51.9 0.5 13.2 7.3 8.7 9.7 8.7 802 321 1,123 
1999 42.0 0.3 12.2 7.2 8.4 22.1 7.8 841 311 1,151 
2000 44.8 0.4 12.7 7.7 8.6 18.2 7.7 721 320 1,041 
2001 40.5 0.5 18.2 7.3 9.1 13.1 11.3 726 324 1,050 
2002 45.0 0.5 18.4 6.1 9.8 14.7 5.5 848 303 1,150 
2003 47.7 0.4 16.7 5.0 12.5 11.6 6.0 913 364 1,277 
Average 52.8 0.4 16.1 6.5 6.1 10.0 8.1 751 253 1,004 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) by geographical region, Sweden 1990-2003 
Sweden 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
South and 
Central 
Asia 
Far 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East Europe Other 
Bilateral 
allocable 
Un-
allocated 
Total 
bilateral 
ODA 
1990 61.7 4.5 12.4 12.9 1.7 0.1 6.9 722 357 1,079 
1991 62.0 1.2 11.6 9.1 4.1 0.8 11.2 791 309 1,100 
1992 49.8 1.9 12.4 13.5 1.8 10.3 10.4 805 447 1,252 
1993 49.6 1.0 12.1 13.1 2.3 12.1 9.8 928 304 1,232 
1994 45.5 1.4 16.9 10.3 3.5 11.3 11.2 831 399 1,230 
1995 45.4 1.5 15.4 10.6 6.8 7.0 13.4 674 279 953 
1996 46.1 1.7 12.4 13.7 7.8 6.8 11.5 744 295 1,038 
1997 46.7 0.5 11.1 13.1 9.1 8.5 11.1 693 315 1,008 
1998 53.7 0.7 11.0 13.6 4.3 5.5 11.1 550 354 904 
1999 45.1 0.7 10.0 10.6 5.5 10.9 17.1 621 399 1,020 
2000 44.5 0.5 10.7 12.6 5.9 8.5 17.3 765 445 1,210 
2001 40.9 0.6 14.1 12.9 3.9 11.8 15.8 768 530 1,298 
2002 45.9 0.5 11.3 11.1 5.5 11.2 14.6 704 568 1,271 
2003 53.6 0.4 11.6 9.7 4.9 9.0 10.8 856 593 1,449 
Average 49.3 1.2 12.4 11.9 4.8 8.1 12.3 746 400 1,146 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) by geographical region, DAC 1990-2003 
Denmark 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
North 
Africa 
South 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Far 
East 
Asia 
Middle 
East Europe Other 
Bilateral 
allocable 
Un-
allocated 
Total 
bilateral 
ODA 
1990 33.1 13.3 11.3 18.3 7.2 2.7 14.1 40,081 7,289 47,370 
1991 23.7 24.3 10.8 12.9 8.1 3.5 16.8 50,446 7,841 58,287 
1992 27.5 12.6 10.8 21.5 8.7 3.8 15.3 39,399 7,781 47,180 
1993 28.0 12.1 10.2 19.2 6.2 5.1 19.2 39,506 7,576 47,082 
1994 29.5 9.4 12.7 19.1 8.5 3.8 17.1 36,593 7,802 44,395 
1995 29.8 7.8 12.7 21.4 5.6 4.4 18.2 32,060 7,918 39,978 
1996 26.6 8.3 12.5 19.6 11.9 4.1 17.0 32,785 8,208 40,993 
1997 29.9 8.0 13.2 21.6 4.8 4.0 18.7 28,538 8,722 37,260 
1998 28.3 8.0 14.4 23.4 4.1 3.8 18.1 31,022 9,368 40,390 
1999 25.6 7.0 12.1 27.1 4.2 7.0 16.9 32,194 9,767 41,961 
2000 29.3 7.6 13.4 23.7 4.5 7.0 14.5 30,539 10,972 41,511 
2001 26.9 7.2 17.2 20.9 4.3 6.0 17.5 32,418 9,951 42,369 
2002 30.8 6.2 16.6 18.8 3.7 9.4 14.5 37,280 10,474 47,754 
2003 35.2 4.6 16.6 17.2 9.4 4.6 12.3 42,647 11,201 53,848 
Average 28.9 9.7 13.2 20.3 6.5 4.9 16.4 36,108 8,919 45,027 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Bilateral ODA to LDCs 
The table below shows that throughout the period 1990 to 2003 the Nordic countries allocated 
a higher share of their allocable bilateral ODA to LDCs than the DAC average. 
 
Percentage share of allocable bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD) allocated to LDCs, Nordic countries and DAC total 1990-2003 
% of allocable bilateral ODA to LDCs Allocable bilateral ODA (mill USD) 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 61.3 52.7 61.9 57.5 27.9 512 285 638 722 40,081 
1991 60.4 46.0 63.1 58.6 21.4 511 345 644 791 50,446 
1992 61.4 39.6 63.3 46.6 24.5 491 327 682 805 39,399 
1993 59.4 30.7 62.5 43.6 24.7 518 217 613 928 39,506 
1994 51.3 46.7 55.1 40.9 27.6 585 158 795 831 36,593 
1995 44.5 34.3 52.2 42.4 27.5 661 151 747 674 32,060 
1996 50.2 38.3 52.6 41.0 23.2 663 140 766 744 32,785 
1997 46.9 35.7 53.2 43.7 27.2 669 138 783 693 28,538 
1998 52.5 41.7 53.5 48.5 25.6 708 148 802 550 31,022 
1999 53.5 38.8 45.3 41.5 24.0 738 208 841 621 32,194 
2000 52.1 42.2 47.8 43.2 28.9 761 165 721 765 30,539 
2001 50.2 45.4 48.2 45.7 26.9 858 172 726 768 32,418 
2002 47.6 47.0 53.3 49.0 29.7 787 167 848 704 37,280 
2003 54.9 48.8 55.0 57.9 35.5 680 169 913 856 42,647 
Average 53.3 42.0 54.8 47.2 26.8 653 199 751 746 36,108 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Non-grant component of bilateral ODA 
The table below shows the non-grant percentage share of bilateral ODA (gross) disbursements 
for Nordic countries and the DAC total from 1990 to 2003. Over this period the DAC group 
allocated on average 22.3% of bilateral ODA as non-grants. The Nordic countries were all 
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well below this level in the same period. Sweden had the lowest average share non-grant 
allocations, followed by Norway and then Denmark. 
 
Non-grant share of bilateral ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2002 prices, mill 
USD), Nordic countries and the DAC total, 1990-2003 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 2.7 8.6 0.5 - 27.5 
1991 1.6 3.9 0.8 0.5 33.4 
1992 2.9 5.5 0.6 0.6 27.7 
1993 1.2 13.8 0.8 - 28.6 
1994 0.1 2.6 0.9 0.1 23.7 
1995 2.9 3.2 1.0 - 21.4 
1996 2.8 3.3 1.3 - 20.2 
1997 3.4 3.5 1.3 - 19.9 
1998 2.9 1.2 1.2 0.3 21.2 
1999 3.2 1.0 1.9 0.3 21.3 
2000 2.9 2.1 1.5 1.6 18.8 
2001 3.2 1.8 0.7 1.6 17.2 
2002 7.0 3.6 0.6 0.7 16.2 
2003 2.5 3.2 0.9 1.5 15.3 
Average 2.8 4.1 1.0 0.8 22.3 
Source: OECD IDS database 
Tying status of bilateral ODA 
The table below shows the share of untied bilateral ODA commitments from the Nordic 
countries and DAC in the period 1990 to 2003.71  
                                                     
71 The remaining share was either partially untied or tied. According to DCD/DAC (2000)10, tied aid is 
defined as “…grants and loans tied to procurement in the donor country only,  [and] official subsidies 
to domestic exporters that are recorded as ODA”. Untied aid is defined as “…loans or grants whose 
proceeds are fully and freely available to finance procurement from substantially all aid recipient 
countries and from OECD countries”. Partially untied aid is defined as “…loans and grants which are 
tied contractually or in effect to procurement of goods and services from the donor country and from a 
restricted number of countries”. 
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Untied aid as a percentage of bilateral ODA (commitments, current prices, mill USD), 
Nordic countries and the DAC total, 1990-2003  
Untied bilateral ODA 
Year Denmark Finland Norway Sweden DAC 
1990 - 27.4 61.3 78.5 59.4 
1991 - 27.8 - 83.7 58.8 
1992 - 50.6 81.7 85.4 48.2 
1993 - 59.0 81.8 85.0 56.4 
1994 - 47.0 85.0 81.7 66.1 
1995 61.3 75.8 77.0 93.9 69.6 
1996 61.3 60.2 88.4 78.9 71.3 
1997 71.6 76.8 91.1 74.5 83.2 
1998 81.4 78.6 89.8 79.3 81.4 
1999 70.8 84.7 99.1 91.5 85.8 
2000 80.5 89.5 97.7 85.4 81.1 
2001 93.3 87.5 98.9 86.5 79.4 
2002 82.1 82.5 99.1 78.5 84.9 
2003 71.5 85.8 99.9 93.6 92.0 
Average 74.9 66.6 88.5 84.0 72.7 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Bilateral ODA by sectors 
The table below shows the percentage distribution of bilateral ODA commitments for the four 
Nordic countries and the DAC total, over the four sectors as defined by OECD/DAC (table 5): 
(i) Social infrastructure & services, (ii) Economic infrastructure and services, (iii) Production 
sectors, and (iv) Multi-sector/ cross-cutting.72 The Other category here covers commitments 
not allocated to these sectors.73 
                                                     
72 Note that the four main sectors are in bold. Under each of these main sectors, the biggest sub-sectors 
are included in percent of the total  
73 These six remaining groups in the DAC IDS Table 5 are: (i) Commodity aid/general programme 
assistance; (ii) Action relating to debt; (iii) Emergency assistance; (iv) Administrative costs of donors; 
(v) Support to NGOs; and (vi) Unallocated/unspecified  
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Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current 
prices, mill USD), Denmark, 1990 and 1995-2003 
Denmark 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social infrastructure/services 45.1 33.1 45.1 33.8 25.1 50.6 22.3 34.4 35.6 43.1 
Education 1.6 6.0 3.4 9.7 3.9 1.4 8.1 3.0 9.0 4.5 
Health 6.4 11.8 20.5 3.6 1.1 15.6 2.6 4.5 6.0 9.8 
Water/sanitation 26.9 3.4 14.2 10.0 10.1 22.3 4.7 2.9 3.6 6.9 
Gov./civil society 0.2 7.5 4.9 8.5 5.2 9.3 4.0 20.9 9.9 15.8 
Other social 10.0 4.3 2.1 2.0 4.9 2.1 2.9 3.1 7.0 6.1 
Eco infrastructure/service 10.3 17.3 17.9 14.8 11.7 10.4 35.0 4.1 15.2 24.0 
Transp./storage 3.6 11.5 8.5 8.7 2.9 6.9 28.0 1.6 6.5 9.3 
Communications 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.3 
Energy 4.6 4.0 4.8 4.0 5.2 2.8 6.9 1.5 8.2 3.6 
Other economic 0.0 0.4 3.3 0.5 3.0 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.2 8.8 
Production sectors 17.1 6.5 12.4 13.0 6.3 14.6 16.3 11.0 10.0 5.7 
Agri./forestry/fishing 9.1 4.3 10.5 12.7 4.8 14.6 15.4 5.8 6.3 3.0 
Industry/mining/constr. 8.0 2.2 1.9 0.3 1.5 - 0.4 4.7 3.3 2.5 
Other production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Cross-cutting 7.9 18.8 4.2 23.4 8.6 11.1 2.4 13.2 7.9 8.8 
Other 19.7 24.2 20.3 15.0 48.2 13.3 24.0 37.4 31.4 18.4 
Alloc. Bilat. ODA (mill USD) 502 675 1171 798 585 700 926 638 838 818 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current 
prices, mill USD), Finland, 1990 and 1995-2003 
Finland 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social infrastructure/service 12.4 21.8 26.9 34.0 39.1 35.5 46.0 42.2 55.0 46.9 
Education 1.6 6.7 3.8 8.2 7.3 7.6 9.7 8.9 11.2 10.8 
Health 6.0 4.0 5.6 2.7 10.5 6.6 5.5 5.1 12.3 8.2 
Water/sanitation 2.8 7.4 11.5 7.3 5.1 4.8 7.1 3.8 7.0 4.5 
Gov./civil society 1.0 1.0 3.5 11.6 10.3 8.5 17.3 15.1 16.4 17.2 
Other social 1.1 2.8 2.7 4.2 5.9 8.0 6.4 9.2 8.1 6.3 
Eco infrastructure/service 11.2 4.1 17.8 4.1 6.5 5.5 1.4 0.9 3.6 7.1 
Transp./storage 4.7 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
Communications 3.9 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.9 
Energy 2.6 0.9 15.3 2.0 2.2 3.7 0.4 0.1 2.4 3.7 
Other economic 0.1 2.4 1.9 1.0 3.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.7 
Production sectors 43.6 5.2 14.7 12.7 16.2 5.1 6.2 8.6 9.8 4.1 
Agri./forestry/fishing 20.5 3.8 12.9 7.7 13.9 4.0 4.6 8.2 7.1 2.2 
Industry/mining/constr. 19.9 1.1 1.1 4.9 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.2 1.7 1.4 
Other production 3.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 0.5 
Cross-cutting 11.0 33.4 11.6 23.1 14.8 8.6 18.6 22.4 9.5 15.7 
Other 21.8 35.5 29.0 26.1 23.4 45.3 27.7 25.9 22.2 26.2 
Alloc. Bilat. ODA (mill USD) 605 223 199 207 244 254 188 277 301 383 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current 
prices, mill USD), Norway, 1990 and 1995-2003 
Norway 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social infrastructure/service 17.6 26.7 30.9 28.0 33.0 45.3 38.8 49.0 60.2 41.9 
Education 4.6 3.0 7.0 8.5 5.4 10.7 6.2 7.8 11.7 9.2 
Health 3.0 4.6 2.8 4.6 3.8 6.0 2.7 11.8 6.8 6.9 
Water/sanitation 5.4 3.4 0.7 1.8 4.3 3.1 2.1 4.6 2.4 1.4 
Gov./civil society 0.3 6.5 4.9 6.4 10.4 13.2 18.0 15.1 25.3 15.7 
Other social 4.2 9.2 15.5 6.7 9.2 12.3 9.7 9.7 14.1 8.8 
Eco infrastructure/service 24.9 23.3 14.6 12.1 10.0 6.7 10.7 15.2 6.9 7.7 
Transp./storage 14.2 5.4 2.2 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.8 2.4 0.5 1.4 
Communications 0.8 0.6 1.7 1.3 0.0 1.0 0.6 3.0 0.4 0.3 
Energy 7.3 15.5 9.1 9.1 7.8 3.2 5.5 7.7 3.5 4.3 
Other economic 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.8 3.8 2.1 2.5 1.7 
Production sectors 14.1 9.0 7.4 5.3 5.1 6.9 7.3 7.7 6.5 4.6 
Agri./forestry/fishing 9.3 6.2 4.4 3.7 2.3 5.3 6.1 4.5 5.5 3.9 
Industry/mining/constr. 3.9 2.8 2.9 1.4 2.4 1.4 1.0 3.0 0.7 0.1 
Other production 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 
Cross-cutting 4.8 8.6 10.4 12.7 10.0 10.3 5.8 7.8 9.3 9.4 
Other 38.5 32.3 36.7 41.9 41.9 30.7 37.4 20.3 17.1 36.4 
Alloc. Bilat. ODA (mill USD) 617 909 839 677 680 1120 781 983 1069 1444 
Source: OECD IDS database 
 
Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current 
prices, mill USD), Sweden, 1990 and 1995-2003 
Sweden 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social infrastructure/service 28.4 35.4 33.8 35.7 33.2 34.5 31.6 33.7 36.8 32.7 
Education 6.6 8.5 7.6 9.3 6.0 6.0 4.3 3.8 6.2 5.0 
Health 9.3 10.0 9.0 7.0 4.4 4.3 5.9 2.2 4.8 4.4 
Water/sanitation 3.3 3.0 3.2 1.6 2.2 3.7 2.2 5.0 2.0 2.2 
Gov./civil society 7.2 8.9 11.0 6.0 14.4 10.7 11.5 14.6 13.8 12.2 
Other social 2.1 4.9 3.0 11.8 6.3 9.9 7.9 8.2 10.0 8.9 
Eco infrastructure/service 18.2 10.9 13.0 15.9 9.5 9.2 8.4 11.1 6.9 9.3 
Transp./storage 4.6 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.4 1.0 5.2 2.0 4.1 
Communications 6.5 1.8 3.4 3.5 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.5 
Energy 4.4 4.7 7.4 6.1 3.2 2.6 3.8 2.7 1.4 2.8 
Other economic 2.7 1.9 0.0 3.8 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.5 3.2 1.9 
Production sectors 27.5 11.9 10.0 11.1 7.2 3.9 2.5 5.2 3.1 2.9 
Agri./forestry/fishing 13.5 10.2 8.0 9.2 6.3 3.2 2.1 4.5 2.2 2.2 
Industry/mining/constr. 13.0 1.7 1.8 1.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 
Other production 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Cross-cutting 1.7 5.6 8.7 5.7 7.5 6.5 4.6 11.0 11.9 5.8 
Other 24.2 36.2 34.4 31.5 42.6 45.9 52.9 39.0 41.2 49.2 
Alloc. Bilat. ODA (mill USD) 1127 1187 1395 1205 1002 1123 1062 1065 1258 1675 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Percentage of bilateral ODA by main sector (commitments/gross disbursements, current 
prices, mill USD), DAC total, 1990 and 1995-2003 
DAC 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Social infrastructure/service 23.5 32.5 31.9 30.1 31.3 31.2 33.4 33.3 34.9 31.4 
Education 10.2 12.0 11.4 11.4 10.8 11.2 8.2 9.0 9.0 7.9 
Health 2.9 4.3 4.9 4.0 3.8 4.2 3.7 4.2 5.0 3.9 
Water supply and sanitation 3.3 6.0 7.1 6.5 6.1 4.4 6.7 4.8 2.6 3.3 
Gov./civil society 3.1 3.4 3.1 2.6 4.5 4.3 5.2 7.0 8.0 8.7 
Other social 3.9 6.8 5.4 5.6 6.1 7.0 9.6 8.3 10.2 7.7 
Eco. infrastructure/service 15.0 25.3 24.9 24.6 18.6 18.0 17.4 15.4 12.7 9.4 
Transp. and storage 6.6 10.7 13.2 10.0 8.8 8.7 9.1 8.9 5.7 2.6 
Communications 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Energy 5.1 10.8 7.6 10.3 6.4 4.6 3.3 3.9 4.4 4.6 
Other economic 1.0 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.1 4.2 4.0 2.0 2.2 1.7 
Production sectors 12.4 11.3 14.1 11.2 9.6 8.2 7.4 9.0 6.9 5.4 
Agri./forestry/fishing 7.9 7.9 10.2 8.3 7.5 5.5 5.4 6.9 4.8 3.1 
Industry/mining/constr. 3.5 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.7 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.9 
Other production 1.0 1.8 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.4 
Mulitsector/ cross-cutting 3.4 5.3 6.2 8.0 7.5 7.7 8.7 7.5 7.5 8.7 
Other 45.8 25.6 22.9 26.2 33.1 34.9 33.2 34.8 38.0 45.1 
Bilateral ODA (mill USD) 55595 50473 46269 41011 41564 44451 42770 40954 48490 68320 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Top twenty recipients of bilateral ODA 
Below tables of the top 20 recipients of bilateral ODA (net disbursements) for the years 2003, 1999, 1995 and 1990 are presented. 
 
Top 20 recipients of aid from the Nordic countries and the DAC, percent of total allocable bilateral ODA (net disbursements, constant 2002 prices, mill 
USD), 2003 
Rank Recipient Den Recipient Fin Recipient Nor Recipient Swe Recipient DAC 
1 Tanzania 12.4 Mozambique 10.9 Afghanistan 6.5 Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire) 16.3 Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire) 13.0 
2 Viet Nam 10.2 Afghanistan 6.7 Tanzania 6.4 Tanzania 6.3 Iraq 6.0 
3 Mozambique 9.7 Tanzania 6.5 Iraq 5.6 Mozambique 5.4 Indonesia 4.4 
4 Ghana 8.2 South Africa 4.8 Mozambique 5.2 Afghanistan 4.0 Afghanistan 3.3 
5 Uganda 7.7 Namibia 4.7 Palestinian adm.areas 5.1 Nicaragua 3.4 China 3.1 
6 Bangladesh 6.6 Ethiopia 4.5 Serbia & Montenegro 4.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.4 Jordan 3.2 
7 Egypt 6.0 Viet Nam 4.3 Somalia 3.8 Palestinian adm.areas 3.3 Ethiopia 2.9 
8 Nepal 5.8 Nicaragua 3.9 Uganda 3.7 Bangladesh 3.3 Viet Nam 2.6 
9 Nicaragua 4.7 Serbia & Montenegro 3.9 Ethiopia 3.5 Serbia & Montenegro 3.3 Tanzania 2.5 
10 Zambia 4.4 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.5 Zambia 3.4 Uganda 3.1 Serbia & Montenegro 2.2 
11 Bolivia 4.2 Kenya 2.8 Sudan 3.2 Ethiopia 2.7 Egypt 2.1 
12 Burkina Faso 4.0 Nepal 2.6 Sri Lanka 2.7 Kenya 2.4 Colombia 2.2 
13 Benin 3.1 Zambia 2.3 Malawi 2.7 South Africa 2.3 Cameroon 1.9 
14 South Africa 3.0 Egypt 2.2 Angola 2.3 Bolivia 2.2 Philippines 2.0 
15 Afghanistan 2.6 Iraq 2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.1 Laos 2.2 Mozambique 1.8 
16 Bhutan 2.2 Palestinian adm.areas 2.1 Eritrea 2.1 Viet Nam 2.0 Bangladesh 1.8 
17 Kenya 1.8 Angola 1.9 Nepal 1.9 Zambia 1.9 Zambia 1.5 
18 Eritrea 1.7 Cambodia 1.9 Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire) 1.6 Cambodia 1.8 Uganda 1.6 
19 Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec. 1.6 Sudan 1.7 South Africa 1.5 India 1.8 Bolivia 1.5 
20 Malaysia 1.5 Iran 1.6 Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec. 1.4 Angola 1.3 Pakistan 1.5 
Allocable (mill USD) 564   168   913   856   33,311 
Unallocated 282  88  358  593  11,159 
Total bil. ODA (net)  846   256   1,271   1,449   44,470 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Top 20 recipients of aid from the Nordic countries and the DAC, percent of total allocable bilateral ODA (net disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD), 1999 
Rank  Recipient Den Recipient Fin Recipient Nor Recipient Swe Recipient DAC
1  Tanzania 10.7
 Serbia &
Montenegro 13.3 Serbia & Montenegro 13.1 Mozambique 7.4 Indonesia 7.1
2  Uganda 7.8 Mozambique 8.8 Tanzania 6.8 Tanzania 6.6 China 6.2
3  Mozambique 6.8 China 7.9 Mozambique 5.0 South Africa 5.9 Egypt 4.9
4  Bangladesh 5.6 Tanzania 6.3 Bangladesh 4.6 Nicaragua 4.8 Viet Nam 3.4
5  Egypt 5.3 Nicaragua 5.7 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.3 Viet Nam 4.7 Thailand 3.3
6  Viet Nam 5.2
 Bosnia-         
Herzegovina 4.8 Palestinian adm.areas 3.8 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.4 India 2.8
7  Ghana 5.0 Viet Nam 4.6 Zambia 3.7 Honduras 4.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.6
8  Burkina Faso 4.6 Namibia 4.1 Uganda 3.5 Bangladesh 3.6 Serbia & Montenegro 2.5
9  Thailand 4.0 Ethiopia 3.5 Ethiopia 3.3 Palestinian adm.areas 3.6 Tanzania 2.2
10  Zimbabwe 3.8 Nepal 3.4 Iraq 3.0 Uganda 2.9 Philippines 2.1
11  Malawi 3.8 Thailand 2.8 Angola 2.7 Serbia & Montenegro 2.8 Bangladesh 2.2
12  Zambia 3.4 Kenya 2.4 Nicaragua 2.3 Zimbabwe 2.7 Mozambique 2.2
13  India 3.3 Iraq 2.3 South Africa 2.2 Ethiopia 2.7 Pakistan 1.5
14  Nicaragua 3.2 Zambia 2.2 Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec. 2.0 Guatemala 2.6 Senegal 1.5
15  Nepal 3.2 Angola 2.2 Sudan 1.9 Angola 2.5 Peru 1.5
16  Bolivia 2.8 Afghanistan 2.1 China 1.9 Zambia 2.2 Bolivia 1.5
17  South Africa 2.3
 Palestinian  
adm.areas 2.0 Sri Lanka 1.9 Sri Lanka 2.0 South Africa 1.4
18  Bhutan 1.8 Iran 2.0 Zimbabwe 1.8 India 1.9 Cote d'Ivoire 1.3
19  Kenya 1.5 South Africa 1.7 Guatemala 1.8 Bolivia 1.9 Uganda 1.3
20  Malaysia 1.5 Egypt 1.6 Malawi 1.7 Rwanda 1.9    Ghana 1.3
Allocable (mill USD) 709  159  837  621  26,333
Unallocated 254 69 308 399 9,627
Total bil. ODA (net)  964  228  1,146  1,020  35,960
 Source: OECD IDS database 
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Top 20 recipients of aid from the Nordic countries and the DAC, percent of total allocable bilateral ODA (net disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD), 1995 
Rank Recipient Den Recipient Fin Recipient Nor Recipient Swe Recipient DAC 
1 Uganda 10.0 China 10.0 Mozambique 7.4 Mozambique 6.4 China 7.0 
2 Tanzania 9.9 Zambia 7.3 Tanzania 7.4 India 6.1 Egypt 5.8 
3 Mozambique 7.6 Mozambique 7.3 Bangladesh 5.8 Tanzania 5.4 Indonesia 3.5 
4 Ghana 5.9 Viet Nam 6.9 Palestinian adm.areas 5.7 Ethiopia 4.6 India 3.2 
5 Bangladesh 5.4 Tanzania 5.7 Zambia 5.0 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.6 Thailand 2.2 
6 Egypt 4.5 Thailand 5.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina 4.6 Viet Nam 4.0 Philippines 2.3 
7 Nicaragua 4.5 Namibia 4.9 Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec. 4.5 Zambia 3.9 Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.3 
8 India 4.4 Zimbabwe 4.8 Angola 4.1 Nicaragua 3.8 Bangladesh 2.4 
9 Zambia 4.3 Ethiopia 4.7 Nicaragua 3.9 Zimbabwe 3.4 Cote d'Ivoire 2.2 
10 Nepal 3.9 Nicaragua 3.9 Ethiopia 3.5 Iraq 3.4 Mozambique 2.4 
11 South Africa 3.8 Kenya 3.8 Indonesia 3.0 Angola 3.2 Tanzania 1.9 
12 Kenya 3.6 Nepal 3.7 Uganda 2.9 Bangladesh 3.1 Viet Nam 1.6 
13 Zimbabwe 3.1 Egypt 3.2 South Africa 2.8 Uganda 3.0 Ethiopia 1.8 
14 Burkina Faso 2.7 Bangladesh 2.9 Zimbabwe 2.6 Bolivia 2.7 Bolivia 1.7 
15 Thailand 2.5 Sts Ex-Yugo. Unspec. 2.8 Rwanda 2.3 Kenya 2.4 Haiti 2.1 
16 Viet Nam 2.3 Iraq 1.9 Sri Lanka 2.0 South Africa 2.3 Nicaragua 1.5 
17 Benin 2.2 Peru 1.8 Eritrea 2.0 Palestinian adm.areas 2.1 Kenya 1.4 
18 China 1.7 Rwanda 1.7 Cote d'Ivoire 1.7 Afghanistan 1.8 French Polynesia 1.3 
19 Bhutan 1.6 Sudan 1.3 Guatemala 1.7 China 1.8 New Caledonia 1.3 
20 Namibia 1.4 Iran 1.3 Sudan 1.6 Namibia 1.7 Zambia 1.5 
Allocable (mill USD) 487   127   744   674   26,167 
Unallocated 240  45  207  279  7,883 
Total bilateral ODA (net) 727   172   951   953   34,050 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Top 20 recipients of aid from the Nordic countries and the DAC, percent of total allocable bilateral ODA (net disbursements, constant 2002 prices, 
mill USD), 1990 
Rank Recipient Den Recipient Fin Recipient Nor Recipient Swe Recipient DAC 
1 Tanzania 16.3 Tanzania 13.8 Tanzania 18.0 Tanzania 16.2 Egypt 11.3 
2 Bangladesh 11.2 Kenya 8.2 Zambia 9.7 Mozambique 14.8 Indonesia 4.8 
3 India 7.7 Mozambique 7.2 Mozambique 9.1 India 6.4 China 4.5 
4 Kenya 7.6 Zambia 6.8 Bangladesh 7.7 Viet Nam 5.8 Israel 5.1 
5 Uganda 5.3 Egypt 6.7 Nicaragua 6.1 Ethiopia 5.3 Bangladesh 3.6 
6 Mozambique 5.0 Somalia 6.1 Ethiopia 4.4 Angola 4.1 Philippines 3.7 
7 Egypt 4.1 Ethiopia 5.7 India 4.4 Zambia 4.0 Tanzania 2.4 
8 Zambia 3.6 China 4.4 Zimbabwe 4.2 Zimbabwe 3.9 India 2.2 
9 Nicaragua 3.0 Viet Nam 4.4 Sri Lanka 3.9 China 3.5 Mozambique 2.2 
10 Zimbabwe 3.0 Nepal 4.2 Kenya 3.9 Nicaragua 3.4 Kenya 2.3 
11 Sudan 2.8 Sri Lanka 3.7 Botswana 3.8 Kenya 3.4 Thailand 2.3 
12 Yemen 2.7 Nicaragua 3.6 Pakistan 2.6 Bangladesh 2.8 Pakistan 2.2 
13 Morocco 2.6 Bangladesh 3.4 Mali 1.9 Botswana 2.7 Congo Dem.Rep. (Zaire) 1.8 
14 China 2.3 Sudan 3.4 Namibia 1.8 Algeria 2.1 Morocco 1.8 
15 Burkina Faso 2.1 Zimbabwe 2.8 Nepal 1.7 Tunisia 2.1 Senegal 1.8 
16 Lesotho 1.7 Namibia 1.8 Sudan 1.7 Laos 1.9 Turkey 1.8 
17 Nepal 1.6 Chile 1.5 Uganda 1.3 Afghanistan 1.7 Cote d'Ivoire 1.5 
18 Niger 1.5 Thailand 1.2 Angola 1.3 Uganda 1.6 Ethiopia 1.5 
19 Sri Lanka 1.3 Jordan 1.1 Chile 1.1 Guinea-Bissau 1.4 Malaysia 1.5 
20 Malawi 1.3 India 0.8 China 1.0 Sri Lanka 1.1 Jordan 1.4 
Allocable (mill USD) 480   284   633   722   33,682 
Unallocated 212  100  202  357  7,080 
Total bilateral ODA (net) 692   384   835   1,079   40,763 
Source: OECD IDS database 
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Public opinion 
Several surveys measure public support for development aid. Eurobarometer has performed consistent 
and timely surveys for the EU countries since 1996 (including Denmark, Finland and Sweden). 
Similar surveys for Norway74 are undertaken by Statistics Norway and Statistics Sweden.  
Attitudes to development assistance 
The table below shows the percentage of the population that is in favour of assistance to developing 
countries.75 We see that the citizens in the Nordic countries have become increasingly in favour of 
development assistance.  
 
Percentage of population in favour of development assistance, Nordic countries and the EU, 
1996 - 2004 
Description 1996 1998 2002 2004 
Denmark 83.1 83.6 92.5 97.0 
Finland 77.2 69.9 91.6 91.0 
Norway* 84.0 88.5 88.2 - 
Sweden 81.0 83.1 91.9 96.0 
EU** 81.7 75.8 82.5 91.0 
* For Norway survey data are from 1996, 1999 and 2001. Data for the 2004 survey are not yet available 
** 2004: the EU was enlarged from 15 to 25 members. Norway is not a member of the EU, and hence not part of 
the EU average 
Source: Denmark, Finland, Sweden and EU data from Eurobarometer (various reports). Norway data from 
Statistics Norway 
Attitudes to the level of development assistance 
There are also opinion polls on attitudes to the level of development assistance that at given times is 
being disbursed by their national governments. Below available polls from Norway and Sweden are 
shown. 
 
In the Norwegian surveys, respondents are first informed about the amount of development aid, the 
share of the state budget this corresponds to, and how this share relates to other sectors in the budget.76 
They are then asked whether the amount of development aid should increase, is about right, decrease 
or stop. The table below gives the corresponding percentage share of each answer, including 
respondents who refused to answer or did not know, from 1972 to 2001.  
 
                                                     
74 Norway is not a member of the EU. 
75 In the Eurobarometer survey (data for Denmark, Finland, Sweden and EU) the tables gives the share of the 
respective respondents that see it as very or fairly important “...to help people in poor countries in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia, etc. to develop”. In the survey done by Statistics Norway, the table gives the share of the 
respondents that are in favour of Norway helping developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.  
76 The Norwegian parliament has for the year (.) allocated (.) million NOK to development aid. This corresponds 
to (.)% of the state budget, (.) billion NOK in total. In comparison, the defence budget received (.)%, and the 
social/education sector received (.)%. Do you think the amount of funds allocated to development aid should be 
increased; is ok; should be decreased; or stopped? 
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Attitudes to the amount allocated as development aid through the state budget, Norway, 1972 
to 2001 
Year Increase 
About 
right Decrease Stop 
Refuses 
to answer 
Do not 
know 
Sum 
respondents Missing Total 
1972 10.2 47.6 24.3 10.6 - 7.3 2,243 - 2,243 
1974 12.5 46.1 25.8 8.9 - 6.7 2,105 - 2,105 
1977 10.7 48.1 27.2 6.7 - 7.3 1,965 4 1,969 
1980 18.9 52.3 16.3 6.2 - 6.4 1,961 1 1,962 
1983 19.5 55.9 14.5 4.7 - 5.3 1,908 2 1,910 
1986 24.5 55.2 11.6 2.7 - 6.0 2,170 4 2,174 
1990 15.2 53.2 22.3 4.9 - 4.4 2,159 1 2,160 
1993 13.7 54.6 26.0 2.4 - 3.2 1,821 1 1,822 
1995 8.8 52.9 29.5 4.2 0.2 4.4 1,402 - 1,402 
1996 11.7 51.4 30.2 4.9 - 1.8 675 671 1,346 
1999 11.3 52.8 30.3 3.3 - 2.3 1,163 380 1,543 
2001 14.8 52.6 24.9 4.1 0.5 3.2 1,274 352 1,626 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
An interesting trend is revealed when comparing these opinion polls data with the actual level of 
ODA disbursed from Norway. The figure shows ODA disbursements (constant 2003 prices) on the 
left axis. The right axis gives the percentage of the surveyed population who report that the current 
level of development aid is “about right”. We see that Norwegian ODA disbursements have 
increased gradually over the period, with an average annual growth rate of 6%.77 Nevertheless, the 
share of the surveyed Norwegian population reporting that the amount of development aid is about 
right has remained stable at more than 50% throughout the period. This may indicate that the 
majority of the population supported continued increases in Norwegian ODA. 
 
 
Comparing total ODA (gross disbursements, constant 2003 prices, mill USD) and share of 
surveyed population who report current level of ODA is about right, Norway 1972 to 2001 
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Source: OECD IDS database and Statistics Norway 
 
                                                     
77 Total ODA (gross disbursement, constant 2003 prices) 1972: 300.05 mill USD; 2001: 1726.38 mill USD. 
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Swedish public opinion polls on the attitudes to ODA have been performed by Statistics Sweden 
since 1974. They show that the largest group of respondents see the level of ODA as about right. In 
all years surveyed after 1977, except 1986 and 1988, the share wanting a reduction in aid 
allocations is larger than the share wanting to see an increase. 
 
Attitudes to the amount allocated as development aid through the state budget, Sweden, 1974 
to 2004 
Year Increase About right Decrease Stop 
Do not 
know 
No 
answer 
Sum 
respondents Missing 
1974 32.0 51.0 6.0 5.0 7.0 1.0 1200 240 
1975 23.0 56.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 1.0 1200 228 
1976 26.0 54.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 1200 252 
1977 22.0 53.0 14.0 7.0 3.0 0.0 500 110 
1979 15.0 58.0 18.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 835 209 
1980 15.0 50.0 24.0 11.0 - - 1600 - 
1981 17.3 56.4 17.0 9.3 - - 813 130 
1982 16.3 54.8 21.7 7.2 - - 799 - 
1983 15.0 60.0 18.0 7.0 - - 1200 192 
1984 16.0 58.0 19.0 8.0 - - 1200 - 
1985 15.7 61.2 18.0 5.1 - - 1200 152 
1986 20.9 64.0 11.2 3.9 - - 1218 280 
1988 20.7 63.5 12.0 3.8 - - 1209 - 
1990 11.4 51.1 25.9 8.4 - - 1200 - 
1991 9.7 53.6 26.7 7.3 - - 1200 - 
1992 8.8 44.1 37.8 7.6 - - 1200 276 
1993 9.0 54.0 28.0 9.0 - - 1200 - 
1994 11.0 51.0 33.0 6.0 - - 1200 - 
1995 9.0 50.0 32.0 9.0 - - 1200 - 
1996 9.8 34.5 29.1 12.7 12.7 - 1200 - 
1997 10.7 42.2 28.7 10.4 7.2 - 1200 - 
1998 13.4 43.5 25.8 7.4 9.7 - 1200 - 
2000 15.2 44.8 23.6 7.8 8.7 - 1984 - 
2001 16.2 45.8 22.4 7.5 8.0 - 2000 - 
2002 15.4 45.5 19.1 5.4 14.6 - 2000 - 
2003 16.1 40.3 23.6 6.4 13.6 - 2000 - 
2004 14.8 34.3 26.0 7.0 17.8 - 2000 - 
Source: Statistics Sweden 
 
In the graph below the ODA disbursements (constant 2003 prices, mill USD) are plotted on the left 
axis, and the share of the respondents that saw the level of Swedish ODA as about right on the right 
axis. From 1995, less than half of the respondents reported the level of Swedish ODA as about 
right. Interestingly, and as pointed out, the majority of respondents who would like to see a change 
in the level of ODA wanted a reduction. Nevertheless, the period from 1998 up to 2003 saw a 
massive increase in the level of ODA. 
 
  86 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
M
ill
 U
SD
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Pe
rc
en
t ODA (gross)
Public
opinion
 
Source: OECD IDS database and Statistics Sweden 
Comparing government expenditure on defence, health, education and 
ODA 
Data on annual government spending on defence, health and education are extracted from the 
OECD general government expenditure database.78 Entries are available from 1992 to 2003 for 
most OECD member countries. Data on ODA (gross disbursements) are collected from the OECD 
IDS database. We choose the first year for which data on general government expenditure is 
available as the base year. OECD data on government expenditure on defence, health and education 
are available in current local currency. We have therefore also used ODA data in current national 
currency.  
 
For Denmark, we see that ODA increased at the same rate as education and health expenditures. 
Defence increased much more slowly. From 2001, however, there has been a drastic decline in 
ODA allocations, whereas health and education have continued to expand.  
                                                     
78 http://www.oecd.org 
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Comparing government expenditure on defence, health, education and ODA, Denmark 1992 
to 2003 (1992=100) 
 
Source: OECD General Government Account database, and OECD IDS database 
 
As was the case in Denmark, Finnish allocations to ODA either followed or exceeded health and 
education prior to 2001.79 
 
Comparing government expenditure on defence, health, education and ODA, Finland 1995 to 
2002 (1995=100) 
Source: OECD General Government Accounts database, and OECD IDS database 
 
In Norway, ODA disbursements were below or at the 1992 level until 1995. From 1995 ODA 
increased gradually, but less than health and education.  
                                                     
79 National currency in 2002 Euros. 
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Comparing government expenditure on defence, health, education and ODA, Norway 1992 to 
2002 (1992=100) 
 
Source: OECD General Government Accounts database, and OECD IDS database 
 
The figures for Sweden are shown in the graph below. 
 
Comparing government expenditure on defence, health, education and ODA, Sweden 1995 to 
2002 (1995=100) 
 
Source: OECD General Government Accounts database, and OECD IDS database 
Development finance organisations 
This section reviews the development finance organisation of the Nordic countries: IFU/IØ 
(Denmark), Finnfund (Finland), Norfund (Norway) and Swedfund (Sweden). All four are members 
of the Association of European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI). EDFI is a fourteen-
member group of European bilateral development finance institutions, and was founded in 1992 to 
foster co-operation among its members and to strengthen links with institutions of the European 
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Union.80 It is the shared vision of the EDFI members to provide long-term finance to the private 
sector in developing countries and reforming economies, thereby bridging the gap between 
commercial investment agencies and government development aid.  
 
The table below gives details of the regional coverage of four Nordic development investment funds 
in 2004. We see that the funds differ quite substantially in this respect, especially with the relative 
share of their portfolio invested in Europe.  Whereas IFU/IØ and Swedfund had about a quarter of 
their portfolio invested in the new EU member countries, Finnfund only had 3% and Norfund no 
investment projects in these countries.  
 
Nordic development investment fund portfolios by geographical region, percentage shares, 
2004 
Region IFU/IØ Finnfund Norfund Swedfund 
Africa, Caribbean, Pacific and RSA 10 24 26 31 
Latin America 5 16 15 7 
Asia 23 15 16 13 
China 9 10 3 2 
New EU member countries 27 3 - 21 
Central and Eastern Europe 8 2 10 1 
CIS and Russia 10 18 - 24 
Mediterranean and Middle East 8 1 1 - 
Other - 11 29 1 
 Total  100 100 100 100 
Source: EDFI 2004 
 
The table below shows the Nordic investment funds’ portfolio in terms of investment activity in 
2004. Whereas more than two-thirds of investments by IFU/IØ, Norfund and Swedfund are equity 
stakes, Finnfund has an even split between equity and loan.  
 
Nordic development investment fund portfolios by investment activity, percentage shares, 
2004 
Investment activity IFU/IØ Finnfund Norfund Swedfund 
Equity and quasi-equity 68 53 77 71 
Loans 31 47 23 24 
Guarantees 1 - - 5 
  100 100 100 100 
Source: EDFI 2004 
 
IFU/IØ 
Danish international investment funds are the three funds IFU, IØ and IFV. From 1 January 2004 
IFV stopped making new investments, and we will therefore focus on IFU and IØ.  
 
The IFU was established in 1967, and IØ in 1989. The two funds have the same supervisory board 
and executive board. IFU operates in poor developing countries, and the host countries of 
investments must be on the OECD’s DAC list of development aid recipients with a GNP per capita 
not exceding USD 5,295 (in 2005). IØ operates in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Asian part 
of the former Soviet Union, but it may not initiate projects in EU member countries. 
                                                     
80 AWS: Austria, BIO: Belgium, CDC: UK, COFIDES: Spain, Corvinus: Hungary, DEG: Germany, 
FINNFUND: Finland, FMO: The Netherlands, IFU: Denmark, NORFUND: Norway, PROPARCO: France, 
SBI-BMI: Belgium, SIMEST: Italy, SWEDFUND: Sweden 
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To be eligible, a project must be financed in part by a Danish business partner, and the project must 
be evaluated as being commercially viable. Also eligible are green-field projects, expansion of 
existing projects and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. IFU's policy is to withdraw from a 
project when it has become self-supporting, usually after 5-10 years.  
 
Finnfund 
Established by law in 1979, Finnfund started its operations in 1980. Though the fund 
mainly invests in Finnish companies and their partners, Finnfund may also support other 
projects that make use of Finnish technology or that are generate significant environmental 
or social benefits. Finnfund does not have an explicit cut-off level for the per capita income 
of its host countries, but aims over the next five years to allocate at least two-thirds of its 
new commitments to low-income and lower middle-income countries.  
 
Norfund 
Norfund was established in 1997, and commenced its operations in 1998. Contrary to the policy of 
the other Nordic development funds, Norfund's commitments do not need a Norwegian partner. Any 
country on the OECD DAC recipient list with a GDP under USD 5,290 per capita is eligible for 
investments. Norfund can invest in most sectors of the economy as long as the investment offers 
opportunities for growth, profitability and local development. 
 
Swedfund 
Part of Swedfund’s task is to promote Swedish interests. For this reason it cooperates primarily with 
Swedish companies, investing in a local company to establish or expand their operations. Swedfund 
is to invest in countries that according to the OECD/DAC definition qualify for development 
financing. For investments in reforming European countries, the OECD DAC threshold does not 
apply. 
International trade and investment relations 
So far we have look at government-initiated interaction with developing countries. In the following 
we briefly review each Nordic country’s private sector involvement with the rest of the world. More 
specifically, we will look at trade and investment statistics for all four Nordic countries. 
Trade in goods by geographical region 
The tables below show, for each Nordic country, the export and import of goods by geographical 
region.  
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Danish goods exports and imports, percentage share of geographical regions, 2002-2003 
Export Import Trade in goods by region 
2002 2003 2002 2003 
Europe 79.4 79.8 84.3 83.6 
North Africa* 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.4 
North America 7.8 7.5 5.2 4.1 
Central and South America 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Asia 9.4 9.4 8.4 10.0 
Oceania 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.4 
Total classified by country (DEK mill) 441,649 436,138 387,414 376,227 
Not classified (DEK mill) 514 501 404 474 
Total (DEK mill) 442,163 436,639 387,818 376,700 
* Includes: Algeria, Ceuta, Egypt, Libya, Melilla, Morocco, Tunisia 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
Finnish goods exports and imports, percentage share of geographical regions, 2003-2004 
Export Import Trade in goods by region 
2003  2004  2003  2004  
Europe 72.8 72.8 86.18 85.04 
North Africa 0.7 0.8 0.03 0.02 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 1.2 0.42 0.72 
North America 9.2 7.4 2.80 2.97 
Central and South America 1.9 2.0 1.33 1.55 
Asia 13.7 14.8 8.49 8.76 
Oceania and Polar regions 0.8 1.0 0.75 0.94 
Total (mill Euro) 46,586 48,997 35,195 38,486 
Source: Central Bank of Finland 
 
 
Norwegian goods exports and imports, percentage share of geographical regions, 2002-2004 
Export Import Trade in goods by region 
2002 2003 2004 2002 2003 2004 
Europe 79.1 80.8 80.5 75.4 75.9 75.9 
North-America 12.1 11.8 12.4 8.2 7.2 7.2 
Central and South-America 1.8 1.0 1.2 2.4 2.9 2.5 
Africa 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 
Asia and Oceania 6.4 5.8 5.4 13.1 13.1 13.3 
Total (mill. NOK) 472,662 488,320 557,999 279,760 288,594 332,221 
Source: Statistics Norway 
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Swedish goods exports and imports, percentage share of geographical regions, 2003-2004 
Export Import Trade in goods by region 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
Europe 71.2 72.3 84.8 85.2 
North Africa 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.1 
Sub-Sahara 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.3 
North America 12.8 11.9 4.3 3.8 
Central and South America 2.0 2.0 1.2 1.3 
Asia 11.0 10.8 9.2 9.1 
Oceania and other territories 1.3 1.2 0.3 0.3 
Total classified by country (SEK mill) 823,399 900,023 673,419 729,930 
Not classified (SEK mill) 550 657   
Total (SEK mill) 823,949 900,680   
Source: Statistics Sweden 
 
Investment abroad by geographical region 
We will here briefly investigate the net direct investments abroad from the four Nordic countries. 
These are acquisitions outside the home country of physical investment assets (e.g. plant and 
equipment), or of a controlling stake in a company. Figures are presented by geographical region in 
percent of the total net direct investment abroad for each year. Negative entries signify divestment, 
i.e. more capital was divested abroad than was invested. 
 
The table below gives Danish net direct investment abroad for the period 1999 to 2004.  
 
Danish direct investment abroad (net), percentage share of geographical regions, 1999-2004 
Net capital flow by region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Europe 85.9 51.1 93.0 87.7 128.0 240.1 
America 7.6 43.3 7.2 12.5 9.3 -39.2 
Africa 3.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 2.1 -33.9 
Asia 3.2 4.8 -1.2 0.1 -33.6 -65.3 
Oceania 0.0 0.3 1.0 -0.6 -4.8 -0.6 
Total (mill DEK) 51,291 68,183 67,418 35,798 6,277 -3,267 
Source: Central Bank of Denmark 
 
The table below shows Finnish net direct investment abroad from 1995 to 2003.  
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Finnish direct investment abroad (net), percentage share of geographical regions, 1995-2003 
Net capital flow by region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 
Europe 87.9 102.0 78.5 92.8 73.3 77.9 73.6 115.8 37.6 
North America 13.3 -6.3 19.8 6.2 20.5 18.6 15.6 -17.1 51.0 
Central and South America -1.3 5.9 0.9 -0.3 0.6 1.6 5.8 -0.8 2.8 
Asia 3.6 2.7 3.9 1.2 3.5 1.3 4.9 2.0 4.9 
Africa 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.2 
Oceania and polar regions 0.6 0.6 1.0 -0.1 1.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 2.5 
Unclassified -4.4 -5.2 -3.9 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 
Total (mill Euro) 1,100 2,778 4,617 16,759 6,209 26,082 9,354 8,099 -2,294 
* Preliminary 
Source: Central Bank of Finland 
 
The table below gives the geographical distribution of Norwegian direct investment abroad.  
 
Norwegian direct investment abroad (net), percentage share of geographical regions, 1999-
2002 
Geographical region 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Europe 74.3 69.4 61.4 63.9 
Africa 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.2 
America 19.0 21.2 26.4 24.4 
Asia 3.0 6.4 7.0 5.6 
Oceania 0.3 0.3 2.4 2.9 
Total (mill. NOK) 334,354 387,501 481,297 474,390 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
The table below gives the Swedish net direct investment abroad.  
 
Swedish direct investment abroad (net), percentage share of geographical regions, 1998-2004 
Net capital flow by region 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Europe 68.23 60.00 81.28 48.99 93.44 119.00 69.11 
North America  14.38 23.08 10.43 63.93 8.26 -17.03 -11.71 
Central and South America 3.52 5.27 2.50 -3.23 -10.06 -3.22 8.10 
Africa 0.34 0.17 0.29 1.15 0.11 0.53 1.79 
Asia 2.86 1.47 2.44 3.55 14.94 4.14 6.88 
Oceania 0.59 -0.34 -0.26 -2.27 -0.31 -0.44 12.39 
Not allocated 10.07 10.34 3.33 -12.13 -6.38 -2.98 13.45 
Total (mill SEK)* 149,003 111,502 293,629 44,093 59,965 98,019 31,988 
* Total excludes reinvested earnings, which is not possible to beak down by country. 
Source: Central Bank of Sweden 
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SUMMARY
The Nordic countries are often praised for their efforts in development assistance 
and commended for their generosity. Over the last few decades the Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands have consistently been among the most generous 
donors. What is it that makes them more generous and seemingly less selfish than 
most other donor countries? Are they so much more altruistic than most other 
donors? In all the Nordic countries, the modes and ways of dealing with aid are in 
the process of undergoing substantial changes, both in terms of how the donors 
organise their activities and how aid is delivered. This study aims to understand 
and explain the Nordic countries’ aid policies and practices. It elaborates on the 
main underpinnings of their aid policies, how they are shaped and how they have 
transformed into practice at the more general level. The study focuses on recent 
and current developments, but is also briefly giving an outline of the historical 
background. A field report from the Nordic countries’ operations in Tanzania 
is also presented, which will provide some insights into their operations at the 
country level.
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